Raheem Lamont Cherry v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 1048-25-1

RAHEEM LAMONT CHERRY v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Malveaux, Friedman and Lorish Argued at Norfolk, Virginia Opinion Issued July 28, 2026*

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE Rufus A. Banks, Jr., Judge

(Diallo K. Morris; Morris, Currin & O’Keefe, P.C., on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

David A. Stock, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN

A jury convicted Raheem Cherry of first-degree murder, concealment of a dead body,

robbery, and abduction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove any of

the four convictions. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm his convictions.

BACKGROUND

“Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the

Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). In doing

so, we discard any evidence that conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, and regard as true

all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that can be fairly

drawn from that evidence. Cady, 300 Va. at 329.

The Events of May 17, 2021

This case arises from the murder of Laura Miles. Laura was employed by a dredging

company as a site safety officer in Chesapeake. Laura’s husband, Jack, was living in New York

while Laura was in Virginia. To keep in touch, the two would talk on the phone every morning

before Laura left for work.

On May 17, 2021, Laura and Jack had their morning phone call as usual, but the call

ended abruptly with Laura screaming. Jack then received a text from Laura’s phone number

assuring him that she was okay, but the messages did not match her typical texting style. Jack

repeatedly asked Laura to call him but he received no response.

As the site safety officer, Laura was often the first employee at the dredging facility.

Laura drove a Ford F150 truck. A coworker, James Jackson, noticed that she had not shown up

to work as usual on May 17, so he tried to reach her by phone. Unable to get a hold of her,

Jackson went to Laura’s apartment. Laura was not there when Jackson arrived, and he did not

see any signs of disturbance.

Chesapeake Police Officer Mikayla Beasley then arrived at Laura’s apartment responding

to a welfare check; other officers were already at the scene. Officer Beasley saw no signs of

distress in the apartment. When Officer Beasley returned to her car, she noticed a bag on the

ground in the parking lot which was later identified as Laura’s bag.2 Shortly after seeing the bag,

2 A forensic technician who packaged and catalogued the contents of the bag noted that it contained a camera, nail polish, a phone cord, and a medical supply pack for diabetes. Jack testified that Laura was diabetic and that she owned a “diabetic kit.” -2- Officer Beasley located Laura’s truck; it was backed into a parking space in front of another

apartment building nearby.

Officer Beasley was then instructed to search for cameras in the area. She discovered a

Ring doorbell camera at a nearby apartment complex. It showed a young man walking in the

general area of Laura’s apartment at 4:41 a.m. Investigators captured a still photo from the video

and later identified the person as Raheem Cherry. A surveillance video near where Laura’s truck

was found depicted someone exiting the driver’s side of the truck and placing items into a trash

can. Laura’s Buffalo Bills hardhat was later found in that trash can.

After Officer Beasley found Laura’s truck, April Palmer, a crime scene technician for the

Chesapeake Police Department, arrived to examine it. Palmer observed touch marks and

fingerprints on the driver’s and passenger’s sides and the tailgate area of the truck, as well as

swipe marks with “an odor of bug spray.” There were several red stains inside the truck, which

investigators swabbed for forensic analysis. Officers also found a can of bug spray and Laura’s

cell phone in the center console.

Detective William Rocca obtained location history from Laura’s cell phone provider and

followed it to the YMCA near her apartment building. Behind the YMCA, the officers found

Laura’s dead body in a ditch, covered in leaves. The officers observed blood coming from her

nostrils, insect activity on her body, and that she was “stiff and cold to touch.” They found a pair

of glasses next to her body, which Jack later identified as belonging to Laura. Laura’s wallet,

which contained her driver’s license, a TWIC card, $40 in cash, and six credit cards, was found

in the back pocket of her pants. YMCA video surveillance confirmed that Laura’s truck had

entered the YMCA parking lot at 5:11 a.m. on May 17 and exited around 5:25 a.m.

