Rahoi v. Internal Revenue Service

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided November 4, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-01289·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

MARK E RAHOI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-CV-1289

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE

Currently pending before the court is plaintiff Mark E Rahoi’s Request to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying the Filing Fee (ECF No. 2). Having reviewed Rahoi’s request, the court concludes that he lacks the financial resources to prepay the fees and costs associated with this action. Therefore, his Request to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying the Filing Fee will be granted. Because the court is granting the plaintiff Rahoi’s Request to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying the Filing Fee, it must determine whether the complaint is legally sufficient to proceed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Congress sought to ensure that no citizen would be denied the opportunity to commence a civil action in any court of the United States solely due to poverty. Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)). However, Congress also recognized that “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an

economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To balance these competing concerns, before the court can allow a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis it must

determine that the case neither (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, nor (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Thus, although “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), a pro se complaint must meet these minimal standards before the court shall grant a plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton, 504 U.S. at 31; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. Although factual allegations must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff, that does not mean that the court is required to accept

without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Thus, a court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” “fantastic,” “delusional,” “irrational,” “wholly incredible,” or “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 32-33. A court may not dismiss a claim as frivolous simply because

“the plaintiff’s allegations are unlikely.” Id. A claim might not be frivolous or malicious but nonetheless fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, be subject to dismissal. In determining

whether a complaint is sufficient to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court applies the same well-established standards applicable to a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 611

(7th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Although the allegations in a complaint need not be detailed, a complaint “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). The complaint must be sufficiently detailed “to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (quotation marks and ellipses omitted).

If the complaint contains well-pleaded, non-frivolous factual allegations, the court should assume the veracity of those allegations and “then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will… be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

With the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) in mind, the court turns to the allegations raised in Rahoi’s complaint. Rahoi argues that he is eligible to receive an economic impact payment (“stimulus check”) but has not received it due to an IRS computer error. (ECF No. 1 at 2-4.) Rahoi alleges that he filled out a 2019 1040 form on

paper and on the “IRS free non-filers website” on April 13, 2020. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) When he contacted the IRS on June 24, 2020, he was told that he “was not eligible for the stimulus check because the IRS computer said [he] checked the box that says someone

could claim [him] as a dependent on the non-filers form.” (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) He alleges that IRS agent Monroe #100307255 determined that no one claimed him as a dependent, but said that she could not change the system’s determination that someone could claim

him as a dependent. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Finally, he alleges he filed a complaint with the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration on July 6, 2020, and with the Director of Operations of the IRS on August 2, 2020, both of which were “to no avail.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.)

Liberally construing plaintiff’s complaint, as the court must all pleadings of non- attorneys, the court construes it as at least alleging that the IRS violated his right to due process. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rahoi implies that he has a property interest in receiving an

economic impact payment under the 14th Amendment because that is a right created by the CARES Act, a federal law. See Bell v.

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Leora H. Bell v. City of Country Club Hills
841 F.3d 713 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Johnnie Savory v. William Cannon, Sr.
947 F.3d 409 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)