Raine v. BrandSafeway

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Louisiana
DecidedSeptember 20, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00265
StatusUnknown

This text of Raine v. BrandSafeway (Raine v. BrandSafeway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raine v. BrandSafeway, (M.D. La. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LEILANI RAINE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-265-BAJ-RLB

BRANDSAFEWAY LLC, ET AL.

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses filed on August 28, 2024. (R. Doc. 8). The deadline to file an opposition has expired. LR 7(f). Accordingly, the motion is unopposed. I. Background On or about April 13, 2023, Leilani Raine (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action in the 23rd Judicial District Court, Ascension Parish, Louisiana, naming as defendant BrandSafeway [LLC] (“Defendant”) and the fictitious entity XYZ Insurance Company. (R. Doc. 1-1 at 11-13). Plaintiff alleges that she suffered personal injuries while working as an asbestos worker at the BASF plaint in Geismar, Louisiana when she “tripped and fell due to a defective and unreasonably dangerous scaffolding entryway that had been constructed by [Defendant].” (R. Doc. 1-1 at 11- 12). Defendant removed this action on April 3, 2024, asserting that an exercise of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is proper. (R. Doc. 1). On June 24, 2024, Defendant served its First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, which consist of 23 interrogatories and 36 requests for production. (R. Doc. 8-2). Request for Production No. 33 seeks Plaintiff’s written authorization consenting to the release of medical, employment, government, and financial records. After Plaintiff failed to provide responses to these discovery requests, the parties held a discovery conference on July 15, in which Plaintiff’s counsel obtained an extension until July 22, 2024 to provide responses. (R Docs. 8-3, 8-4). No responses were provided. Defendant then informed Plaintiff that a motion to compel would be filed if responses were not received by July 26, 2024. (R. Doc. 8-5). On July 24, 2024, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Entry of Protective Order. (R. Doc. 6). The Court granted the motion and entered the Protective Order, which governs the exchange

of confidential information in discovery, into the record. (R. Doc. 7). It is unclear whether counsel for the parties discussed another extension of Plaintiff’s deadline to provide discovery responses. At any rate, on August 15, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel mailed a copy of Plaintiff’s responses to the discovery requests, stating in the cover letter that because Plaintiff lives out of state, Plaintiff’s counsel would be providing signed releases once she returns to his office. (R. Doc. 8-7 at 1). On August 20, 2024, defense counsel sent an email stating that if Defendant did not receive “verified responses and signed authorizations” by August 27 at noon, that Defendant would file a motion to compel. (R. Doc. 8-8).

On August 28, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Compel (R. Doc. 8), which seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to provide signed interrogatory responses and written authorizations and an award of reasonable fees. Plaintiff failed to respond to the instant Motion to Compel with a timely opposition. See LR 7(f). II. Law and Analysis A. General Legal Standards for Discovery “Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that: “(i) the

discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific

demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)). B. Verification of Interrogatories Plaintiff did not sign or verify, under oath, any of her 23 answers to Defendant’s interrogatories. Rule 33(b)(3) provides that “[e]ach interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3); see Dugas v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 12-02885, 2014 WL 458083, at *2 (W.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014) (warning counsel that “verification of discovery responses is required” by Rule 33(b)(3) and noting that “further violation of that requirement will not be tolerated). Furthermore, Rule 33(b)(5) provides that the “person who makes the answers must sign them and the attorney who objects must sign any objections.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5). Given the foregoing, the Court will order Plaintiff to sign and verify, under oath, her

answers to Defendant’s interrogatories within 7 days of the date of this Order. See Brown v. Clark, No. 18-1069, 2019 WL 3728274 (M.D. La. Aug. 7, 2019). C. Signed Authorization Forms Defendant’s Request for Production No. 33 requests Plaintiff to provide written authorization consenting to the release of medical, employment, government, and financial records. (R. Doc. 8-2 at 15-16). Defendant provided the blank authorization forms. (R. Doc. 8-2 at 20-43). Plaintiff did not object to Request for Production No. 33. Instead, Plaintiff responded with “Attached.” (R. Doc. 8-7 at 11). Plaintiff did not, however, provide signed authorization

forms. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s counsel represented that Plaintiff would sign the authorization forms the next time she traveled to Louisiana and visited Plaintiff’s counsel’s office. (R. Doc. 8-7 at 1). Plaintiff’s counsel did not provide a time frame for when these authorizations would be provided or otherwise explain why Plaintiff could not sign and return the forms by electronic means. The Fifth Circuit has suggested, in dicta, that Rule 34 may be an appropriate mechanism by which to require a party to sign an authorization form. See McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982). Various district courts have compelled parties to sign authorization forms. see Baqer v. St. Tammany Par.

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Related

In Re Terra International, Inc.
134 F.3d 302 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)
In Re United States of America
864 F.2d 1153 (Fifth Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Garrett
571 F.2d 1323 (Fifth Circuit, 1978)

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Raine v. BrandSafeway, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raine-v-brandsafeway-lamd-2024.