Railroad Commission v. Riley

218 P. 415, 192 Cal. 54, 1923 Cal. LEXIS 316
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 14, 1923
DocketS. F. No. 10785.
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 218 P. 415 (Railroad Commission v. Riley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Railroad Commission v. Riley, 218 P. 415, 192 Cal. 54, 1923 Cal. LEXIS 316 (Cal. 1923).

Opinion

LENNON, J.

This is an application for a writ of mandate directing the respondent, Ray L. Riley, as controller of the state of California, to examine and settle the account of the state Railroad Commission covering and controlling certain fees collected by said Commission pursuant to the provisions of section 57 of the Public Utilities Act (Stats. 1915, c. 91, p. 115), and to certify the amount thereof to the treasurer of the state of California for deposit by him to the credit of the Railroad Commission fund.

Section 57 of the Public Utilities Act provides for the collection of fees by the Railroad Commission for the following purposes: (1) For certificates issued by the Commission pursuant to section 52 of the Public Utilities Act, authorizing the issuance of bonds, notes, and other evidences of indebtedness by public utilities; (2) for certified copies of official documents and orders filed in the Commission’s office and for annual reports, transcripts of evidence and proceedings before the Commission, and (3) for various reports and publications issued under the Commission’s authority. By the same section it is provided that all of the fees charged and collected thereunder “shall be paid, at least once each week, accompanied by a detailed statement thereof, into the treasury of the state to the credit of a fund to be known as the ‘Railroad Commission Fund.’ ” Section 85 of the same act provides that the fees so charged and collected are specifically appropriated to be used by the Railroad Commission in carrying out the provisions of the Public Utilities Act.

Between July 1, 1923, and July 6, 1923, the Railroad Commission, acting under and in pursuance of the provisions of said section 57 of the Public Utilities Act, charged and collected certain fees aggregating in amount the sum of $477.45. This money was thereafter transmitted by the Railroad Commission to the treasurer of the state of California, with a request that said treasurer deposit the same to the credit of the “Railroad Commission Fund.” At the same time the Railroad Commission transmitted a report of the fees so collected to the respondent, Ray L. Riley, controller of the state *56 of California, requesting him to examine and settle the account of the Railroad Commission as set forth in said report, and to certify the amounts stated therein to the treasurer of the state of California for deposit by him to the credit of the “Railroad Commission Fund.” Respondent refused to credit said sum to the “Railroad Commission Fund.”

No claim has been made, and of course no claim could be made, that the provisions of the Public Utilities Act creating the fund known as the Railroad Commission fund and appropriating the same to the use of the Railroad Commission are expressly repealed by the enactment of either the constitutional provision known as the “budget amendment” (art. IV, sec. 34, Const.) or the “budget bill” (Stats. 1923, c. 121). Nowhere in either of these enactments is there any attempt made to repeal the statute directing the collection of the revenue and specifying the fund into which the revenue is to be paid, nor is there a specific provision requiring that the revenue so collected be transferred to the general fund. In the absence of such express provisions there can, of course, be no express repeal.

It is contended, however, in support of the respondent’s refusal to credit the sum in controversy to the “Railroad Commission Fund,” that the constitutional provision for the budget bill, together with the budget bill itself, operated necessarily as an implied repeal of all appropriations made and existing pursuant to the provisions of statutes which preceded the preparation and presentation of the budget bill, and thereby, in effect, demitted and diverted all special funds into the general fund.

If section 57 of the Public Utilities Act has not been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation, then, of course, it is the plain duty of the state controller, in accordance with the provisions of section 433, subdivision 11, and section 434 of the Political Code, to examine and settle the account transmitted to him by the Railroad Commission and to certify the amount thereof to the treasurer, to be credited to the “Railroad Commission Fund.”

In support of the contention of the existence of a repeal by necessary implication it is urged that it was intended by the “budget amendment” to provide a scheme whereby each and every state expenditure, of whatsoever nature, during the biennial period following the enactment of the “budget bill,” was to be provided for. in the “budget bill,” and that *57 the “budget bill' was to become the single and exclusive source of all state appropriations and that the result of the passage of the constitutional provisions providing for such a scheme was to repeal by implication all previous statutes providing for continuing all recurrent appropriations. Repeals by implication are not favored and are recognized only when there is an irreconcilable conflict between two or more existing legislative enactments. (Malone v. Bosch, 104 Cal. 680 [38 Pac. 516] ; Rowe v. Hibernia etc. Society, 134 Cal. 403 [66 Pac. 569] ; Estate of Brewer, 156 Cal. 89 [103 Pac. 486].) There is a difference in the language of the constitutional amendment of this state and that of the other states, and whatever may have been the purpose and intent of the budget bills of other states, the language employed in the California constitutional provision clearly indicates that the “budget bill” was not intended to become the single and exclusive source of all state appropriations. This necessarily follows from the fact that it is provided in the constitutional amendment itself that other appropriation bills may be enacted. The only limitation which is placed upon other possible appropriation bills is that neither house shall place upon final passage any other appropriation bill until the budget bill has been finally enacted, and that no bill making an appropriation of money, except the budget bill, shall contain more than one item of appropriation, and that for one single and certain purpose to be therein expressed.

Furthermore, instead of there being any indication in the “budget amendment” of an intent to repeal appropriations validly made and provided for by existing law, there is, on the contrary, a clear intent shown to provide for a scheme of appropriation for a biennial period whereby all prior appropriations validly made and provided by existing law are to continue. It is expressly provided in the “budget amendment” that the “governor shall, within the first thirty days of each regular session . . . , submit to the legislature, ... a budget containing a complete plan and itemized statement of all proposed expenditures of the state provided by existing law or recommended by him. ...” It further provides that the budget shall be accompanied by an appropriation bill covering the proposed expenditures, to be known as the “budget bill.” In .other words, the “budget amendment” expressly provides that appropriations made *58 by existing law shall be provided for by appropriations in the budget bill. 'This falls far short of showing an intent to repeal these appropriations.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
218 P. 415, 192 Cal. 54, 1923 Cal. LEXIS 316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/railroad-commission-v-riley-cal-1923.