Raineri v. Hillsborough
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
March 29, 1994
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 93-1725
BRUCE T. RAINERI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, Senior U.S. District Judge]
__________________________
____________________
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
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____________________
Bruce T. Raineri on brief pro se.
________________
Carolyn M. Kirby, Assistant County Attorney, on brief for
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appellee Hillsborough County House of Corrections.
Wilbur A. Glahn, III, McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton,
_______________________ ________________________________________
Professional Association, Duane, Morris & Heckscher, Allen C. Warshaw,
________________________ _________________________ ________________
and Mary P. Patterson on brief for appellee Pennsylvania Institutional
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Health Services, Inc.
Amy L. Fracassini, Robert J. Lanney, and Sulloway & Hollis on
__________________ _________________ __________________
brief for appellee Barbara Condon.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Appellant Bruce T. Raineri appeals
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from the dismissal of his complaint based on 42 U.C.S.
1983. He asserted that health providers at the New Hampshire
jail where he was incarcerated violated the Eighth Amendment
by providing constitutionally deficient medical care. After
carefully reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties,
we agree with the reasoning of the district court contained
in its Order, dated June 24, 1993. We add the following
comments concerning the grant of summary judgment to appellee
Barbara Condon and the dismissal of the complaint against
Hillsborough County House of Corrections (Hillsborough) and
its medical provider, Pennsylvania Institutional Health
Services, Inc. (PIHS).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the
moving party must "show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once
the movant has met this standard, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to establish the existence of "at least one
issue that is both `genuine' and `material.'" Kelly v.
_____
United States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation
_____________
omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In support of her motion for summary judgment,
Condon submitted her own affidavit and appellant's medical
records. She argues, and the dispensary cards (which
chronicle each contact appellant had with the medical staff)
show, that the first time appellant brought up the problem
with the timing of his morning dose of insulin was on
September 28 or 29, 1992. About three days later, Condon
instituted the change in the time at which appellant ate
breakfast to conform to his request that the insulin be given
within one-half hour of his morning meal. The rest of the
dispensary cards reveal that from June 23, 1992 until
September 28, 1992, insulin was given to appellant daily,
apparently without complaint.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion,
appellant did not file any affidavits or other record
evidence
However, his complaint is "verified" in the sense that it was
made under "the pains and penalties of perjury." In
Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259 (1st Cir. 1991), we held
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that, under certain circumstances, a verified complaint can
suffice for Rule 56 purposes. Id. at 1262. Thus, the
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factual statements in the complaint, to the extent they can
be deemed to come within appellant's knowledge, are "fully
tantamount to a counter-affidavit, and hence, worthy of
consideration." Id. at 1262-63. Conclusory allegations are
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disregarded. Id. at 1262.
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To state an Eighth Amendment claim, appellant must
adduce evidence concerning his medical treatment that raises
-3-
an inference that Condon's actions amounted to the wanton
infliction of unnecessary pain. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
___ _______ ______
U.S. 97, 104 (1976). "Deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners" satisfies this standard. Id. In
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turn, this standard has two components: (1) the subjection
of the prisoner to a "sufficiently serious deprivation"; and
(2) acts that amount to "wanton disregard" of the rights of
the inmate. DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir.
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1991). Negligence and inadvertence in providing medical
treatment do not state a valid claim of deliberate
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