This text of Rahila Tarverdiyeva, on behalf of herself, and Vijay Tandon, as permissive joinder v. Coinbase, Inc., Coinbase Global, Inc., Phillip Martin, and Matthew Muller (Rahila Tarverdiyeva, on behalf of herself, and Vijay Tandon, as permissive joinder v. Coinbase, Inc., Coinbase Global, Inc., Phillip Martin, and Matthew Muller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8
10 RAHILA TARVERDIYEVA, on behalf of herself, and VIJAY TANDON, as 11 permissive joinder, No. C 22-05468 WHA
12 Plaintiffs,
13 v. ORDER DENYING SECOND MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT 14 COINBASE, INC., COINBASE GLOBAL, INC., PHILLIP MARTIN, and MATTHEW 15 MULLER, 16 Defendants.
17 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiffs’ claims involving cryptocurrency were dismissed for res judicata three years 20 ago. Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate that judgment was denied two years ago. Plaintiffs’ appeal of 21 that denial resulted in an affirmance one year ago. Now, plaintiffs again move to vacate 22 judgment. 23 STATEMENT 24 Plaintiff Rahila Tarverdiyeva has long alleged that Coinbase took cash and 25 cryptocurrency from her, and Coinbase has long asserted that such claims must be arbitrated. 26 In July 2021, Tarverdiyeva brought suit in the Middle District of Florida. Coinbase 27 moved to arbitrate. The motion was granted and the federal matter stayed pending arbitration 1 attempted interlocutory appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Tarverdiyeva v. 2 Coinbase Glob., Inc., No. 21-13354-CC, 2022 WL 997800, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 22), cert. 3 denied, 143 S. Ct. 107 (Oct. 3, 2022). Finally, she voluntarily dismissed her stayed action 4 “without prejudice” from the Middle District of Florida, in October 2022 (see Dkt. No. 15-14). 5 Meanwhile, in September 2022, plaintiff already had commenced the instant action in our 6 district. The factual predicates for the claims were identical, but this incarnation included a 7 new plaintiff (Tarverdiyeva’s husband, Vijay Tandon) plus two new defendants (Coinbase 8 employees Phillip Martin and Matthew Muller) (compare, e.g., Dkt. No. 15-3 ¶¶ 1–8, with Dkt. 9 No. 1 ¶ 10). Coinbase asserted that the instant suit was barred by res judicata (Dkt. No. 14). 10 After full briefing, the undersigned vacated the hearing on the motion because the required 11 result was clear: The claims and issues were precluded from re-litigation (Dkt. No. 22). The 12 parties were the same (or in privity with the prior ones), the factual predicates the same, and — 13 the crux here — the threshold question of whether to compel arbitration already had been 14 decided. The claims were subject to an order already compelling arbitration; they could not be 15 decided here. The claims were dismissed and final judgment entered in December 2022 (Dkt. 16 No. 23). No appeal was taken. 17 About a year after judgment, in December 2023, plaintiffs moved to vacate judgment — 18 styling the motion under Rule 60(b)(3) (Dkt. No. 25). They stated they had not been “afforded 19 a meaningful opportunity to present” their claims and had not “receive[d] a full adjudication on 20 the merits” (id. at 6). They contended that Coinbase had procured a final judgment by 21 fraudulently mischaracterizing the action in the Middle District of Florida. But the 22 undersigned found no basis for relief (Dkt. No. 32). And, our appellate court affirmed (Dkt. 23 No. 36). The appeals court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the underlying 24 issue of res judicata, which had not been timely appealed (ibid.). Tarverdiyeva v. Coinbase, 25 Inc., No. 24-826, 2024 WL 3963843, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024) (mem.) (per curiam). 26 Now, about a year after this affirmance, plaintiffs again seek relief from judgment — this 27 time styling their motion under Rule 60(b)(4) (Dkt. No. 38). This order follows full briefing, a 1 ANALYSIS 2 Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from judgment where the “judgment is void.” “A judgment 3 is not void merely because it is erroneous.” In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 4 (9th Cir. 1985). Instead, “final judgment is ‘void’ for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the 5 court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over 6 the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” United 7 States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 1. THE ISSUES RAISED IN BRIEFING. 