Rakow v. Wenig

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rakow v. Wenig

247 A.D. 812

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 15, 1936

StatusPublished

This text of 247 A.D. 812 (Rakow v. Wenig) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rakow v. Wenig, 247 A.D. 812 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1936).

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Opinion

reversed on the law, with costs, and judgment directed for the plaintiff, with costs. Conclusions of law numbered fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh are reversed, and new conclusions will be made. Since the conveyance by defendant Annie Wenig to defendant 6400-4th Ave. B’klyn, Inc., was an absolute conveyance and was not in satisfaction of an antecedent indebtedness to the Midtown Bank of New York, there was no fair consideration within the meaning of subdivision a of section 272 of the Debtor and Creditor Law. We are of opinion that the decision by the learned trial court may not be construed as finding that the conveyance was “ to secure' a present advance or antecedent debt,” within the meaning of subdivision b of section 272 (supra). Young, Hagarty, Davis, Johnston and Adel, JJ., concur. Settle order on notice.

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reversed on the law, with costs, and judgment directed for the plaintiff, with costs. Conclusions of law numbered fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh are reversed, and new conclusions will be made. Since the conveyance by defendant Annie Wenig to defendant 6400-4th Ave. B’klyn, Inc., was an absolute conveyance and was not in satisfaction of an antecedent indebtedness to the Midtown Bank of New York, there was no fair consideration within the meaning of subdivision a of section 272 of the Debtor and Creditor Law. We are of opinion that the decision by the learned trial court may not be construed as finding that the conveyance was “ to secure' a present advance or antecedent debt,” within the meaning of subdivision b of section 272 (supra). Young, Hagarty, Davis, Johnston and Adel, JJ., concur. Settle order on notice.

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Bluebook (online)

247 A.D. 812, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rakow-v-wenig-nyappdiv-1936.