NUMBER 13-19-00595-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
RAHEEM DAVON JONES, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
A jury convicted appellant Raheem Davon Jones of murder, a first-degree felony,
and assessed his punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 12.32, 19.02. By a single issue, Jones submits that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a self-defense instruction. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND
On the evening of June 7, 2016, school was out for the summer and two separate
groups of teenagers were hanging out and smoking marijuana. One of those teenagers,
eighteen-year-old Vonsell Ramirez, had been selling drugs for about a year. He was five
feet, eight inches tall and weighed around 130 pounds.
Jones was in the other group. He was nineteen years old at the time and had
played quarterback for Calhoun High School. Later in the evening, Jones called Ramirez
to purchase some marijuana and Xanax, and Ramirez told Jones to meet him outside his
house. Jones arrived in a red truck with Marissa Martinez, Kenny Freeman, and Benny
Snell. Ramirez was with his fifteen-year-old brother Jordan Brooks and their fifteen-year-
old friend Cyncere Parker. The three of them met Jones in the street in front of Ramirez’s
house.
According to Parker, instead of paying for the drugs, Jones snatched them out of
Ramirez’s hand and slapped him hard in the face. Parker testified that both brothers then
swung at Jones at different times but missed. Having backed up against the tailgate of
the truck, Jones produced an empty beer bottle from his back pocket, and as Ramirez
started to take another swing, Jones hit him across the face and neck with the bottle. The
bottle shattered, causing an incised wound across Ramirez’s neck, including his jugular
vein. Jones fled in the truck, and Ramirez bled out before emergency medical personnel
arrived.
Brooks agreed that Jones took the drugs without paying, but testified that instead
of slapping Ramirez, Jones initiated the altercation by striking Ramirez with the empty
2 bottle: “He acted like he was going to pay for it; and then he reached in his back pocket,
which is where the bottle was, and hit my brother with it to try to blindside him.” Brooks
testified that he noticed the empty beer bottle in Jones’s back pocket before the altercation
but did not think anything of it at the time.
Ramirez’s autopsy noted “[n]umerous abrasions” on the knuckles of his right hand.
There was no testimony or other evidence about the source of these abrasions, when
they occurred, or whether they were consistent with punching someone.
Martinez, the driver of the red truck, testified as an accomplice witness. The State
agreed not to use her testimony against her in a later prosecution, but she did not enter
into a plea agreement in exchange for her testimony. After Jones called Ramirez to
purchase the drugs, she overheard Jones ask Snell, “Do you think it’s suspicious that I’m
ordering too much?” She also heard Jones say that he wanted to rob Ramirez. Martinez
said that she became concerned, but that Snell reassured her that Jones “had the money
to buy whatever he wanted.” According to Martinez, when they arrived at Ramirez’s,
Jones got out of the vehicle holding a steering wheel lock, and either Martinez or Snell
got out of the vehicle and took it from him. Later, Martinez heard what sounded like glass
breaking, but she claimed not to see what transpired because she was inside the truck,
which was facing the opposite direction of the altercation. As they were driving away,
Jones joked about how he dropped some of the Xanax pills. At some point afterward,
Martinez texted her friend and said something to the effect of, “They hit [Ramirez] and
stole his shit.”
3 Neither Freeman nor Snell, the other two occupants of the truck, were called to
testify, and Jones did not testify in his defense. Thus, the only witnesses who testified
about the sequence of events that precipitated the altercation were Brooks and Parker,
and both testified that Jones was the aggressor and took the drugs without paying for
them. The trial court denied Jones’s request for a self-defense instruction because “the
evidence demonstrated that [Jones] in this case was engaging in criminal activity, also
that he provoked the difficulty.” The jury returned a guilty verdict, and this appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
The trial court is required to instruct the jury on statutory defenses, affirmative
defenses, and justifications whenever they are raised by the evidence. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 2.03(d), 2.04(c); Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 208–09 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense if the issue is raised by
the evidence, whether that evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted, and
regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of the defense.” Ferrel v.
State, 55 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). However, if the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the defendant, does not support a rational finding of self-
defense, the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the issue. Id. Whether the
evidence sufficiently raises self-defense is a question of law. Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d
647, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he
reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other’s use
or attempted use of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a). A person is justified
4 in using deadly force against another if he would be justified in using force, and he
reasonably believes deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the
other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id. § 9.32(a).
III. ANALYSIS
Jones contends that provocation and engaging in criminal activity are fact issues
that when raised by the evidence should be included in the court’s charge as limitations
on self-defense. See id. § 9.31(a)(2), (3).