9 Because error is not enough to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(4), this order declines 10 plaintiffs’ invitation to revisit the factual and legal analyses underlying the res judicata order 11 (e.g., Br. §§ V.1–4, VI.1, VI.3). See also Tarverdiyeva, 2024 WL 3963843, at *1 (declining to 12 address res judicata as untimely appealed). And, because plaintiffs do not point to any 13 jurisdictional defect in the suit they themselves brought, only due process concerns remain to 14 be addressed. 15 First, plaintiffs contend their due process rights were violated because the district court 16 dismissed their suit “without holding a hearing” (Br. § III.A.8). But a “court may provide for 17 submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 18 see Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). 19 Second, plaintiffs contend their rights were violated because the district judge took 20 judicial notice of proceedings in the Middle District of Florida (Br. § V.5). But plaintiffs were 21 afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of such notice. Recall that 22 defendant requested that this Court take notice of the other docket (Dkt. No. 15), and moved to 23 dismiss while pointing to the other docket’s entries (Dkt. No. 14). Plaintiffs did not oppose the 24 request. Rather, plaintiffs themselves requested that the district court take notice of even more 25 from the Middle District of Florida (see Dkt. No. 18 at 3; see also Dkt. No. 47-1 (doing so 26 again)). 27 Finally, plaintiffs make a litany of arguments that are unclear but that appear to have in 1 grand theft, a first-degree felony” (Reply 2). This is just another way of stating that plaintiffs’ 2 instant motion to vacate is premised not upon due process violations at all but upon plaintiffs’ 3 belief that the res judicata order was wrongly decided and the underlying claims should be 4 heard. That question is behind us. Tarverdiyeva, 2024 WL 3963843, at *1. 5 2. THE ISSUES RAISED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING. 6 At our hearing and just afterward, the district judge asked the parties to consider one 7 more point: While the res judicata decision had focused on the threshold question of 8 arbitrability, what if defendants in fact refused to arbitrate the fraud/conversion claims, 9 whether as time-barred or otherwise? Would this mean that litigation could proceed in federal 10 district court instead? The parties were asked to provide supplemental briefing (Dkt. No. 50). 11 Defendants respond by rejecting the stated premise: “[N]o Defendant would contend that 12 any of the claims asserted in the Middle District of Florida or in this action are not subject to 13 arbitration” (Supp. Opp. 1 (emphasis omitted)). Yes, defendants admit they will invoke 14 plaintiffs’ lack of timeliness in bringing claims as a reason to bar them under various statutes 15 of limitations. But defendants assert that how these statutes of limitations apply (or not) is 16 itself a decision that can and should be arbitrated. And, defendants further promise to treat the 17 statutory periods as tolled during the pendency of all litigation in the Middle District of 18 Florida, the Northern District of California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (id. 19 at 2:14–20). Defendants end by underscoring that plaintiffs assert no jurisdictional or due 20 process defect, so judgment must stand. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 21 U.S. 260, 271 (2010). 22 Plaintiffs’ response does not reveal any error in defendants’ characterization. Recall 23 plaintiffs appear pro se.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8
10 RAHILA TARVERDIYEVA, on behalf of herself, and VIJAY TANDON, as 11 permissive joinder, No. C 22-05468 WHA
12 Plaintiffs,
13 v. ORDER DENYING SECOND MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT 14 COINBASE, INC., COINBASE GLOBAL, INC., PHILLIP MARTIN, and MATTHEW 15 MULLER, 16 Defendants.
