[Cite as Ragouzis v. Madison House Condominium Owners Assn., Inc., 2025-Ohio-2797.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY
EDGAR T. RAGOUZIS, et al., :
Appellants, : CASE NOS. C-240402 C-240407 - vs - : JUDGMENT ENTRY THE MADISON HOUSE : CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., :
Appellees. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the Clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on August 8, 2025 per order of the court.
By: Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
By: Mike Powell, Judge
By: Juergen A. Waldick, Judge [Cite as Ragouzis v. Madison House Condominium Owners Assn., Inc., 2025-Ohio-2797.]
Appellants, : CASE NOS. C-240402 C-240407 : - vs - OPINION :
THE MADISON HOUSE : CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., :
Appellees.
CIVIL APPEAL FROM HAMILTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. A-2204283
Edgar T. Ragouzis, pro se.
Reminger Co., LPA, and Ian D. Mitchell and James M. Schirmer, for appellant, Bertha G. Helmick.
Cummins Law LLC, and James R. Cummins, and Rebecca S. Rhein, and Ethan K. Losier, for appellees, 153 Interested Party Defendant-Counterclaimants.
OPINION
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellants, Edgar Ragouzis and Bertha Helmick, appeal a decision of the
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granting class certification to a group of Case Nos. C-240402 _ C-240407
condominium owners in a civil action.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The present appeal arises from a dispute among the owners of
condominium units at The Madison House, a 175-unit high-rise building located in Hyde
Park, Ohio. The complex litigation in the trial court involves a large number of parties and
various claims. Our discussion below is limited to the procedural history and facts relevant
to this appeal.
{¶ 3} On November 21, 2022, Ragouzis, Helmick, and five other condominium
owners filed a 22-count complaint against a number of parties, including the condominium
association, the condominium board, the management company, and vendors who
performed work on the building.1 According to the complaint, the defendants were not
following procedure and law, and repairs were not being done properly. The complaint
also alleged that there was a conspiracy and conflict of interest in transactions, and other
related claims. Although no claims were brought against them, the complaint listed the
remainder of the condominium owners as "interested defendants."
{¶ 4} Together, 137 of the interested defendants filed an answer which included
a counterclaim with five causes of action. The counterclaim alleged that Ragouzis,
Helmick, and the other plaintiffs engaged in a conspiracy of harassing conduct that
interfered with the residents' quiet enjoyment of the property and diminished the value of
the property. Additional interested defendants filed answers including the same
counterclaims so that eventually 153 of the interested defendants had asserted the same
counterclaims. For purposes of this opinion, because the appeal involves only the
1. We note that the number of plaintiffs has fluctuated throughout the course of this complex litigation, as another plaintiff was added, then plaintiffs began settling their claims. -3- Case Nos. C-240402 _ C-240407
counterclaims, the court will refer to the 153 interested defendants as "Counterclaim
Plaintiffs" and the plaintiffs as "Counterclaim Defendants."
{¶ 5} Together, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify their
counterclaims as a class action on January 24, 2023. The Counterclaim Defendants filed
a response arguing against the certification of a class action and the Counterclaim
Plaintiffs replied. No hearing was requested, nor held on the motion, and the trial court
decided the motion based on the parties' filings alone.
{¶ 6} The trial court granted a motion to certify the counterclaim as a class action
on three of the claims: 1) breach of contract for nuisance; 2) tortious interference with a
business relationship; and 3) slander of title. The trial court found the other two claims,
frivolous litigation and a request to determine Ragouzis is a vexatious litigator, were not
subject to class certification as they were not independent causes of action. Instead, the
court indicated these claims should be presented as post-judgment motions.
{¶ 7} The trial court certified the class as the following2:
All condominium unit owners within the Madison House— except for the eight Counterclaim defendants—at the time that the Motion for Class Certification was filed, which was on January 24, 2023.
This class may be modified by the Court as the case progresses and new information becomes available or legal considerations evolve. If the court finds modification necessary to ensure the fair and equitable resolution of this action, no individuals currently in the Class would be removed. However, additional members may be added who owned a condominium in the Madison House either before or after January 24, 2023 and have cognizable claims against Counterclaim Defendants which are typical of the Class.