However, in addition to a limiting instruction, the provocation doctrine can also act
as a total bar on a defendant’s right to self-defense. Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 512
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Commonly referred to as “provoking the difficulty,” the doctrine
has long roots in Texas common law: “If a person by his own willful and wrongful act
bring[s] about the necessity of taking the life of another to prevent being killed himself, he
cannot say or claim that such killing was in his own necessary self-defense, for the law
then imputes to him his own wrong and its consequences.” Mason v. State, 88 Tex. Crim.
642, 646, 228 S.W. 952, 955 (1921). The provocation doctrine is now codified in
§ 9.31(b)(4) of the penal code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(4). That section
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NUMBER 13-19-00595-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
RAHEEM DAVON JONES, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
A jury convicted appellant Raheem Davon Jones of murder, a first-degree felony,
and assessed his punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 12.32, 19.02. By a single issue, Jones submits that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a self-defense instruction. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND
On the evening of June 7, 2016, school was out for the summer and two separate
groups of teenagers were hanging out and smoking marijuana. One of those teenagers,
eighteen-year-old Vonsell Ramirez, had been selling drugs for about a year. He was five
feet, eight inches tall and weighed around 130 pounds.
Jones was in the other group. He was nineteen years old at the time and had
played quarterback for Calhoun High School. Later in the evening, Jones called Ramirez
to purchase some marijuana and Xanax, and Ramirez told Jones to meet him outside his
house. Jones arrived in a red truck with Marissa Martinez, Kenny Freeman, and Benny
Snell. Ramirez was with his fifteen-year-old brother Jordan Brooks and their fifteen-year-
old friend Cyncere Parker. The three of them met Jones in the street in front of Ramirez’s
house.
According to Parker, instead of paying for the drugs, Jones snatched them out of
Ramirez’s hand and slapped him hard in the face. Parker testified that both brothers then
swung at Jones at different times but missed. Having backed up against the tailgate of
the truck, Jones produced an empty beer bottle from his back pocket, and as Ramirez
started to take another swing, Jones hit him across the face and neck with the bottle. The
bottle shattered, causing an incised wound across Ramirez’s neck, including his jugular
vein. Jones fled in the truck, and Ramirez bled out before emergency medical personnel
arrived.
Brooks agreed that Jones took the drugs without paying, but testified that instead
of slapping Ramirez, Jones initiated the altercation by striking Ramirez with the empty
2 bottle: “He acted like he was going to pay for it; and then he reached in his back pocket,
which is where the bottle was, and hit my brother with it to try to blindside him.” Brooks
testified that he noticed the empty beer bottle in Jones’s back pocket before the altercation
but did not think anything of it at the time.
Ramirez’s autopsy noted “[n]umerous abrasions” on the knuckles of his right hand.
There was no testimony or other evidence about the source of these abrasions, when
they occurred, or whether they were consistent with punching someone.
Martinez, the driver of the red truck, testified as an accomplice witness. The State
agreed not to use her testimony against her in a later prosecution, but she did not enter
into a plea agreement in exchange for her testimony. After Jones called Ramirez to
purchase the drugs, she overheard Jones ask Snell, “Do you think it’s suspicious that I’m
ordering too much?” She also heard Jones say that he wanted to rob Ramirez. Martinez
said that she became concerned, but that Snell reassured her that Jones “had the money
to buy whatever he wanted.” According to Martinez, when they arrived at Ramirez’s,
Jones got out of the vehicle holding a steering wheel lock, and either Martinez or Snell
got out of the vehicle and took it from him. Later, Martinez heard what sounded like glass
breaking, but she claimed not to see what transpired because she was inside the truck,
which was facing the opposite direction of the altercation. As they were driving away,
Jones joked about how he dropped some of the Xanax pills. At some point afterward,
Martinez texted her friend and said something to the effect of, “They hit [Ramirez] and
stole his shit.”
3 Neither Freeman nor Snell, the other two occupants of the truck, were called to
testify, and Jones did not testify in his defense. Thus, the only witnesses who testified
about the sequence of events that precipitated the altercation were Brooks and Parker,
and both testified that Jones was the aggressor and took the drugs without paying for
them. The trial court denied Jones’s request for a self-defense instruction because “the
evidence demonstrated that [Jones] in this case was engaging in criminal activity, also
that he provoked the difficulty.” The jury returned a guilty verdict, and this appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
The trial court is required to instruct the jury on statutory defenses, affirmative
defenses, and justifications whenever they are raised by the evidence. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 2.03(d), 2.04(c); Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 208–09 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense if the issue is raised by
the evidence, whether that evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted, and
regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of the defense.” Ferrel v.
State, 55 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). However, if the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the defendant, does not support a rational finding of self-
defense, the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the issue. Id. Whether the
evidence sufficiently raises self-defense is a question of law. Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d
647, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he
reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other’s use
or attempted use of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a). A person is justified
4 in using deadly force against another if he would be justified in using force, and he
reasonably believes deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the
other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id. § 9.32(a).
