Filed 8/26/26 Rainey v. Taylor CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PRISCILLA RAINEY, B345426
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21SMCV01514)
v.
JAYCEON TERRELL TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Novian & Novian, Farhad Novian and Sean Raymond Bozarth for Defendant and Appellant.
Borchard & Callahan and Janelle M. Dease for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Jayceon Terrell Taylor appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate the default judgment against him pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).1 Taylor contends plaintiff Priscilla Rainey’s service by publication was invalid because she did not mail the court’s order for publication to his known address. He further asserts that service was ineffective because the summons did not identify the relevant court as the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles; it contained an error in the courthouse address; and the published summons was inconsistent with the original summons in several respects. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Taylor is a recording artist also known as “The Game.” In 2016, Rainey obtained a $7,130,100 judgment against Taylor in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.2 Rainey registered the judgment in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The Complaint In September 2021, Rainey filed this action against Taylor;
JTT Holdings, LLC (JTT Holdings) and F12 & Associates, LLC (F12), of which Taylor was the sole member; Cash M. Jones, Taylor’s manager; 5th Amendment Entertainment, Inc. (5th
1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 In an opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Taylor’s motion for a new trial or a remittitur, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that Taylor “did not take the litigation seriously” and had “evaded process, trolled Rainey on social media, dodged a settlement conference, and did not bother to show up at trial.” (Rainey v. Taylor (7th Cir. 2019) 941 F.3d 243, 247.)
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Amendment), whose sole shareholder is Jones; and Pass Go 2 Win, LLC (Pass Go 2 Win), a company “ostensibly owned and controlled by Jones.”
The complaint alleged that Rainey had collected less than 4 percent of the judgment from Taylor’s royalties prior to filing this action. Over $6.8 million remained outstanding. According to the complaint, Taylor used the other defendants to hide his income and assets. While Rainey’s enforcement efforts were ongoing, Taylor transferred to Jones his interest in JTT Holdings and a property owned by JTT Holdings. Taylor also assigned his trademark “The Game” to Pass Go 2 Win. Taylor boasted in interviews and Instagram posts about flouting his payment obligations to Rainey.
The complaint asserted causes of action for alter ego liability against F12, JTT Holdings, and Taylor; voidable transactions against Jones, JTT Holdings, Pass Go 2 Win, and Taylor; and conspiracy to commit voidable transaction against Jones, JTT Holdings, and Taylor. It sought a judgment holding JTT Holdings and F12 liable for Taylor’s debts to Rainey, charging liens against JTT Holdings’ and F12’s interests, avoidance of the transfers, and a constructive trust. Attempted Service and Publication In September 2022, Rainey filed a motion for order directing service of summons by publication. Rainey had been unable to serve Taylor personally or by substitute service. Taylor lives in a gated residence in Calabasas. A process server acting on Rainey’s behalf approached the residence on six separate occasions but was unable to gain access to the property and received no response at the call box on the gate. On one occasion, Taylor left the residence in his car and the process server
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followed him to an office building. The process server attempted personal service on Taylor there, but Taylor refused to accept. The process server left the papers for Taylor at the front desk of the building, but an employee returned them to the process server. Rainey also mailed the summons, complaint, and a notice and acknowledgement of receipt to Taylor’s residence.
In October 2022, the court granted Rainey’s motion and entered her proposed order. The order instructed that Rainey serve the defendants, including Taylor, by publication in the Los Angeles Daily Journal. It further ordered that a copy of the summons and complaint be mailed to the defendants “if his/its address is ascertained before expiration of the time prescribed for the publication of this summons.” The order required Rainey to file a declaration stating that she had mailed the summons and complaint, or had failed to ascertain an address, at the expiration of the time prescribed for publication.
Rainey filed the proof of publication in November 2022.
The published version of the summons identified Taylor, 5th Amendment, Pass Go 2 Win, and Jones as defendants. It did not list JTT Holdings or F12, which had already been served and defaulted. The published summons identified the name and address of the court as “Santa Monica Courthouse, 725 Main Street, Santa Monica CA 90401.” It provided the name, address, and telephone number of Rainey’s current counsel, which differed from the counsel identified in the original summons.
In January 2023, Rainey’s counsel filed a declaration stating: “During the period of publication of the Summons ordered by the court, no other address of defendant [Taylor] was ascertained.” The clerk entered Taylor’s default at Rainey’s request.
