Ralph A. Skilken and Loretta Skilken v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

420 F.2d 266, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 317, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9645
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedDecember 18, 1969
Docket19275
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 420 F.2d 266 (Ralph A. Skilken and Loretta Skilken v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ralph A. Skilken and Loretta Skilken v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 420 F.2d 266, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 317, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9645 (6th Cir. 1969).

Opinion

WEICK, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal we are called upon to decide whether a partnership is entitled to deduct as business losses amounts allocated to locations terminable at will, which locations were required in its purchase of vending machine businesses and were terminated during the taxable years.

Taxpayer, Ralph A. Skilken 1 , owned a one-third interest in a partnership known as Acme-Miami Vending Service [Acme-Miami], which sold cigarettes, candy and other items through the use of vending machines. Taxpayer’s wife, Loretta Skilken, is a party to these proceedings because she signed a joint income tax return for the taxable years in question.

During 1962 Acme-Miami purchased the businesses of seven competitors in Dayton, Ohio. To determine the price to pay for each of these businesses, a rule of thumb was applied which multiplied the average number of cases of cigarettes sold per week by the machines of the company, times $3,000. Acme-Miami acquired vending machines operating in approximately 922 different locations. The purchase price paid exceeded the fair market value of the tangible property acquired. The excess ($377,-716.30) was capitalized and charged to “location costs” on the partnership books.

In each of the seven acquisitions, the trade name, trademark and goodwill were transferred to Acme-Miami. However, the partnership did not use the name of the former owner, but operated the machines under its own name. In some instances the owners of the premises where the vending machines of the acquired companies were located, did not know the vending business had been sold.

With inconsequential exceptions, there were no leases or agreements in effect with the owners of the premises, to guarantee the continued use of the locations. These agreements were oral, terminable at will, and required the partnership to pay a portion of the receipts to the owners of the premises.

*268 In 1962, 150 locations were lost by reason of terminations of lease contracts; in 1963, 102 locations were lost, and none of them was reacquired. The partnership allocated on its books $35,-885.86 as “location costs” covering the locations which were lost in the year 1962, and $29,943.54 covering those locations lost in the year 1963, and taxpayer deducted these amounts as losses in his tax returns in the respective tax years.

In sustaining the Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency, the Tax Court held—

“* * * that these agreements are similar to ‘customer lists’ and as such should not be accounted for separately, but lumped together as a single asset and treated as good will. Accordingly, * * * no deduction is allowable for partial losses, but must await the final disposition or termination of all the rights under these agreements.” (App. at 65)

We affirm.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the partnership was entitled under § 165 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 2 to take as a loss deduction the vending machine “location costs” for locations that were subject to oral, terminable-at-will contracts, which were in fact terminated.

Section 165 allows a deduction for any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. In order to be allowable as a deduction, “a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events.” 26 C.F.R. § 165-1 (b). The taxpayer urges that loss of the vending machine locations is a closed transaction fixed by identifiable events. It is his position that the purchases from the seven competitors consisted of 922 separate vending machine location agreements, and when 252 of those locations were lost there were closed 252 transactions.

The Tax Court, however, agreed with the Commissioner that the nature of the purchase from the competitors was more akin to a “customer list.” In the customer list cases no depreciation has been allowed to taxpayers, on the ground that a customer list is not an asset which has a determinable, limited useful life.Rather, the lists have been treated as indivisible, intangible mass assets — in the nature of goodwill. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 33 T.C. 1038 (1960), aff’d, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961).

In the “customer list” or “mass asset” cases, the courts have most often been faced with the problem of whether the asset was entitled to depreciation or amortization. However, the issue of whether to permit a loss deduction for partial loss presents analogous problems. In the case of depreciation, a determination of the probable economic life span is crucial in order to determine the probable loss of value over a period of years. The determination of a loss deduction under § 165, on the other hand, is concerned with actual economic loss. However, as in the case of depreciation, a determination of the useful economic life of the asset can be crucial to a determination of the nature of the asset and its value, both of which are interrelated concepts.

At the outset, it is clear that a customer list in the present context is not merely a list of names such as one might find in a telephone book. The distinguishing characteristic of the customer list is a pre-existing business relationship based on a continuous course of dealing. The' list may consist of a group of existing contracts to deal for a set period of time, e. g., David Hoffman, 48 T.C. 176 (1967), and Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, or it may consist of less formal arrangements in which the relationship can be terminated at will by either party, e. g., Anchor Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 22 T.C. 1029 (1954).

*269 It is clear from the facts in the instant case that we are concerned with the latter situation. The agreements with the owners of the premises where the vending machines were located were oral and terminable at will. Merely to characterize a purchased asset as a customer list does not answer the ultimate question of whether it can be depreciated or amortized, or whether a loss deduction can be taken for loss of some of the customers on the list.

In some instances, the individual elements of the customer list have been treated as separate capital assets which could be depreciated or amortized. In David Hoffman, swpra, the taxpayer was permitted to depreciate the value of vending machine locations under contracts which he had purchased. Several factors in that case were determinative. There were individual written contracts for the locations. The contracts did not have automatic renewal provisions, but expired on a specific date and were subject to renegotiation. There was vigorous competition for these locations so that the price offered to the location owner was critical. As a result, taxpayer carefully valued the contracts separately. Under these facts, each contract had an individual, ascertainable, useful life and was, therefore, depreciable. Accord, Seaboard Finance Co., 23 T.C.M.

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Bluebook (online)
420 F.2d 266, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 317, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9645, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ralph-a-skilken-and-loretta-skilken-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca6-1969.