2. Amended certification October 15, 2024. -4- Case Nos. C-240402 _ C-240407
Assignments of Error
{¶ 8} Counterclaim Defendants Ragouzis and Helmick now appeal the trial
court's decision to certify the counterclaim as a class action.3 Helmick raises the following
two assignments of error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RULE 23 MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN THE PLEADINGS AND APPENDED TO THE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RULE 23 MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION WITHOUT HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
{¶ 9} Ragouzis raises the following three assignments of error on appeal:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION WHEN[ ] THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT RIGOROUSLY ANALYZE ANY OF THE FACTORS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION. II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CERTIFYING THIS CASE AS A CLASS ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFFS MEETING THEIR EVIDENTIARY BURDEN TO SATISFY ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION AS A CLASS UNDER CIV.R. 23(A). III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT THE CLASS MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF CIV.R. 23(B)(3).
{¶ 10} Because they are dispositive of the appeal, we begin our discussion with
Helmick's first and Ragouzis' second assignments of error which challenge the trial court's
determinations under Civ.R. 23(A).
Class Action Legal Framework
{¶ 11} The purpose of a class action is to facilitate the adjudication of disputes
involving common issues between multiple parties in a single action. Planned Parenthood
Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St. 3d 56, 62 (1990); Marck v. Partin,
12th Dist. Brown No. CA2023-11-013, 2024-Ohio-4829, ¶ 11. Utilizing the framework
3. The remaining Counterclaim Defendants did not appeal the trial court’s certification order.
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provided in Civ.R. 23, a trial court must find that seven prerequisites are satisfied before
certifying a class:
(1) an identifiable class must exist and the definition of the class must be unambiguous;
(2) the named representatives must be members of the class;
(3) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical;
(4) there must be questions of law or fact common to the class;
(5) the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
(6) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and
(7) one of the three Civ.R. 23(B) requirements must be satisfied.
Voss v. Quicken Loans, LLC, 2024-Ohio-12, ¶ 34-36 (1st Dist.), citing In re Consol. Mtge.
Satisfaction Cases, 2002-Ohio-6720, ¶ 6. If a party fails to establish even one of these
requirements, class certification is not proper. Shipp v. Norton Outdoor Advertising., Inc.,
2022-Ohio-216, ¶ 9.
{¶ 12} In this case, the trial court made the first six findings above, and with respect
to the seventh prerequisite, found pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(3) that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods to the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
{¶ 13} Because a class action is "'an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only,'" the party seeking to
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maintain a class action bears the burden to affirmatively establish compliance with Civ.R.
23. Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2013-Ohio-373 ¶ 11, quoting Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701 (1979). The party seeking class action certification
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed class
meets each of the requirements in Civ.R. 23. Jones v. Sharefax Credit Union, Inc., 2022-
Ohio-176, ¶ 21 (1st. Dist.).
{¶ 14} A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to certify a class
action and the trial court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse
of that discretion. Hamilton v. Ohio Savings Bank, 1998-Ohio-365, ¶ 11. An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court's decision-making is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Edje v. Holmes, 2024-Ohio-1663, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). The use of this
standard is grounded in the trial court's special expertise and familiarity with case
management and the inherent power to manage its own docket. Hamilton at ¶ 11.
However, the trial court's discretion is not unlimited and it must be exercised within the
framework of Civ.R. 23. Voss, 2024-Ohio-12, at ¶ 35; Hamilton at ¶ 12.
{¶ 15} In addition, "[a] trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis when
determining whether to certify a class and may grant certification only after resolving all
relevant factual disputes and finding that sufficient evidence proves that all of the
requirements have been satisfied." Safi v. Central Parking Sys. Ohio, Inc., 2015-Ohio-
5274, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), citing Cullen at paragraph one of the syllabus; Sharefax at ¶ 24-25.
A trial court is not required to make formal findings to support its decision, although formal
findings are preferable. Hamilton at ¶ 13; Sharefax at ¶ 26.