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Default Judgment In December 2023, the court entered a final judgment and permanent injunction against Taylor. It declared JTT Holdings and F12 to be Taylor’s alter egos, and therefore liable for the judgment against Taylor entered in the Northern District of Illinois. It voided the transfer of Taylor’s residence from JTT Holdings to Jones, the conveyance of Taylor’s membership interest in JTT Holdings to Jones, and the assignment of the trademark “The Game” from Taylor to Pass Go 2 Win. The court also enjoined Taylor, Jones, JTT Holdings, F12, and Pass Go 2 Win from transferring, encumbering, dissipating, or conveying Taylor’s Calabasas residence or any property or accounts held by JTT Holdings. Motion to Quash Service and Set Aside Judgment In January 2025, Taylor filed a motion to quash service and set aside the judgment as void. He argued the summons was substantially defective because it failed to properly name the court exercising jurisdiction. He asserted the summons should have identified the court exercising jurisdiction as the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles but instead it stated “Santa Monica Courthouse” and omitted one digit from the courthouse address.3 Taylor also argued the published summons was invalid because it “substantially deviated from the summons issued in this case” by omitting two of the defendants and updating the name of Rainey’s counsel.
Rainey opposed the motion. She argued that it was not incorrect to identify the title of the court as the Santa Monica
3 The address of the Santa Monica Courthouse is 1725 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90401. Both the original and published summons omitted the leading 1.
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Courthouse, there was no statutory requirement to provide the courthouse address, and the file stamp and seal on the summons mailed to Taylor identified the court as the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles. Rainey asserted the omission of two defendants who had already been served was immaterial, and the statute governing service by publication does not require that the summons include the name of the plaintiff’s attorney. She also argued that including the name and contact information of her current counsel was accurate and “bolsters the notification” to Taylor.
In his reply, Taylor argued for the first time that service by publication was invalid because section 415.50, subdivision (b), required the trial court to order Rainey to mail the order for publication to him. The order for publication did not include this requirement and Rainey had not mailed the order for publication to Taylor.
The trial court denied Taylor’s motion. It found the identification of the court as the Santa Monica Courthouse was “an immaterial variation from the title of the court.” Notwithstanding the typo in the address, the court found that the summons “provide[d] sufficient information to put [Taylor] on notice that he was being sued at the Superior Court of Los Angeles (specifically the Santa Monica Courthouse).” The court further found that Taylor failed to show how the omission of JTT Holdings and F12 from the published summons rendered it substantially noncompliant as to Taylor. The court obtained jurisdiction over Taylor because the summons included his name and thus “provid[ed] him with notice and due process.” The court noted: “[T]he theories of the suit are not part of the summons. . . . Summons are not designed to place defendant on notice of the
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legal theories supporting the action, only notice of the action and the timeframe to respond.” Finally, the court held the identification of Rainey’s current attorney substantially complied with statutory requirements. The order did not expressly address Taylor’s argument concerning the mailing of the order for publication, although the parties discussed it at the hearing.
Taylor timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Vacate the Judgment Taylor contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment because service was invalid on several grounds. He argues that Rainey failed to comply with section 415.50, subdivision (b), by not mailing him the order for publication. He further asserts that Rainey failed to comply with the trial court’s order for publication, and thereby violated section 415.50, because she published a summons that differed slightly from the original summons. Finally, Taylor contends the published summons’s incomplete identification of the court and failure to include two of the defendants rendered it substantially noncompliant with section 412.20.
A. Standard of review Section 473, subdivision (d), provides: “The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion . . . set aside any void judgment or order.” “ ‘ “[A] judgment or order that is invalid on the face of the record . . . may be set aside on motion, with no limit on the time within which the motion must be made.” ’ [Citation.] This rule has also been applied when uncontested extrinsic evidence shows that the defendant was never properly served.” (California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th
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207, 215.) Taylor’s arguments rely on the judgment roll and on the undisputed fact that Rainey did not mail the order for publication. We review the issue of whether a judgment is void de novo. (Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961 (Calvert).)
