Railcar Management LLC v. Cedar AI, Inc

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided July 10, 2023·No. 2:21-cv-00437·Unknown

Opinion

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3 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 RAILCAR MANAGEMENT, LLC, 7 Plaintiff, 8 v. CEDAR AI, INC.; MARIO PONTICELLO; 9 DARIL VILHENA; and YI CHEN, C21-0437 TSZ 10 Defendants, MINUTE ORDER v. 11 WABTEC CORPORATION, 12 Third-Party Defendant. 13 The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable 14 Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge: 15 (1) The motion to compel, docket no. 190, brought by defendant Cedar AI, Inc. (“Cedar”), is STRICKEN in part, GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, DEFERRED in 16 part, and RENOTED to August 18, 2023, as explained further below. By Minute Order entered May 18, 2023, docket no. 207, the Court deferred ruling on Cedar’s motion to 17 compel, in which Cedar asked the Court to require plaintiff Railcar Management, LLC (“Railcar”) to produce the communications or documents relating to 103 entries on 18 Railcar’s privilege log. See Kaiser Decl. at ¶ 9 & Ex. G (docket nos. 191 & 195). The Court allowed Cedar to designate up to twenty (20) privilege log entries that it believed 19 related to materials not protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine, and directed Railcar to provide to the Court for in camera review the documents 20 associated with the designated log entries. Of the twenty (20) entries identified by Cedar, see Notice (docket no. 209), Railcar conceded that eight (8) involved items as to which 21 the attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product doctrine were/was not appropriately invoked, and those eight (8) items were produced to Cedar. See Exs. B, D, & F–K to 22 Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241). Railcar also disclosed in redacted form the materials 1 associated with four (4) other privilege log entries, but it has not explained why those redacted versions could not have been provided before Cedar filed its motion to compel. 2 See Pl.’s Supp. Br. at 7–8 (docket no. 223) (indicating merely that redacted versions of RMI_PLOG_0038, RMI_PLOG_133, RMI_PLOG_182, and RMI_PLOG_204 have been 3 produced). The Court has conducted an in camera review of the unredacted versions of these four (4) items, as well as of the remaining eight (8) documents on Cedar’s original 4 list, and hereby ORDERS as follows. 5 (a) Cedar’s motion to compel, docket no. 190, is STRICKEN as moot with regard to the following eight (8) privilege log entries: 6 • RMI_PLOG_0001 (Ex. F to Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241-4)) 7 • RMI_PLOG_0003 (Ex. G to Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241-5)) • RMI_PLOG_0095 (Ex. H to Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241-6)) 8 • RMI_PLOG_0108 (Ex. D to Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241-2)) • RMI_PLOG_0123 (Ex. I to Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241-7)) 9 • RMI_PLOG_0125 (Ex. B to Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241-1)) • RMI_PLOG_0137 (Ex. J to Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241-8)) 10 • RMI_PLOG_0142 (Ex. K to Kaiser Decl. (docket no. 241-9)) 11 Although Railcar should have produced these materials before Cedar filed its motion to compel, the Court will not, for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees 12 and/or costs, treat Cedar as having prevailed on its motion with respect to the above-enumerated items. 13 (b) Cedar’s motion to compel, docket no. 190, is GRANTED as to the 14 following privilege log entries: (i) Pages 1–9 of RMI_PLOG_00261; 15 (ii) RMI_PLOG_0038; 16