{¶ 16} A trial court's "articulation of the reasons for the decision tends to provide a
firm basis upon which an appellate court can determine that the trial court exercised its
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discretion within the framework of Civ.R. 23, and discourages reversal on the ground that
the appellate judges might have decided differently had they been the original
decisionmakers." Hamilton at ¶ 13. Conversely, "the failure to provide an articulated
rationale greatly hampers an appellate inquiry into whether the relevant Civ.R. 23 factors
were properly applied by the trial court . . . ." Id. This court has recognized that explicit
findings are especially important where a trial court grants certification. Sharefax at ¶ 28.
Numerosity Requirement
{¶ 17} We begin our discussion with an analysis of the numerosity requirement.
Under Civ.R. 23(A)(1), a class action may only be maintained if "the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable." "'The reason for [the impracticability]
requirement is obvious. Only when joinder is impracticable is there a need for a class
action device.'" In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir.1996), quoting 1 Herbert
B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, § 3.01, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1992).
{¶ 18} When considering this requirement, there are not particular numerical limits.
Warner v. Waste Mgt., 36 Ohio St.3d 91, 97(1988). Instead, this determination must be
made on a case-by-case basis. Id. Ohio courts have provided approximate ranges to
guide the analysis. Shipp, 2022-Ohio-216, at ¶ 11, citing Warner at 97. If a class has less
than 25 members, it likely does not meet the numerosity requirement, while generally, if
a class has more than 40 people in it, numerosity will be satisfied. Warner at 97; Shipp at
11. However, regardless of the number of members in the class, "'impracticability of
joinder must be positively shown, and cannot be speculative.'" Young v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 541 (6th Cir. 2012), quoting Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d
950, 966 (6th Cir.2005); Shipp at ¶ 11, ¶ 15.
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Trial Court Arguments, Decision, and Arguments on Appeal
{¶ 19} As mentioned above, no hearing was held on the motion for class
certification. Accordingly, our review on appeal is limited to the evidence and arguments
presented in the motion for class certification and the responses presented to the trial
court.
{¶ 20} In the motion for class certification, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs argued that
the numerosity requirement was met based on the fact that the number of unit owners
was more than 200 people.
{¶ 21} The Counterclaim Defendants responded, arguing that the class was not so
numerous that joinder was impractical. They argued that the law does not provide "a hard
and fast rule" regarding the number of class members and that impracticality of joinder
must be established. They further argued that the property owners have already been
easily identified, and all but four have been served with the complaint filed by plaintiffs.
They further argued that geographic proximity could not be closer and public records
show ownership.
{¶ 22} In response to these arguments, Counterclaim Plaintiffs asserted that R.C.
5311.23(A) specifically "endorses" a class action format for owners of condominium units
on behalf of all unit owners and argued this provision would be rendered meaningless if
the close proximity of owners prohibits certification. They again focused on the number
of owners in order to establish numerosity and claimed that at 147 members,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs are "well over the threshold to certify a class action in Ohio."
{¶ 23} The trial court's entry granting class certification listed the Civ.R. 23
requirements, stating in turn that each was satisfied, but the trial court did not provide any
reasoning or rationale for its decision. With regard to numerosity, the entry simply states
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that "[t]he proposed Class satisfies the numerosity requirement[.]"
{¶ 24} The parties' arguments on appeal mirror those presented in the trial court.
Counterclaim Defendants argue that the Counterclaim Plaintiffs have not met their burden
to show that joinder is impractical based on the facts of this case. They contend that a
court should look at factors such as identification of members, determining addresses,
ease of service if joined and geographical dispersion. They further argue that appellants
have not established that joinder is not impractical because the members are already
identified and named as interested parties in the case and the same law firm represents
over 150 of them.
