Rail Intermodal Specialists, Inc. v. General Electric Capital Corp.

103 F.3d 627, 1996 WL 731894
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedDecember 23, 1996
Docket95-3821, 95-3929
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 103 F.3d 627 (Rail Intermodal Specialists, Inc. v. General Electric Capital Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rail Intermodal Specialists, Inc. v. General Electric Capital Corp., 103 F.3d 627, 1996 WL 731894 (8th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC”) appeals from a judgment entered against it in an action brought by Rail Inter-modal Specialists (“Intermodal”) for intentional interference with an existing contract. GECC asserts that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and asks, in the alternative, for a new trial due to errors in the district court’s instructions to the jury. Intermodal cross-appeals from certain evidentiary rulings. The case, here under our diversity jurisdiction, is governed by Iowa law. Because we believe that GECC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that the cross-appeal is without merit, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

I.

The contract at issue in this case was between Intermodal and a small railroad company called the Chicago Central and Pacific Railroad (“CC&P”). CC&P came into existence in December of 1985 when GECC lent John E. Haley $75 million to purchase a rail line from the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad. Mr. Haley, whose primary work experience was in real estate and property management,’ had first ventured into the railroad business the year before when he bought the Cedar Valley Railroad, also from the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad.

Intermodal is a company that brokers the placement of trucks on flatbed railroad cars. The business moves goods by a combination of trucking and railroad more cheaply than can be done by either mode by itself. Thomas Hastings, president of Intermodal, learned of the impending sale of the railroad to Mr. Haley through the newspaper, and called him to talk about the possibility of having Inter-modal traffic on CC&P. An agreement between the two companies followed in December of 1985.

The contract at issue here was not the original one but one signed the following year. While under the first contract Inter-modal paid an amount directly proportional to the volume of traffic it ran, under the second contract Intermodal paid a fixed amount of $6,106 a day for a train dedicated only to Intermodal’s traffic. Under this second contract the revenue to the railroad was therefore the same whether Intermodal ran one car or a large train. Mr. Haley testified that he liked the new arrangement because it relieved him of his concern about not covering his overhead during days when there were only a few Intermodal cars. Intermodal, for its part, felt that the contract was potentially more profitable. The contract contained a provision that allowed the parties to negotiate a new rate every three months to ensure that the contract remained “profitable for both parties.”

*629 CC&P, under Mr. Haley’s stewardship, did not fare well. Within two years, it had become the paradigm of a business very much in distress: It had a severe cash flow problem; its accounts payable were overdue by several hundred thousand dollars; it was unable to make or adhere to financial projections; and its important personnel were leaving. The business had persistently failed to meet the financial performance targets set out in the loan agreement. By July, 1987, it was losing over $1 million a month. By that time loan payments had stopped, placing the business in default to GECC.

By September of 1987, GECC had acted on its prerogative under the loan agreement to audit the business. The audit report indicated that $8 million to $10 million would be needed to cover the cash-flow shortfalls expected to occur in the ensuing four months. The auditors, noting that the railroad’s business comprised three parts — coal delivery (called the “lifeblood” of the business), grain delivery, and Intermodal traffic — found serious problems with the coal business. They were impressed with recent increases in revenues from grain shipments. As far as Intermodal business was concerned, although volume had recently risen, real revenue growth had been minimal because of the flat-rate contract with Intermodal; and the auditors concluded that “a lot of CCP marketing effort [was] expended in this minimally profitable area.”

GECC came to believe that CC&P’s fundamental difficulty was a lack of effective management: One auditor noted that “CCP appears to be a business without a management system infrastructure”; another auditor noted that he had a “[t]otal lack of confidence in operating management.” GECC therefore acted to remove Mr. Haley from his position as president of CC&P. A deal was eventually struck and Mr. Haley left the railroad with a settlement. Don Wood, an independent consultant who had been hired by GECC to look into the railroad’s operation, was installed as the new chief executive officer. Mr. Wood’s compensation was set out in an employment contract with CC&P negotiated between him and GECC, which controlled CC&P’s corporate board. In addition, as one GECC executive testified, there was an understanding that the stock which GECC had received from Mr. Haley would go to Mr. Wood “if he did something” with regard to the railroad.

Mr. Wood acted immediately to try to stem the sizable losses from which the business was suffering, and one object of his attention was the Intermodal contract. Andrew Lloyd, a GECC employee who was responsible for monitoring the railroad’s loan, had reviewed the contract and scribbled some notes in the margin of the contract, including one exhorting someone to “do this now” next to the provision allowing for periodic readjustments of the price charged to Intermodal. Mr. Wood made his own notes on the same contract and later met with Intermodal officials to discuss adjusting the contract pricing. There was disagreement as to what the contract allowed, mainly with respect to whether, as Intermodal insisted, the permissible adjustments to the price were limited to increases of direct variable costs.

More meetings were planned, but in the meantime Mr. Wood sent a letter to Intermodal; the contents of this letter are not in dispute, but its meaning very much is. The letter stated that “[i]n order to restore this service to profitability the Daily Train Charge ... will be $16,424 per day,” almost three times the existing price. The letter, as an alternative, offered a consolidated service to Intermodal that represented a similar increase in costs, and closed with a request for an immediate response from Intermodal. According to Mr. Wood and GECC, this letter represented an attempt to negotiate adjustments in the pricing of the contract in order to make the contract profitable for the railroad. Intermodal, which says that the new pricing would have forced it out of business, contends that the letter itself constituted a breach of the contract.

After the letter was sent, negotiations between the railroad and Intermodal broke down. Intermodal halted all payments of any kind to the railroad, although it did continue to use the railroad’s service. The railroad then filed suit against Intermodal seeking payment of nearly $1 million; Inter-modal counterclaimed against the railroad for breach of contract. The parties resolved the *630 lawsuit by executing a mutual release, with no money changing hands, several months later.

II.

Iowa’s law on the tort of interference with contract adheres closely to the principles outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979). Under those principles, Intermodal had the burden to prove not only that the.

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103 F.3d 627, 1996 WL 731894, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rail-intermodal-specialists-inc-v-general-electric-capital-corp-ca8-1996.