Rahman v. Exxon Mobil Corporation

District Court, M.D. Louisiana·Decided February 11, 2020·No. 3:18-cv-00894·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OMAR A. RAHMAN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 18-894-BAJ-RLB EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel. (R. Doc. 29). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 39). I. Background On October 9, 2018, Omar A. Rahman (“Plaintiff”) commenced this employment discrimination action naming his former employer Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Defendant” or “Exxon”) as the sole defendant. (R. Doc. 1, “Compl.”). Plaintiff alleges that he “began employment with Defendant on or about February 13, 2017 as a Process Technician at Defendant’s Baton Rouge Polyolefins Plant (‘BRPO’) and was terminated by Defendant on the basis of his race [black] on or about July 31, 2017.” (Compl. ¶¶ 5-6). Plaintiff alleges that he “was singled out and intentionally discriminated against by Defendant in his training, his work environment and in his termination from employment because of Plaintiff’s race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.” (Compl. ¶ 19). There appears to be no dispute that approximately six weeks after his hire date, Plaintiff began basic operating training at Exxon’s training facility along with nine other trainees. Plaintiff passed the required written test and was then assigned to field training in the BRPO Polypropylene Unit (“Poly Unit” or “PP Unit”) in April of 2017. Plaintiff does not allege any discrimination prior to his assignment to field training. There also appears to be no dispute that Ray Crawford, who is white, was Plaintiff’s assigned trainer. Plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate training from Mr. Crawford despite repeated complaints about the inadequate field training to Mr. Crawford’s supervisors, including Second Line Supervisor Michael Bough and Area Superintendent Roger Dyer, who are both white. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-12). Plaintiff alleges that while he was in field training, the entire field of supervisors for the BRPO Poly Unit were white, and black employees were excluded from “permanent assignment to an outdoor technical field position in this department on any of the work shifts” as a result of

the “intentional design and actions” of employees at the BRPO Poly Unit. (Compl. ¶ 13). Plaintiff alleges that he “was intentionally subjected to inadequate training in the field” and that he failed the field training because of his race, not the pretextual reason provided by Defendant “that he lacked the knowledge necessary for employment as to the equipment, processes and procedures of the job.” (Compl. ¶¶ 15-16). There appears to be no dispute that James LeBlanc was the only other trainee who trained with the BRPO Poly Unit at the same time as Plaintiff, and that Mr. LeBlanc, unlike Plaintiff, passed the field training and was offered permanent employment. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Leblanc passed the training and was provided permanent employment because he is white. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18). On May 29, 2019, the Court entered an Agreed Protective Order governing the exchange

of confidential information in this action. (R. Doc. 14). The Court set the deadline for the parties to complete non-expert discovery, including the filing of related motions, on August 20, 2019. (R. Doc. 12). On July 19, 2019, Plaintiff served his Second Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission on Defendant. (R. Doc. 29-2 at 1-6). Exxon responded on the day before the close of non-expert discovery, August 19, 2019, and produced a redacted spreadsheet. (R. Doc. 29-2 at 7-24). On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff sent a correspondence to Exxon setting a discovery conference to be held on September 3, 2019 with respect to Request for Production Nos. 27, 28, 29, and 30, and Interrogatory Nos. 21, 22, and 23. (R. Doc. 29-3 at 1-2). Plaintiff then rescheduled the discovery conference to be held on August 27, 2019 in light of the non-expert discovery deadline. (R. Doc. 29-3 at 3). Plaintiff represents in his motion that the parties held the discovery conference and eliminated disputes over Interrogatory No. 23 and Request for Production No. 30. (R. Doc. 29 at 2).

On August 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Sealed Motion for Leave to file Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel Under Seal. (R. Doc. 25). The Court granted this motion on August 29, 2019 (R. Doc. 27), and Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel was entered into the record that day. (R. Doc. 29). On January 20, 2020, the Court issued a ruling on various discovery motions and denied Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel as untimely. (R. Doc. 70). On reconsideration, the Court vacated its denial of the motion on the basis of untimeliness. (R. Doc. 80). The Court now addresses the merits of the motion, which seeks an order requiring supplemental responses to Interrogatory No. 21 and 22, and Request for Production Nos. 27, 28, and 29. (R. Doc. 29-1). II. Law and Analysis

A. Legal Standards for Discovery

“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)). “When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the party must: (i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications, or

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