Raheem Alton Bernard Brown v. State of Alabama

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: November 7, 2025
• Docket: CR-2024-0245
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: November 7, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________

CR-2024-0245 _________________________

Raheem Alton Bernard Brown

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CC-17-793.70 and CC-19-362.70)

On Return to Remand

ANDERSON, Judge.

Raheem Alton Bernard Brown appeals the Montgomery Circuit

Court's judgment revoking his probation. Previously, this Court

determined that, although the circuit court had provided a sufficient

reason for revoking Brown's probation, it had failed to adequately CR-2024-0245

identify the specific evidence it had relied upon to support its reasoning.

As our precedent requires, we issued an order remanding this case to the

circuit court with instructions for it to enter a written judgment

specifically stating the evidence upon which it had relied and its reasons

for revoking Brown's probation.

On remand, however, the circuit court found it impossible to comply

with our instructions. The circuit judge who had presided over Brown's

probation revocation hearing had retired from judicial service while this

case was pending on appeal, and was replaced by Judge Monet Gaines.

Unable to comply with this Court's instructions -- Judge Gaines could not

speak to the evidence relied upon by her predecessor -- she attempted to

comply with our order by conducting a de novo review of the transcript of

the revocation hearing and issuing a new probation-revocation judgment

identifying her reason for revoking Brown's probation, specifically

identifying the evidence she relied upon. Brown objected, correctly

arguing that the circuit court and parties lacked the authority to agree

to exceed the scope of this Court's remand order.

On return to remand, Brown challenges the circuit court's issuance

of a new probation-revocation judgment based on Judge Gaines'

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independent, de novo review of the evidence as exceeding the scope of this

Court's mandate. The State's brief on return to remand does not address

this jurisdictional issue identified by Brown.

We agree with Brown that the actions of the circuit court, although

taken with an obvious and commendable desire to serve the interests of

justice by finding some method of complying with this Court's remand

instructions (despite it being impossible to do so), exceeded the scope of

our remand order. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment is void for

lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 796 So. 2d 1151, 1155

(Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Lynch v. State, 587 So. 2d 306 (Ala. 1991),

and Ellis v. State, 705 So. 2d 843, 847 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)).

In Dennis v. State, 167 So. 3d 379 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014), this Court

found itself in a similar procedural posture. In Dennis, this Court was

confronted with a probation-revocation order entered by the trial court

after it had conducted a hearing that had not been transcribed, and,

therefore, this Court was "unable to ascertain from the circuit court's

order the evidence that the court relied on in revoking Dennis's

probation." 167 So. 3d at 381. This Court determined that the appropriate

disposition in such a situation is to "reverse the [trial] court's judgment

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and remand th[e] case for [the trial] court to set aside [its] probation-

revocation order and conduct a new probation-revocation hearing that is

properly recorded and transcribed for this Court's review." Id.

In this case, too, something is missing from the record below that

prevents this Court from "fulfill[ing] its duty to review the circuit court's

actions," though it is a missing circuit judge rather than a missing

transcript. Dennis, 167 So. 3d at 381. The difference, however, is

immaterial, and we hold that the appropriate resolution of this issue is

to follow the procedure used by this Court in Dennis.

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment as being void

for lack of jurisdiction. Because, for reasons outside the State's control, it

is impossible for the circuit judge who entered the judgment Brown

appeals to provide his reasons for revoking Brown's probation and

because we cannot ascertain those reasons from that circuit judge's

original order, which formed the judgment Brown appealed, we remand

this case to the circuit court for that court to set aside its February 24,

2024, probation-revocation judgment and to conduct a new probation-

revocation hearing. That hearing, at which Brown must be represented

by counsel, shall be properly recorded and transcribed for this Court's

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review, and the circuit court must enter written findings in accordance

with Rule 27.6(f), Ala. R. Crim. P., and Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100,

312 So. 2d 620 (Ala. 1975). In the event that Brown is dissatisfied

following his new probation-revocation hearing, he should file a new

appeal to this Court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Windom, P.J., and Cole and Minor, JJ., concur.

Kellum, J., dissents.