17 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiffs’ claims involving cryptocurrency were dismissed for res judicata three years 20 ago. Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate that judgment was denied two years ago. Plaintiffs’ appeal of 21 that denial resulted in an affirmance one year ago. Now, plaintiffs again move to vacate 22 judgment. 23 STATEMENT 24 Plaintiff Rahila Tarverdiyeva has long alleged that Coinbase took cash and 25 cryptocurrency from her, and Coinbase has long asserted that such claims must be arbitrated. 26 In July 2021, Tarverdiyeva brought suit in the Middle District of Florida. Coinbase 27 moved to arbitrate. The motion was granted and the federal matter stayed pending arbitration 1 attempted interlocutory appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Tarverdiyeva v. 2 Coinbase Glob., Inc., No. 21-13354-CC, 2022 WL 997800, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 22), cert. 3 denied, 143 S. Ct. 107 (Oct. 3, 2022). Finally, she voluntarily dismissed her stayed action 4 “without prejudice” from the Middle District of Florida, in October 2022 (see Dkt. No. 15-14). 5 Meanwhile, in September 2022, plaintiff already had commenced the instant action in our 6 district. The factual predicates for the claims were identical, but this incarnation included a 7 new plaintiff (Tarverdiyeva’s husband, Vijay Tandon) plus two new defendants (Coinbase 8 employees Phillip Martin and Matthew Muller) (compare, e.g., Dkt. No. 15-3 ¶¶ 1–8, with Dkt. 9 No. 1 ¶ 10). Coinbase asserted that the instant suit was barred by res judicata (Dkt. No. 14). 10 After full briefing, the undersigned vacated the hearing on the motion because the required 11 result was clear: The claims and issues were precluded from re-litigation (Dkt. No. 22). The 12 parties were the same (or in privity with the prior ones), the factual predicates the same, and — 13 the crux here — the threshold question of whether to compel arbitration already had been 14 decided. The claims were subject to an order already compelling arbitration; they could not be 15 decided here. The claims were dismissed and final judgment entered in December 2022 (Dkt. 16 No. 23). No appeal was taken. 17 About a year after judgment, in December 2023, plaintiffs moved to vacate judgment — 18 styling the motion under Rule 60(b)(3) (Dkt. No. 25). They stated they had not been “afforded 19 a meaningful opportunity to present” their claims and had not “receive[d] a full adjudication on 20 the merits” (id. at 6). They contended that Coinbase had procured a final judgment by 21 fraudulently mischaracterizing the action in the Middle District of Florida. But the 22 undersigned found no basis for relief (Dkt. No. 32). And, our appellate court affirmed (Dkt. 23 No. 36). The appeals court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the underlying 24 issue of res judicata, which had not been timely appealed (ibid.). Tarverdiyeva v. Coinbase, 25 Inc., No. 24-826, 2024 WL 3963843, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024) (mem.) (per curiam). 26 Now, about a year after this affirmance, plaintiffs again seek relief from judgment — this 27 time styling their motion under Rule 60(b)(4) (Dkt. No. 38). This order follows full briefing, a 1 ANALYSIS 2 Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from judgment where the “judgment is void.” “A judgment 3 is not void merely because it is erroneous.” In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 4 (9th Cir. 1985). Instead, “final judgment is ‘void’ for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the 5 court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over 6 the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” United 7 States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 1. THE ISSUES RAISED IN BRIEFING. 9 Because error is not enough to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(4), this order declines 10 plaintiffs’ invitation to revisit the factual and legal analyses underlying the res judicata order 11 (e.g., Br. §§ V.1–4, VI.1, VI.3). See also Tarverdiyeva, 2024 WL 3963843, at *1 (declining to 12 address res judicata as untimely appealed). And, because plaintiffs do not point to any 13 jurisdictional defect in the suit they themselves brought, only due process concerns remain to 14 be addressed. 15 First, plaintiffs contend their due process rights were violated because the district court 16 dismissed their suit “without holding a hearing” (Br. § III.A.8). But a “court may provide for 17 submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 18 see Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). 