While officers were canvassing the area near Laura’s apartment on May 17, Detective

Ron Ward noticed a man who “seemed to be very interested in what everybody was doing, but at

-3- the same time, keeping his distance.” After observing him for about an hour, Detective Ward

and another detective approached the man, who initially refused to provide his name, address, or

date of birth to the detectives. He stated that his girlfriend lived in the building and that he had

just arrived and had not seen or heard anything. He subsequently provided his personal

information to the detectives, identifying himself as Raheem Cherry.

The Investigation

Dr. Elizabeth Kinnison, the Tidewater District’s Assistant Chief Medical Examiner,

performed the autopsy of Laura’s body. Dr. Kinnison identified 11 sharp force injuries caused

by a cutting or stabbing instrument. The wounds were isolated to the left side of Laura’s body.

Dr. Kinnison also identified abrasions on Laura’s back and bruising on her upper arms consistent

with her body having been dragged. A swab from Laura’s arms came back consistent with male

DNA, but an exact match was indeterminable. In Dr. Kinnison’s opinion, the likely cause of

death was a stab wound to her neck which injured the spinal cord. Dr. Kinnison provided no

opinion about a likely time of death.

After receiving evidence that led to an identification, Detective Jason Lightfoot and

Detective Bobby Hatchell started looking for Cherry on May 22.3 They met Cherry at his

girlfriend’s apartment, located in the same complex as Laura’s apartment, and interviewed him

in their unmarked police vehicle. Cherry stated that he was staying intermittently with his

girlfriend, who was pregnant and due within a few weeks. Cherry initially told the detectives

that his girlfriend called him around 9:00 a.m. on May 17 to tell him about the police activity.

Then he told the detectives he arrived at the apartment complex between 11:00 a.m. and

12:00 p.m. after his mother dropped him off. When they began questioning Cherry, the

3 It is unclear from the record what the evidence was that led the detectives to Cherry. -4- detectives did not know that Detective Ward had spoken to him on May 17, but Cherry told them

so during their conversation. Cherry denied ever talking to Laura or touching her truck.

At that point, the detectives shared with Cherry that his fingerprints were detected on

Laura’s truck and that there was a photo of him from a Ring camera. Cherry ended the interview

and left the vehicle. The detectives returned to the Chesapeake Police Headquarters and decided

to arrest Cherry. He was taken into custody on charges of murder, robbery, and abduction.

Once in custody, Cherry spoke with the detectives again, changing his story a few times.

Cherry admitted that he was the person walking around at 4:41 a.m. in the Ring camera footage

and stated that he had previously touched Laura’s truck when it was parked. Cherry explained

that he was out early in the morning because he had an argument with his girlfriend and he went

outside to listen to music. Cherry then told the officers that he had heard screaming that morning

and saw a man driving a black car. The screaming stopped, he said, and he saw Laura’s truck

drive to the YMCA and park, and then he heard doors shutting. He watched as the truck

returned, a man threw some items into a dumpster, and then the truck was parked. Cherry told

the officers that he witnessed all of this from outside his girlfriend’s apartment and then from the

apartment’s balcony.

Cherry’s next iteration of his story was that he did, in fact, enter the truck out of curiosity

because he thought he had witnessed a murder. He said that he opened all the doors and

observed dark stains and blood in the truck, as well as Laura’s cell phone. The interview was

terminated after Cherry became a little agitated. The detectives then informed Cherry that he

was under arrest for murder, robbery, and abduction, to which Cherry replied, “Robbery? What

did I steal, her soul?” Officers later secured an additional charge for concealment of a dead

body.

-5- While in the booking area, Cherry asked to speak with Detective Lightfoot. The

detective did not have a camera or audio recording device with him, so after Cherry started

sharing a different version of events, Detective Lightfoot asked him to write down “a proper

statement of the[] events.” In this statement, Cherry admits to some involvement in the murder.

He states that the man with the black car asked him for a “blunt wrap so he c[ould] smoke.”