B. Section 415.50 “ ‘Personal service remains the method of choice under the statutes and the constitution.’ [Citation.] Consistent with the notions of fair play and due process, substituted service by publication is ‘a last resort’ when ‘reasonable diligence to locate a person in order to give him notice before resorting to the fictional notice afforded by publication’ has been exercised. [Citation.] ‘If there is any situation in which strict compliance can reasonably be required, it is that of service by publication.’ [Citations.] . . . ‘In order to obtain in personam jurisdiction by a form of constructive service, there must be strict compliance with the requisite statutory procedures.’ [Citation.]” (Calvert, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 963.) Section 415.50 sets forth those procedures. (See also Olvera v. Olvera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32, 41.)
Under section 415.50, subdivision (b), an order authorizing service by publication “shall direct that a copy of the summons, the complaint, and the order for publication be forthwith mailed to the party if his or her address is ascertained before expiration of the time prescribed for publication of the summons.” Taylor contends the “is ascertained” language applies to an address already known to the plaintiff. Thus, Taylor asserts Rainey was required to mail the order for publication to the address at which
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she had previously attempted personal and substituted service of the summons and complaint.4 a. Section 415.50, subdivision (b), did not require Rainey to mail the order for publication
Relying on Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871 (Rios), Rainey argues the obligation to mail the summons, complaint, and order for publication under section 415.50, subdivision (b), arises only if the plaintiff discovers an additional address for the defendant after the order for publication is issued. The plaintiff in Rios filed a complaint for premises liability against the trust that owned the property at issue and its trustees. (Rios, at p. 875.) The plaintiff’s personal investigator made multiple attempts to personally serve the trustee defendants at an address at which they operated a business, and also mailed the summons, complaint, and acknowledgment of receipt to a post office box address for the defendant trust. (Id. at pp. 876–877.) The trustee defendants contacted the plaintiff’s attorney concerning the action but did not cooperate with efforts to serve them. (Ibid.) The plaintiff filed an ex parte application for service by publication, which the court granted. (Id. at pp. 877–878.) Defendants later moved to set the default entered against them
4 Taylor also suggests that reversal is warranted because the trial court erred in failing to direct Rainey to mail the publication order to Taylor. However, Taylor has conceded below and on appeal that any omission in the order would not render service invalid if Rainey nevertheless fully complied with the statutory requirements. As discussed below, Rainey complied with those requirements under the circumstances of this case. We therefore need not separately consider the validity of the trial court’s order for publication.
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aside, and the trial court denied their requests. (Id. at pp. 878– 879.)
On appeal, the defendants argued, in part, that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because the plaintiff “should have mailed defendants a copy of the summons pursuant to section 415.50, subdivision (b),” but failed to do so. (Rios, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 883.) The appellate court disagreed. It concluded the defendants “fail[ed] to show what fact triggered mail service under section 415.50, subdivision (b). Nothing in the record shows that [the plaintiff] discovered an additional address for [defendants] after the publication order issued.” (Ibid.)
Taylor contends the defendants’ argument in Rios only concerned the summons and complaint, and the court therefore did not consider a plaintiff’s obligation to mail the order for publication under section 415.50, subdivision (b). However, the Rios court concluded that no newly discovered facts “triggered mail service.” (Rios, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 883, italics added.) Although the court did not specifically address the order for publication, its analysis applies equally to it.
Like the Rios court, we also conclude that the mailing requirement of section 415.50, subdivision (b), does not apply to an address the plaintiff knew of and used to attempt service before the order for publication issued.
“ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265 (Cornett).) Section 415.50, subdivision (a), states that “[a] summons may be served by
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publication if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified in this article.” The statute thus requires a plaintiff to attempt personal and/or substitute service at any known addresses for the defendant before seeking an order for publication. (Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Hendrix (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 740, 746 [§ “415.50 motion was defective as a matter of law” where plaintiff “knew [defendant’s] post office address and that his mail was being picked up from that box” but did not attempt service by mail].)
Section 415.50, subdivision (b), then provides that an order for publication “shall direct that a copy of the summons, the complaint, and the order for publication be forthwith mailed to the party if his or her address is ascertained before expiration of the time prescribed for publication of the summons.” “Ascertain” means “to find out or learn with certainty,” and implies the discovery of new information.5 Considering subdivisions (a) and (b) together, we conclude the only logical reading of the statute is that the summons, complaint, and order for publication must be mailed to any address discovered after the order for publication was issued, not to an address where the plaintiff previously diligently attempted service.
5 Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ascertain> (as of Aug. 25, 2026), archived at <https://perma.cc/B3HD-N8CJ>.