19 Second, plaintiffs contend their rights were violated because the district judge took 20 judicial notice of proceedings in the Middle District of Florida (Br. § V.5). But plaintiffs were 21 afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of such notice. Recall that 22 defendant requested that this Court take notice of the other docket (Dkt. No. 15), and moved to 23 dismiss while pointing to the other docket’s entries (Dkt. No. 14). Plaintiffs did not oppose the 24 request. Rather, plaintiffs themselves requested that the district court take notice of even more 25 from the Middle District of Florida (see Dkt. No. 18 at 3; see also Dkt. No. 47-1 (doing so 26 again)). 27 Finally, plaintiffs make a litany of arguments that are unclear but that appear to have in 1 grand theft, a first-degree felony” (Reply 2). This is just another way of stating that plaintiffs’ 2 instant motion to vacate is premised not upon due process violations at all but upon plaintiffs’ 3 belief that the res judicata order was wrongly decided and the underlying claims should be 4 heard. That question is behind us. Tarverdiyeva, 2024 WL 3963843, at *1. 5 2. THE ISSUES RAISED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING. 6 At our hearing and just afterward, the district judge asked the parties to consider one 7 more point: While the res judicata decision had focused on the threshold question of 8 arbitrability, what if defendants in fact refused to arbitrate the fraud/conversion claims, 9 whether as time-barred or otherwise? Would this mean that litigation could proceed in federal 10 district court instead? The parties were asked to provide supplemental briefing (Dkt. No. 50). 11 Defendants respond by rejecting the stated premise: “[N]o Defendant would contend that 12 any of the claims asserted in the Middle District of Florida or in this action are not subject to 13 arbitration” (Supp. Opp. 1 (emphasis omitted)). Yes, defendants admit they will invoke 14 plaintiffs’ lack of timeliness in bringing claims as a reason to bar them under various statutes 15 of limitations. But defendants assert that how these statutes of limitations apply (or not) is 16 itself a decision that can and should be arbitrated. And, defendants further promise to treat the 17 statutory periods as tolled during the pendency of all litigation in the Middle District of 18 Florida, the Northern District of California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (id. 19 at 2:14–20). Defendants end by underscoring that plaintiffs assert no jurisdictional or due 20 process defect, so judgment must stand. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 21 U.S. 260, 271 (2010). 22 Plaintiffs’ response does not reveal any error in defendants’ characterization. Recall 23 plaintiffs appear pro se. 24 As for any jurisdictional defect, plaintiffs newly assert that they allege criminal violations 25 and that criminal violations are beyond what can be arbitrated (see Supp. Br. 2). But criminal 26 violations are beyond what can be litigated by civil litigants in federal court, too. And, even 27 assuming civil claims involving criminal-like conduct cannot be arbitrated, this is another way ] of saying plaintiffs disagree with the merits of the district court decisions respecting arbitration 2 and res judicata. 3 As for any due process defect, plaintiffs newly assert that they are “left without any 4 forum to pursue their unresolved theft and fraud claims” (id. at 4). But plaintiffs’ assertions 5 are incorrect. Plaintiffs assert what will happen “[i]f Defendants contend that arbitration is no 6 longer available” (id. at 2) — while defendants already have conceded the opposite. And, 7 plaintiffs’ alternative assertions that do account for defendants’ concession are self- 8 contradictory. Plaintiffs will not lack “any forum” “[i]f Defendants [ ] concede that arbitration 9 remains available” (id. at 4). To the extent plaintiffs are concerned defendants will argue in 10 arbitration that some claims are time-barred by statutes of limitations, those arguments concern 11 the viability of a claim and not the forum to decide it (compare ibid., with Dkt. No. 56). 12 Most strikingly, plaintiffs’ response rejects an even more fundamental premise of the E 13 Court’s question (than the premise the defendants reject when stating they accept the claims 14 are subject to arbitration): Plaintiffs state “[p]laintiffs have no intention of initiating 3 15 arbitration” (id. at 3). So be it. 16 CONCLUSION i 17 Plaintiffs have failed to point to any colorable basis to find the judgment void. Plaintiffs’ Z 18 second motion to vacate the judgment (Dkt. No. 38) is DENIED. 19 Plaintiffs are forewarned not to assert these arguments again in this district court. Doing 20 so again would be frivolous. If plaintiffs do make such arguments again regardless, they may 21 subject themselves to a sanctions order requiring that they pay the other side’s cost of 22 defending these assertions, among other possible sanctions that might then be warranted. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 Dated: November 21, 2025. Pee 26 A ~ SS LLIAM ALSUP 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28