III. ANALYSIS
Jones contends that provocation and engaging in criminal activity are fact issues
that when raised by the evidence should be included in the court’s charge as limitations
on self-defense. See id. § 9.31(a)(2), (3).
However, in addition to a limiting instruction, the provocation doctrine can also act
as a total bar on a defendant’s right to self-defense. Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 512
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Commonly referred to as “provoking the difficulty,” the doctrine
has long roots in Texas common law: “If a person by his own willful and wrongful act
bring[s] about the necessity of taking the life of another to prevent being killed himself, he
cannot say or claim that such killing was in his own necessary self-defense, for the law
then imputes to him his own wrong and its consequences.” Mason v. State, 88 Tex. Crim.
642, 646, 228 S.W. 952, 955 (1921). The provocation doctrine is now codified in
§ 9.31(b)(4) of the penal code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(4). That section
provides that the use of force against another is not justified if the actor provoked the
other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless:
(A) the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely abandon the encounter; and
(B) the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the actor[.]
Id. Thus, “[i]f the defendant admits the intent to provoke or the evidence clearly
5 establishes that intent and the defendant does not present any counter-evidence,
provocation can be established as a matter of law.” Halbert v. State, 881 S.W.2d 121,
126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (citing Coble v. State, 871 S.W.2d
192, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). When the evidence establishes as a matter of law that
force is not justified in self-defense, no instruction is required. Coble, 871 S.W.2d at 202
(finding evidence did not raise self-defense because appellant initiated the encounter,
and “it was [the victim] who was acting in self-defense”); Lockhart v. State, 847 S.W.2d
568, 574–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (concluding evidence did not sufficiently raise self-
defense where the defendant initiated the altercation resulting in the victim’s death);
Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 460, 464–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (“[P]rovocation is not a
fact issue since appellant, by his own testimony, established that he intended to provoke
a confrontation with his brother.”); see also Reyes v. State, No. 13-16-00147-CR, 2017
WL 6546277, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 9, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Bonner v. State, No. 13-13-00626-CR, 2015 WL
4141114, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication).
Relatedly, and more specific to this case, “a robber has no right of self-defense
against his victim.” Westley v. State, 754 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Smith
v. State, 676 S.W.2d 379, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Evans v. State, 601 S.W.2d 943,
946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); see also Macias v. State, No. 08-17-00144-CR, 2019 WL
4058584, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 28, 2019, pet. ref’d) (not designated for
publication) (“[A] defendant who is charged with the offense of robbery and/or aggravated
6 robbery has no legal right to claim self-defense against his intended victim, and [he] is
therefore not entitled to receive a self-defense instruction.”); Russell v. State, No. 05-17-
00124-CR, 2018 WL 525559, at *10 (Tex. App —Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (same); Gorman v. State, No. 04-03-00311-CR, 2004
WL 2450875, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 3, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (same); Toliver v. State, No. 01-87-00591-CR, 1988 WL
15126, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 1988, pet ref’d) (not designated for
publication) (same). “This is especially true when the victim is justified in acting to recover
his property, prevent the offense[,] or save another person.” Westley, 754 S.W.2d at 230
(citing Davis v. State, 597 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). As the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals once put it, the idea that a robber could be justified in using illegal force
against his victim is “ludicrous.” Id.
In this case, Jones was indicted on one count of capital murder for intentionally
causing Ramirez’s death while in the course of committing a robbery. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2). He was also indicted separately for aggravated robbery for
intentionally and knowingly causing serious bodily injury to Ramirez while committing theft
of property. See id. § 29.03(a)(1). Ultimately, after the State abandoned the capital
murder charge, Jones was convicted of the lesser included offense of first-degree murder
under alternative theories: (1) he intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed
an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Ramirez’s death; or (2) he committed
or attempted to commit the felony of robbery, and in the course of and in furtherance of
the commission of that robbery, he committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that
7 caused Ramirez’s death. See id. § 19.02(b)(2), (3). Regardless, the uncontroverted
evidence presented at trial was that Jones executed his plan to take Ramirez’s property
by force. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jones, he slapped Ramirez
in the face with one hand as he grabbed the drugs with his other hand. In other words,
the evidence conclusively established that Jones was in the course of robbing Ramirez
when he killed him. See id. § 29.02(a)(1). As such, Jones had no legal right of self-
defense against Ramirez. See Westley, 754 S.W.2d at 230; Smith, 676 S.W.2d at 393;
Evans, 601 S.W.2d at 946; see also Macias, 2019 WL 4058584, at *5; Russell, 2018 WL
525559, at *10; Gorman, 2004 WL 2450875, at *1; Toliver, 1988 WL 15126, at *1. We
overrule Jones’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GINA M. BENAVIDES Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the 22nd day of April, 2021.