Cherry reportedly got in the car with the man, and while they were smoking, the man showed

him his Glock and his knife. The man told Cherry about his desire to rob someone’s car, and the

two approached Laura as she was entering her truck. Cherry returned the knife to the man, who

used it to stab Laura. Cherry said that the man then pulled his Glock on Cherry and told him to

get into Laura’s truck. He forced Cherry to remove Laura’s body from the truck and clean the

interior. Cherry said he followed the man’s instructions because he was scared. The man then

drove off, and Cherry returned home. Cherry described the man as Black, taller than him,

wearing all black and gloves, and carrying a bag. Detective Lightfoot stated that he took no

action to verify Cherry’s statement.

The Trial

At the end of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Cherry moved to strike the charge of

concealment of a dead body. He argued that the Commonwealth did not establish the point in

time at which Laura died and that without a time of death, the Commonwealth could not prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Laura was not alive when Cherry concealed her body. The

Commonwealth replied that Cherry admitted to dragging Laura and dumping her body in a ditch,

suggesting he believed she was dead. The court denied Cherry’s motion to strike.

Cherry also moved to strike the first-degree murder charge, arguing that the

Commonwealth did not sufficiently identify Laura Miles as the deceased. After hearing from the

Commonwealth, the court denied the motion to strike, finding that the Commonwealth

-6- established a “prima facie case with respect to this particular charge given the testimonies of

Mr. Miles, the officers, the video, the autopsy, the photos, the evidence recovered from the body

at the scene, which included, but was not limited to identification of Ms. Miles.”

Cherry then testified in his own defense. His testimony largely mirrored his written

statement, though he added that he tried to dissuade the man with the black car from hurting

Laura. On cross-examination, Cherry stated that he did not know the man, but that he greeted

him and “asked him if he wanted to smoke.” He said that when they saw Laura get into her

truck, Cherry told the man that it was “too late” and “she was already getting in the car, so it was

pointless to steal the car.” But he admitted that after the man stabbed Laura, Cherry helped him

move the body and clean out the truck. That was why his fingerprints were on the bug spray and

cell phone, he said.

He also admitted that he had the chance to escape but did not do so for fear of being shot

or stabbed. And he testified that he originally lied to the detectives because “the killer told [him]

not to speak about it.”

Cherry then renewed his previous motions to strike; the court denied both. The jury

found Cherry guilty on all four counts. The court held a sentencing hearing a little less than one

year later. Cherry had previously filed a motion to set aside the verdict, and the court denied that

motion at the sentencing hearing. The court sentenced Cherry to 80 years, 25 suspended for the

first-degree murder charge; 15 years, 7 suspended for the robbery charge; 10 years, 7 years

suspended for the abduction charge; and 3 years, 2 suspended for the concealment of a dead

body charge, for a total of 67 years of active incarceration. Cherry timely appealed.

-7- ANALYSIS

I. Cherry’s First Two Assignments of Error Are Waived

Rule 5A:20(c)(2) states that “[a]n assignment of error that does not address the findings,

rulings, or failures to rule on issues in the trial court or other tribunal from which an appeal is

taken . . . is not sufficient. If the assignments of error are insufficient, the appeal will be

dismissed.” Thus, for an assignment of error to comply with Rule 5A:20(c)(2), “it must identify

an erroneous ruling, finding, or failure to rule by the trial court.” Barnes v. Commonwealth, 80

Va. App. 588, 595 (2024) (emphasis added).

Here, Cherry brings three assignments of error. The first two assign error not to the trial

court, but to the jury. The first states that “[t]he jury had insufficient evidence to find guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt” for the concealment charge, while the second states that “[t]he jury

had insufficient evidence to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” for all four charges because

the identity of the victim was not proven. These assignments of error could perhaps be read to

assign error to the trial court’s decisions denying Cherry’s motions to strike and submitting the

case to the jury. But Cherry goes on to flatly state in the argument sections corresponding to his

first two assignments of error that “[t]he jury erred.” In so doing, he erases any doubt about the

identity of the decision-maker to whom he assigns error.

Because Cherry’s first two assignments of error fail to identify an erroneous ruling,

finding, or failure to rule by the trial court, they are both waived under Rule 5A:20(c)(2). See

Barnes, 80 Va. App. at 595.