{¶ 25} Counterclaim Plaintiffs argue that Ohio law clearly establishes that class
size, not identifiability or geographic proximity, determines whether joinder is
impracticable and the Ohio Supreme Court established a bright line rule regarding class
size. They contend the volume of members makes individual adjudication impractical, if
not impossible. They contend that Counterclaim Defendants' emphasis on identifiability
and geographic proximity does not defeat class certification because it overlooks its
primary objective and because R.C. 5311.23, the Ohio Condominium Act, provides a
class action mechanism. They contend that while class size is not the sole determinant
for impracticability, it is a heavily weighed factor.
Analysis
{¶ 26} As mentioned above, Counterclaim Plaintiffs' argument that the numerosity
requirement was established is largely based on the general rule regarding the number
of potential class members, along with authorization of class actions under R.C. 5311.23.
{¶ 27} We acknowledge that much of the Ohio caselaw on the numerosity
requirement revolves around the number of potential class members. However, caselaw
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also firmly establishes that the number of potential class members is a guide, not an
absolute rule. Shipp 2022-Ohio-216, at ¶ 11; Currey v. Shell Oil Co., 112 Ohio App.3d
312, 318 (4th Dist.1996); See Warner, 36 Ohio St.3d at 97.
{¶ 28} Moreover, regardless of the number of class members, the proponent of
class certification must still show the class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable.
Ganci v. MBF Inspection Servs., Inc., 323 F.R.D. 249, 255 (S.D. Ohio 2017); Black v.
Dutiel, 2010-Ohio-4626 (5th Dist.). While "large numbers may, in many cases, indicate
the impracticability of joinder, numbers are not a perfect predictor." Turnage v. Norfolk
S. Corp., 307 Fed.Appx. 918, 921 (6th Cir. 2009). "'The reason for [the impracticability]
requirement is obvious. Only when joinder is impracticable is there a need for a class
action device.'" In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir.1996), quoting 1 Herbert
B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, § 3.01, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1992).
{¶ 29} Very few Ohio cases address a challenge to the impracticability requirement
of the numerosity prong of Civ.R. 23(A)(1). Instead, many of the cases discussing the
numerosity prong largely focus on speculative number or nature of the class. See e.g.
Currey v. Shell Oil Co., 112 Ohio App.3d 312, 318 (4th Dist.1996) (the existence of "mere
possible class members" insufficient); Miranda v. Saratoga Diagnostics, 2012-Ohio-2633
(8th Dist.) (number of potential class members not established).
{¶ 30} "Because the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal law interpreting the federal rule is appropriate and
persuasive authority in interpreting a similar Ohio rule." Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc.,
2015-Ohio-3430, ¶ 24. Accordingly, our analysis of this issue includes consideration of
federal cases addressing the impracticability prong of the numerosity requirement.
{¶ 31} "The key to determining whether the numerosity requirement . . . is satisfied
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rests on the impracticability of joining potential class members." Boggs v. Divested Atomic
Corp., 141 F.R.D. 58, 63 (S.D. Ohio 1991). Impracticability is not determined based on a
strict numerical test, but instead, depends on the circumstances surrounding the case. Id.
The proponent is not required to show joinder is impossible, but only that "the plaintiff will
suffer a strong litigational hardship if joinder is required." Id.
{¶ 32} In determining whether joinder would be impractical, courts typically
consider whether joinder would be difficult or inconvenient and consider factors such as
the geographic location of members and whether the potential class members are easily
identifiable and easily served. Turnage, 307 Fed.Appx. at 921; In re Modafinal Antitrust
Litigation, 837 F.3d. 238, 252-53 (3rd Cir. 2016); McGee v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 200 F.R.D.
382 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Davis v. City of Kettering, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 9704, 1987
Ohio App. LEXIS 6111, at *10 (Mar. 13, 1987).
{¶ 33} As mentioned, Counterclaim Plaintiffs argue that geographical location and
identifiability of class members are not issues that impact impracticability of joinder in this
case because R.C. 5311.23 authorizes class actions on behalf of condominium unit
owners. Ohio's Condominium Act, R.C. 5311.23, provides a civil action may be brought
against "any declarant, developer, agent, or unit owner or any person entitled to occupy
a unit . . . for harm caused to any person or the unit owners association by that individual's
failure to comply with any lawful provision of the condominium instruments." R.C.