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To the extent the statutory language is ambiguous, the legislative history supports this interpretation.6 Section 415.50 “was based upon a recommendation of the Judicial Council in its 1969 report to the Legislature.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434; see Judicial Council of Cal., Ann. Rep. to Gov. & Legis. (1969) (Judicial Council Report).) “[T]he Judicial Council ‘Report was adopted by the Legislature as a statement of legislative intent.’ [Citation.]” (Dill, at p. 1435, fn. 6.) With respect to section 415.50, subdivision (b), the Judicial Council Report stated:
“[I]f a defendant’s address is known before an order is made for publication, service must be effectuated by another method of service specified in this article. However, if defendant’s address is ascertained after such order and prior to completion of the full publication of summons, only a copy of the summons and a copy of the complaint must be mailed to him. (Compare former Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 413.) The latter requirement is designed to give defendant actual notice of the action, since publication of summons in a newspaper is not likely to result in such notice.” (Judicial Council Report, supra, p. 50, italics added.)
6 “If . . . ‘the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, “ ‘ “courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Cornett, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1265.)
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Furthermore, we presume the Legislature would have retained the language of section 415.50, subdivision (b)’s predecessor if it intended to require a plaintiff to mail the summons and complaint to a previously known address of the defendant. Former section 413 stated: “In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is known, the court . . . must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited in the post office, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence.” (Stats. 1957, ch. 1669, p. 3049, italics added.) The Legislature chose to replace “known” with “is ascertained.” Taylor’s reading of the statute fails to give effect to the Legislature’s rejection of the former language. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Farley) (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 315, 332 [“ ‘Legislature’s rejection of specific language constitutes persuasive evidence a statute should not be interpreted to include the omitted language’ ”].)
Taylor concedes that Rainey was not required to mail the summons and complaint again but argues she was required to mail the order for publication because she had not previously done so. We recognize the Judicial Council Report relates to the original form of section 415.50, subdivision (b), which did not require a plaintiff to mail the order for publication with the summons and complaint. (Compare Stats. 1969, ch. 1610, pp. 3367–3368 with Stats. 1984, ch. 352, p. 1646.) However, when the Legislature added the requirement that a plaintiff must also mail the order for publication, it retained the “is ascertained” phrasing and made no other relevant changes. This suggests the Legislature did not intend to treat orders for publication differently than the summons and complaint under the amended provision. We conclude a plaintiff is required to mail the order
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for publication, along with the summons and complaint, only if “defendant’s address is ascertained after such order and prior to completion of the full publication of summons.”7 (Judicial Council Report, supra, at p. 50, italics added.)
Rainey was not required to mail the order for publication.
The trial court properly found that she complied with section 415.50.
b. Differences between the published and original versions of the summons did not violate section 415.50 or invalidate service Taylor also attempts to characterize inconsistencies between the original summons and the published version as a failure to comply with the order for publication. He asserts this is also a violation of section 415.50 subject to a strict compliance analysis. We reject this argument.
7 The Conference of Delegates of the State Bar initiated the change in the law, and “state[d] that when a summons and complaint arrive in the mail pursuant to an order authorizing service by publication, it is ‘frequently misinterpreted both by lay persons and by counsel as an ineffective attempt at personal or substituted service.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2790 (1983–1984 Reg. Sess.), as amended Mar. 14, 1984, p. 2.) The requirement of mailing the order for publication was intended to “increase the likelihood that a defendant will understand that service by publication has been authorized and take appropriate steps to protect his or her interests.” (Ibid.) The legislative history does not suggest the statute was intended to change the circumstances under which the mailing of the summons and complaint is required in the first place. Rather, the amendment addressed the confusion that may understandably arise when a defendant obtains notice of an action for the first time from a seemingly invalid service attempt.
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As an initial matter, Taylor’s contention that Rainey ignored the trial court’s order and published “some completely different document” from the original summons is unconvincing. Apart from the omission of two defendant names and the substitution of the contact information for Rainey’s counsel, the published summons was the same as the original. Nonetheless, Taylor asserts that because a plaintiff must strictly comply with section 415.50’s requirements, the nature of the differences is immaterial. As we understand his argument, although section 415.50 does not address the content of the summons to be published, Taylor asserts that the statute directs the trial court to “order the summons to be published.” As a result, if the plaintiff publishes anything other than the original summons, the plaintiff has not strictly complied with the trial court order and has, therefore, not strictly complied with section 415.50.