II. The Trial Court Properly Denied Cherry’s Motion to Set Aside the Jury’s Verdict Because the Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Him Guilty on All Charges

A. Standard of Review

We will not set aside a trial court’s judgment sustaining a jury verdict unless it is “plainly

wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fisher v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 299 (1984) -8- (quoting Code § 8.01-680). “However, to the extent the appellant’s assignment of error requires

‘statutory interpretation, it is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.’” Coomer v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 537, 545 (2017) (quoting Grimes v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 314,

318 (2014)).

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s judgment “is presumed

correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is

whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). So we must affirm if there is any evidentiary support

for the conviction. Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018).

B. First-Degree Murder

Cherry first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was guilty of first-

degree murder. He contends that “there was no evidence offered to prove that the decedent’s

cause of death resulted from any criminal act of Cherry” and “no DNA evidence connecting the

defendant to any weapon used to harm the decedent.” He also claims that the Commonwealth

failed to prove that he possessed the “requisite criminal intent . . . to commit the alleged crimes.”

And he suggests that his testimony at trial showed that he acted under duress and that he “did not

aid and abet the attacker before and during the commission of the murder.”

To prove first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove (1) that the defendant

killed the victim; (2) that the killing was malicious; and (3) that the killing was willful,

-9- deliberate, and premeditated. Clay v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 96, 106 (2000); see Code

§ 18.2-32. Questions of malice and premeditation are usually jury questions. See Craig v.

Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 155, 165 (2000); Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 477

(1994).

“Malice inheres in the ‘doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or

excuse, or as a result of ill will.’” Tizon v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 1, 11 (2012) (quoting

Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 61 (1947)). “Implied malice may be inferred from

‘conduct likely to cause death or great bodily harm, wil[l]fully or purposefully undertaken.’”

Canipe v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 629, 642 (1997) (quoting Essex v. Commonwealth, 228

Va. 273, 281 (1984)). “It necessarily follows that malice may be ‘inferred from the deliberate

use of a deadly weapon.’” Tizon, 60 Va. App. at 11 (quoting Luck v. Commonwealth, 32

Va. App. 827, 834 (2000)).

“To premeditate means to adopt a specific intent to kill, and that is what distinguishes

first and second degree murder. The intent to kill must come into existence at some time before

the killing; it need not exist for any particular length of time.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.

696, 700 (1980). The specific intent to kill is “something more than malice.” Epperly v.

Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 231 (1982).

“Premeditation and formation of an intent to kill seldom can be proved by direct

evidence. A combination of circumstantial factors may be sufficient.” Rhodes v.

Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 486 (1989). Relevant circumstantial factors include “the brutality

of an attack, whether more than one blow was struck, the disparity in size and strength between

the accused and the victim, the concealment of the victim’s body, and the defendant’s efforts to

avoid detection.” Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 134 (1984). Additionally, “evidence

of a mortal wound inflicted by a deadly weapon with little or no provocation creates an inference

- 10 - from which the trier of fact may conclude that the killer acted with premeditation.” Morris v.

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 575, 578 (1995).

Here, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to

prove Cherry guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. To begin, it was

reasonable for the jury to conclude that Cherry stabbed and killed Laura Miles. The Ring

doorbell camera showed Cherry alone in the area around the time Laura was talking to her

husband. Laura’s stab wounds were on her left side, the side that would be exposed while

entering the driver’s seat of her truck. Cherry’s fingerprints appeared on Laura’s truck and her

phone. And that phone was the same one from which Jack received texts that did not sound like

his wife. Cherry also admits to dragging and concealing Laura’s body. See Palmer v.

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 346, 348-49 (1992) (explaining that efforts to avoid detection are

admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself).

Cherry, of course, has a different version of events, one in which an unknown man

murdered Laura and he was “merely present at the scene of the murder.” But the jury is “entitled

to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying

to conceal his guilt.” Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10 (1998).

