Rahal v. Rahal

Erie County Court Common Pleas

Rahal v. Rahal

48 Pa. D. & C. 302, 1943 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 103

CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Erie County

DecidedFebruary 1, 1943

Docketno. 52

StatusPublished

This text of 48 Pa. D. & C. 302 (Rahal v. Rahal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Erie County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rahal v. Rahal, 48 Pa. D. & C. 302, 1943 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 103 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).

Pincite

Opinion

Evans, J.,

This matter appears

before the court on the petition of libellant to discontinue the divorce action brought to the above number and term, and also on a motion to strike off an answer and counterclaim filed by respondent.

The ground for divorce, as alleged in the libel, is indignities to the person, with no details which, in our opinion, constitute any reflection on the character of respondent. The fact that libellant has sought to withdraw the complaint rather indicates the conclusion that he is unable to sustain an action for divorce on the ground set forth. Inasmuch as it is the policy of the courts to promote the continuance of the marriage relationship and the withdrawal or settlement of controversies, we feel that permission to discontinue the action should be. granted.

In respondent’s counterclaim there are allegations of damage because of the divorce proceeding and a claim is made therefor which we consider to be no part of this lawsuit. We have been unable to find, nor have there been cited to us by counsel for respondent, any authorities from which we can conclude that an action for willful and malicious harm can be raised and disposed of in a suit for divorce.

And now, to wit, February 1,1943, the prayer of the petition to discontinue the above action is granted and the motion to strike off the answer and counterclaim is made absolute.

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Evans, J.,

This matter appears

before the court on the petition of libellant to discontinue the divorce action brought to the above number and term, and also on a motion to strike off an answer and counterclaim filed by respondent.

The ground for divorce, as alleged in the libel, is indignities to the person, with no details which, in our opinion, constitute any reflection on the character of respondent. The fact that libellant has sought to withdraw the complaint rather indicates the conclusion that he is unable to sustain an action for divorce on the ground set forth. Inasmuch as it is the policy of the courts to promote the continuance of the marriage relationship and the withdrawal or settlement of controversies, we feel that permission to discontinue the action should be. granted.

In respondent’s counterclaim there are allegations of damage because of the divorce proceeding and a claim is made therefor which we consider to be no part of this lawsuit. We have been unable to find, nor have there been cited to us by counsel for respondent, any authorities from which we can conclude that an action for willful and malicious harm can be raised and disposed of in a suit for divorce.

And now, to wit, February 1,1943, the prayer of the petition to discontinue the above action is granted and the motion to strike off the answer and counterclaim is made absolute.

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Bluebook (online)

48 Pa. D. & C. 302, 1943 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rahal-v-rahal-pactcomplerie-1943.