Yet, as Taylor concedes, courts have concluded that discrepancies between the served copy of a summons and the original do not invalidate service unless they are substantial and misleading. (People v. Davis (1904) 143 Cal. 673, 677 (Davis) [judgment not void on its face based on discrepancies between published summons and original where discrepancies were few, “very slight,” and “not capable of misleading the defendant as to the nature of the proceeding”]; Sharp v. Daugney (1867) 33 Cal. 505, 513 [“purely literal, and quite microscopic” discrepancies between original and published summons did not defeat court’s jurisdiction over defendant]; Hershenson v. Hershenson (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 382, 385 [“Errors or omissions in conforming a copy of a summons to the original do not justify quashing service
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unless the party served has been misled or his substantial rights affected.”].)8 Here, the published summons’s omission of the two defaulted defendants and identification of Rainey’s current counsel was not misleading and did not affect Taylor’s substantial rights. Those differences did not invalidate service.
A summons cannot accomplish service on a defendant who is not named in it. (Lyman v. Milton (1872) 44 Cal. 630, 634–635, disapproved on another ground in In re Clarke (1899) 125 Cal. 388, 392.) While the published summons was therefore ineffective as to JTT Holdings and F12 (which had already been served), it undisputedly identified Taylor and put him on notice of the proceeding and the need to take action.
Taylor contends the omission of JTT Holdings and F12 was misleading because the complaint contained alter ego allegations concerning those defendants and “the judgment contained relief that was only possible if parties not named in the published summons were parties to the action.” But as the trial court aptly
8 Taylor contends in his reply brief that because the order for publication was not part of the judgment roll under the law applicable to the judgment in Davis, that case “could not reach the question of whether the non-identical published summons violated that order.” Regardless of whether Davis directly rebuts Taylor’s claim that the substance of a published summons is subject to the strict compliance analysis that applies to the procedural requirements of the publication statute, it establishes that a “summons [that] was not published as issued” does not void a judgment unless the differences are misleading. (Davis, supra, 143 Cal. at p. 677.) It is Taylor’s burden to establish that a different rule applies when the order for publication is part of the judgment roll. He cites no pertinent authority for that proposition.
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put it: “Summons are not designed to place defendant on notice of the legal theories supporting the action, only notice of the action and the timeframe to respond.” (See § 412.20 generally; Stanquist v. Hebbard (1898) 122 Cal. 268, 269 [rejecting argument that summons was void “because it does not state the nature of the cause of action alleged against defendant,” since former § 407 did not require identification of causes of action].) That the summons did not provide insight into the relief Rainey might obtain does not render it misleading.
Taylor does not argue that Rainey’s identification of her current counsel in the published summons was misleading. In his reply brief, he acknowledges: “Obviously, correcting the attorney information would cause no prejudice . . . .” Indeed, we fail to see how providing contact information for counsel best positioned to respond to inquiries about the case could be adverse to Taylor’s substantial rights.
We reject Taylor’s argument that the inconsistencies between the two versions of the summons constituted a violation of the trial court’s order and, as a result, Rainey failed to strictly comply with section 415.50. The only authority Taylor relies upon to support this argument is Calvert, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 954, however, that reliance is misplaced. The plaintiff in Calvert published the summons in a different and smaller newspaper than the one the trial court identified in the order for publication. (Id. at p. 960.) The appellate court held the subsequently entered default judgment was void on its face. (Id. at p. 962.) It observed that “[s]ection 415.50 states that the ‘court shall order the summons to be published in a named newspaper, published in this state, that is most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served,’ ” and concluded “[p]ublication in the newspaper
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named by the court is essential, as it ensures notice is given via the periodical that the trial court finds most likely to give the defendant notice.” (Ibid.) In that context, the court noted that, “ ‘[i]n order to obtain in personam jurisdiction by a form of constructive service, there must be strict compliance with the requisite statutory procedures.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 963, italics added.)
Thus, in Calvert, the trial court’s order directing publication in a particular newspaper effectuated a specific statutory requirement in section 415.50, subdivision (b). The plaintiffs’ failure to comply with that order necessarily meant they did not strictly comply with section 415.50’s procedural requirements. Taylor has not identified any similar specific statutory requirements in this case. He further cites no authority to support his argument that section 415.50’s reference to “the summons” is an indication that any difference between the original summons and the published version is necessarily a violation of section 415.50. We disagree that the Calvert court’s reasoning may be so extended in this way, in conflict with other caselaw.