There was also sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove malice and premeditation. See

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512-13 (2003) (“There is no distinction in the law

between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.”). The jury

could reasonably infer malice from Cherry’s use of a deadly weapon. See Tizon, 60 Va. App. at

11. And based on the brutality of the attack, the 11 stab wounds, the lack of provocation,

Cherry’s concealment of the victim’s body, and his efforts to avoid detection (including texting

Jack from Laura’s phone, attempting to wipe away his fingerprints from the truck, and telling the

- 11 - police several different stories), the jury could reasonably infer the requisite premeditation. See

Clozza, 228 Va. at 134; Morris, 17 Va. App. at 578.

Lastly, Cherry’s arguments about duress and accomplice liability are unavailing. For one

thing, duress is generally not available as a defense in first-degree murder cases. Arnold v.

Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 781, 788 (2002). Even putting that aside, though, Cherry’s

assertions that he acted under duress and that he did not aid or abet the attacker assume that the

jury accepted his story about the unknown attacker who forced him to help rob Laura and hide

her body. But as already noted, the jury was entitled to disbelieve Cherry’s testimony and to

conclude that he was lying to conceal his guilt. Marable, 27 Va. App. at 509-10.

In sum, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cherry committed first-

degree murder. So the trial court properly denied Cherry’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict.

C. Concealment of a Dead Body4

Cherry next argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of concealment of a

dead body. He contends that because the Commonwealth presented no evidence about Laura

Miles’ time of death, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the body he concealed

was, in fact, dead and not merely unconscious or injured.

Code § 18.2-323.02 makes it a Class 6 felony to transport, secrete, conceal, or alter “a

dead body, as defined in § 32.1-249, with malicious intent and to prevent detection of an

unlawful act or to prevent the detection of the death or the manner or cause of death.” Code

§ 32.1-249, in turn, defines a “dead body” as “a human body or such parts of such human body

from the condition of which it reasonably may be concluded that death occurred.”

4 Most of Cherry’s argument about his conviction for concealment of a dead body is located within his first (waived) assignment of error. See Barnes, 80 Va. App. at 595 n.2 (refusing to “consider the arguments Barnes raise[d] under his first assignment of error” because he assigned error to the jury). Still, we assume without deciding that his argument is preserved through his third assignment of error. - 12 - Cherry finds some support for his argument in the limited case law interpreting Code

§§ 18.2-323.02 and 32.1-249. In Shaw v. Commonwealth, 304 Va. 217, 223 (2025), for instance,

the defendant “confided in two acquaintances that [the victim’s] dead body was in his

apartment,” so it did not matter that the medical examiner was unable to determine the victim’s

time of death. (Emphasis added).

Cherry’s argument could have some force if Code § 32.1-249 defined “dead body” as “a

human body in which death has occurred,” or “a human body that is no longer living,” or

something similar. But it does not. It instead defines “dead body” as “a human body or such

parts of such human body from the condition of which it reasonably may be concluded that death

occurred.” Code § 32.1-249 (emphasis added). And “when analyzing a statute, we must assume

that ‘the legislature chose, with care, the words it used . . . and we are bound by those words as

we interpret the statute.’” Doulgerakis v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 417, 420 (2013)

(alteration in original) (quoting City of Virginia Beach v. ESG Enters., 243 Va. 149, 153 (1992)).

Here, Cherry stabbed Laura 11 times and then dragged her body to the ditch by the

YMCA. Given the absence of a specific time of death in the record, it is possible she was merely

unconscious when he concealed her body. But in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

based on her unresponsive state and multiple, significant stab wounds, one could reasonably

“conclude[] that death occurred.” Code § 32.1-249. That is what the statute requires. So the

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove that Cherry concealed a dead body within

the meaning of the statute.

- 13 - D. Robbery and Abduction5

“In Virginia, robbery is a common law crime defined as the ‘taking, with intent to steal,

of the personal property of another, from h[er] person or in h[er] presence, against h[er] will, by

violence or intimidation.’” Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 524 (2008) (quoting Pierce v.

Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 532 (1964)). “The degree of asportation of the property need only

be slight. The intent to steal means the intent to deprive the owner permanently of h[er]

property.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 292, 295 (1997) (citation omitted).