17 1 In addition to the first nine pages, which are printouts of an email between two employees of third-party defendant Wabtec Corporation (“Wabtec”), namely Andrew G. Parker, Senior 18 Director of Rail Product Solutions, and Quincy Castro, former chief security officer, Item (i) (RMI_PLOG_0026) contains a 250-page spreadsheet with unlabeled columns that appear to 19 contain times ranging from 5:23 a.m. through 2:39 p.m. on January 9, 2019, Internet Protocol addresses, and computer activities. The spreadsheet appears to be the “extract on the CIC TMS 20 system called ‘CEDAR AI ONLINE’” that is referenced in Parker’s email to Castro, but absent further information about this spreadsheet, the Court will not require that it be disclosed to Cedar in unredacted form. The parties shall meet and confer concerning whether the spreadsheet 21 contains data that is proprietary to a third party or to Railcar or Wabtec, and if so, whether it may be produced in unredacted or redacted form subject to the terms of the Stipulated Protective 22 Order, docket no. 79. 1 (iii) RMI_PLOG_0074 and RMI_PLOG_0196,2 which appear to be the same document; 2 (iv) RMI_PLOG_0167; 3 (v) RMI_PLOG_0168; (vi) RMI_PLOG_0171; and 4 (vii) RMI_PLOG_0172. 5 All of these entries relate to items containing purely factual matter, which is not shielded by the attorney-client privilege even when transmitted between an 6 attorney and his or her client. See In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 329 F.R.D. 656, 661 (D. Or. 2019) (applying Washington law and 7 quoting Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 186 Wn.2d 769, 777–78, 381 P.3d 1188 (2016)); see also Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 887 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) 8 (“Because the attorney-client relationship is created and controlled by state law, the nature and extent of the attorney-client privilege is defined by state law.” 9 (citing inter alia Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960))). Although the emails contained in Items (i) and (ii) are marked “Privileged and Confidential / 10 Attorney-Client Communication,” no lawyer was copied on the emails. Items (iii), (v), (vi), and (vii) do not identify an author or include a recipient list, and Railcar’s 11 post hoc representations that the materials were prepared at Wabtec’s attorney’s direction and/or were presented to in-house or outside legal counsel do not show 12 that the communications were “made in confidence and in the context of an attorney-client relationship.” Newman, 186 Wn.2d at 777; see also Youngs v. 13 PeaceHealth, 179 Wn.2d 645, 653, 316 P.3d 1035 (2014) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege protects the privileged communications only–not the facts transmitted in 14 those communications. Facts are proper subjects of investigation and discovery, even if they are also the subject of privileged communications.”). Item (iv) is a 15 contract between Wabtec and CrowdStrike Services, Inc. (“CrowdStrike”) titled “Statement of Work.” Although Wabtec’s lawyer signed the document, the 16 subject matter of the agreement did not relate to the giving or obtaining of legal advice. The Statement of Work was prepared for a purpose entirely separate from 17 Wabtec or Railcar consulting with their attorneys; it operates to bind Wabtec and CrowdStrike to their respective duties in a business transaction, and the contract 18 was intended to be seen by persons other than Wabtec and its attorneys, namely,

19 2 Although Appendix A in RMI_PLOG_0074 and RMI_PLOG_0196 is titled “Legal FAQs,” the 20 information set forth therein is of a factual nature and therefore not protected by attorney-client privilege. Moreover, the document contains certain “security recommendations,” which 21 indicates it was prepared for at least one purpose other than litigation. Because the report discusses certain Railcar and/or Wabtec clients, Railcar may elect to designate the material as 22 “Attorney’s Eyes Only” pursuant to the Stipulated Protective Order, docket no. 79. 1 employees or independent contractors of CrowdStrike who would or did conduct the investigation and needed to understand the scope of their responsibilities. See 2 In re Premera Blue Cross, 329 F.R.D. at 661 (citing Mechling v. City of Monroe, 152 Wn. App. 830, 853,

Railcar Management LLC v. Cedar AI, Inc, (W.D. Wash. 2023).

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Related

Mechling v. City of Monroe
222 P.3d 808 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2009)
Youngs v. PeaceHealth
316 P.3d 1035 (Washington Supreme Court, 2014)
Newman v. Highland School District No. 203
381 P.3d 1188 (Washington Supreme Court, 2016)
Mechling v. City of Monroe
152 Wash. App. 830 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2009)
Baird v. Koerner
279 F.2d 623 (Ninth Circuit, 1960)