C. The published summons substantially complied with section 412.20
Taylor also contends the published summons’s identification of the court and omission of JTT Holdings and F12 was substantially defective and noncompliant with section 412.20. We again disagree.
Section 412.20 provides that “a summons shall be directed to the defendant, signed by the clerk and issued under the seal of the court in which the action is pending, and it shall contain,” among other things, “[t]he title of the court in which the action is
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pending,” “[t]he names of the parties to the action,” and “[a] direction that the defendant file with the court a written pleading in response to the complaint within 30 days after summons is served on the defendant.” (§ 412.20, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) The requirements of section 412.20 are “mandatory, but the rule of liberal construction is followed and minor variations in form are not fatal.” (Judicial Council Report, supra, p. 39.) Courts have applied a substantial compliance standard to the contents of a summons. (Ystrom v. Handel (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 144, 151– 152; MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557.)
In Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 852 (Carol Gilbert), the court found that substantial compliance with the statutory summons requirements requires three preconditions: 1) “some degree of compliance with the offended statutory requirements”; 2) “the objective nature and circumstances of the attempted service must have made it ‘ “ ‘highly probable’ ” ’ that it would impart the same notice as full compliance”; and 3) the summons “must in fact have imparted such notice, or at least sufficient notice to put the defendant on his defense.” (Id. at pp. 865–866.) The appellate court concluded the summons served in that case was not substantially compliant because it “contained no indication whatever that [the defendant] was being sued by a fictitious name, or indeed that he was being sued at all,” “did not by its terms command him to do anything,” and did “not warn him of adverse consequences if he failed.” (Id. at p. 866.)
Taylor relies on Carol Gilbert in his appellate briefing.
However, the problems with the summons Taylor identifies are distinguishable from the deficiencies in Carol Gilbert. The
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published summons here substantially complied with the requirements of section 412.20.9 a. Identification of court There was “some degree of compliance” in the published summons’s identification of the relevant court as the Santa Monica Courthouse. The Santa Monica Courthouse is a location of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles. Notwithstanding the typo in the address, the summons identified the correct city, street, and zip code of the courthouse. The summons also advised Taylor that he could locate forms to use for his response at a county law library or his local courthouse and that he “may want to call an attorney right away.” To the extent the summons might have resulted in any confusion about the court in which Rainey had filed suit against Taylor, a court clerk, law librarian, or attorney could have promptly resolved it.
In addition, the mailed version of the summons had a Superior Court file stamp and included the seal of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Rainey’s prior service attempt by mail was to an address where Taylor undisputedly resided. Considered in their totality, the circumstances of the “attempted service” made it highly probable that the incomplete identification of the court in the published summons imparted the same notice to Taylor as he would have received had it
9 Schering Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 737, on which Taylor repeatedly relies, is also distinguishable. Schering involved a summons that did not clearly disclose that the individual served was being served on behalf of a corporation. (Id. at p. 742.) The objective circumstances of service suggested that he was being served as a Doe defendant. (Ibid.) The published summons here clearly disclosed that Rainey was suing Taylor as an individual.
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identified the court as the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles.
Finally, the published summons clearly gave Taylor notice of the proceedings and the consequences if he failed to act.
b. Omission of defaulted defendants Taylor argues the omission of the defaulted defendants rendered the published summons substantially defective because it did not comply with the literal terms of section 412.20, which provide the summons shall contain “[t]he names of the parties to the action.” (§ 412.20, subd. (a)(2).) However, the doctrine of substantial compliance “ ‘ “ ‘excuses literal noncompliance only when there has been “actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (The Chemical Toxin Working Group, Inc. v. The Kroger Co. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 276, 290.)
Taylor does not identify any objectives of the statute or explain how the omission of JTT Holdings and F12 frustrated them. The published summons gave Taylor notice of the proceedings and put him on his defense. Rainey also mailed the original summons and complaint to Taylor’s undisputed address. The complaint identified all defendants, causes of action, and the relief sought.
We conclude the published summons was substantially compliant with section 412.20.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to vacate the judgment is affirmed. Rainey shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.