5311.23(A). In connection with such an action, "one or more unit owners" "may bring a
class action on behalf of all unit owners." R.C. 5311.23(C).
{¶ 34} However, the "may" language in this section is permissive, not mandatory.
Moreover, the ability to bring a class action under this section is dependent on compliance
with all the applicable class action requirements. Akerstrom v. 635 Lakeside Ltd., 2018-
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Ohio-98 (8th Dist.). In other words, R.C. 5311.23 "is only applicable if the requirements
set out in Civ.R. 23(A) and (B) are met." Knittle v. Big Turtle II Condominium Unit Owners
Assn., 46 Ohio App 3d. 59, 61 (11th Dist. 1988). Therefore, while R.C. 5311.23 authorizes
a class action on behalf of condominium unit owners, the proponent must still meet the
statutory requirements for a class action. Accordingly, while geographical location and
identifiability may not be critical considerations for impracticability when the class
members are condominium owners, impracticability of joinder must still be established.
{¶ 35} Turning to the facts of the case before us, we find that although it is certainly
possible that under different circumstances, a class of over 150 condominium owners
may meet the numerosity requirement, the case before us presents a unique situation—
the potential class action members are already joined in the litigation. As mentioned, the
initial complaint named all of the remaining condominium owners as "interested
defendants" in the action, and so they are already joined in the case. Counterclaim
Defendants allege that at the time of filing their brief, all but four of the owners had been
served with the initial complaint and were joined in the litigation. As mentioned, already
joined as "interested defendants," the 153 Counterclaim Plaintiffs, represented by the
same attorney and law firm, filed the counterclaims they now seek to certify as a class
action.
{¶ 36} Finally, we note that Counterclaim Plaintiffs argue that the number of
members in this proposed class "makes individual adjudications impractical if not
impossible" and "prevents a factfinder from keeping track of all individual
counterclaimants and class members in a trial and rendering a reasoned judgment."
Counterclaim Plaintiffs did not argue or present evidence on this issue before the trial
court, nor have they further explained this statement as it applies to the specific facts of
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this case.
{¶ 37} The judicial economy and practicalities of multi-party litigation are
appropriately considered under the superiority prong, while the numerosity requirement
examines whether joinder of the parties is impractical. See Civ.R. 23(B)(3) (class action
is superior to other available methods to the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy) and Civ.R. 23(3) (class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is
impractical).
{¶ 38} Counterclaim Plaintiffs have not alleged any specific impracticability of
joinder exists as it relates to their counterclaims. Nor does the trial court's decision reflect
any factual findings or analysis regarding the manner in which joinder is impracticable.
Although the number of potential class members is large, nothing in the arguments
presented below establishes that joinder would be impracticable. See Mundell v.
Landstyles, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 3691 (8th Dist. Sept. 6, 2001) (joinder not
impracticable, in part because cases consolidated prior to filing motion for class
certification). Counterclaim Plaintiffs have not argued any specific facts, either before the
trial court or on appeal, to establish the impracticability of joinder.
{¶ 39} We therefore find that Counterclaim Plaintiffs have not positively shown that
joinder is impracticable. See Shipp 2022-Ohio-216, at ¶ 15. Although a preponderance of
the evidence standard applies, some evidence must exist on each element to satisfy the
burden of persuasion. Cullen, 2013-Ohio-473, at ¶ 20. Accordingly, we sustain Helmick's
first assignment of error and Ragouzis' second assignment of error.
{¶ 40} Because the proponent of class certification must establish all of the
requirements of Civ.R. 23, and Counterclaim Plaintiffs have not met their burden to
establish the numerosity requirement by a preponderance of the evidence, class
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certification was not properly granted. The trial court's decision granting class action
certification is hereby reversed. The remainder of the Counterclaim Defendants'
assignments of error are rendered moot.
M. POWELL and WALDICK, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Judges Robert A. Hendrickson and Mike Powell of the Twelfth Appellate District, and Judge Juergen A. Waldick of the Third Appellate District, sitting by assignment in the First Appellate District pursuant to Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(A)(3).
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