A defendant commits the crime of abduction, meanwhile, if he, “by force, intimidation or

deception, and without legal justification or excuse, seizes, takes, transports, detains or secretes

another person with the intent to deprive such other person of h[er] personal liberty.” Code

§ 18.2-47(A).

“Intent is the purpose formed in a person’s mind which may, and often must, be inferred

from the facts and circumstances in a particular case.” Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App.

510, 519 (1994) (en banc). The determination of a defendant’s intent is a “factual question” that,

as always, “lies peculiarly within the province of the jury.” Id. (quoting Ingram v.

Commonwealth, 192 Va. 794, 802 (1951)). It is permissible to infer “that every person intends

5 Cherry’s challenges to his convictions for robbery and abduction are arguably waived under Rule 5A:20(e), which requires that an appellant’s opening brief contain an “argument (including the principles of law and authorities) relating to each assignment of error.” Cherry lists the elements of robbery and abduction but provides no argument about how or why the trial court erred by denying his motion to set aside those convictions. The closest he comes to an argument is at the end of a paragraph about the evidence tying him to Miles’ murder, when he asserts that “[t]he Commonwealth presented no credible evidence that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent or motive to commit the alleged crimes or committed any act that resulted in the death of the decedent.” We assume without deciding that this is enough to comply with Rule 5A:20(e), and we address the robbery and abduction convictions on the merits, as those are the “best and narrowest grounds available.” Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015)). But see Bartley v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 740, 744 (2017) (“The appellate court is not a depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.” (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 730, 734 (2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 279 Va. 52 (2010))). - 14 - the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts.” Walker v. Commonwealth, 47

Va. App. 114, 121 (2005) (quoting Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 145 (2001)).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational

juror could conclude that Cherry robbed Laura of her truck and her phone. Cherry stabbed

Laura, drove her truck to the YMCA, and then parked the truck in a nearby apartment complex.

His fingerprints were also found on her phone. It does not matter that he only took the phone for

a short period of time. See Brown, 24 Va. App. at 295 (“The degree of asportation of the

property need only be slight.”). Nor does it matter that he ultimately abandoned both the truck

and the phone. See id. (noting that the fact that a stolen wallet contained no money and was

thereafter abandoned did not “nullify appellant’s intent to deprive [the victim] of his money”

when he robbed him). Cherry used violence to take Laura’s property from her, and the jury

could infer from his actions that he intended to permanently deprive Laura of her property. See

Clay v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 254, 261 (1999) (en banc) (holding that a fact finder can

infer the intent to steal “from the immediate asportation and conversion of the property, in the

absence of satisfactory countervailing evidence” from the defendant). The evidence was thus

sufficient to find Cherry guilty of robbery.

The evidence was also sufficient to find Cherry guilty of abduction. He attacked Laura in

her truck, pushed her from the driver’s seat, drove her to the YMCA, and dragged her to a ditch.

In other words, he used force to “take” and “transport” Laura. See Walker, 47 Va. App. at 121

(holding that defendant used force or intimidation when he “manhandl[ed]” the victim into a

truck cab). A reasonable jury could also infer that Cherry intended to deprive Laura of her

- 15 - personal liberty, as that was a “natural and probable consequence[]” of his actions.6 See id.; see

also Jones v. Commonwealth, No. 2134-24-2, slip op. at 9, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 192, at *13

(Mar. 31, 2026) (holding that dragging victim across the floor during an argument was, alone,

sufficient to support abduction conviction).7 Accordingly, the Commonwealth presented

sufficient evidence to prove Cherry guilty on all counts, and the trial court did not err in denying

Cherry’s motion to set aside the verdict.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

6 Cherry does not contend that Laura was no longer alive when he abducted her, so we need not decide whether one can, for purposes of the abduction statute, “inten[d] to deprive” a corpse of its “personal liberty.” See Code § 18.2-47(A). 7 “Unpublished opinions of this Court, while having no precedential value, are nevertheless persuasive authority.” Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 351 n.3 (2012). - 16 -