Raghav v. Wolf

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedFebruary 26, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-00551
StatusUnknown

This text of Raghav v. Wolf (Raghav v. Wolf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raghav v. Wolf, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Raghav Raghav, No. CV-20-00551-PHX-DJH

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Chad Wolf, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 This matter is before the Court on Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. 16 R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), or alternatively to transfer the matter to the United States District Court 17 for the Southern District of Mississippi, (Doc. 18) and the Report and Recommendation 18 (“R&R”) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Camille D. Bibles on September 29, 19 2020 recommending that this matter be dismissed (Doc. 30). 20 Petitioner seeks judicial review of an order of expedited removal from the United 21 States. (Doc. 1). Petitioner asserts that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Department 22 of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Thuraissigiam 23 I”). Subsequent to the briefing on the Motion to Dismiss, the Supreme Court reversed the 24 Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam I, and divested federal courts of subject matter 25 jurisdiction over actions requesting judicial review of expedited removal orders. Dep’t of 26 Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1959 (2020) (“Thuraissigiam 27 II”). Following a sound analysis, Magistrate Judge Bibles recommends the Petition be 28 1 dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner filed an Objection (Doc. 31)1, 2 to which Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 32). 3 I. Background 4 Raghav Raghav (“Petitioner”) is a native and citizen of India, who entered the 5 United States without inspection on or about June 30, 2019, near Calexico, California. 6 (Doc. 1-2 at 4, 11, 23, 25-26). Petitioner was apprehended, determined to be inadmissible, 7 and placed in expedited removal proceedings under § 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and 8 Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (Doc. 1-2 at 2, 23-27). 9 Petitioner expressed a fear of persecution or torture if returned to India, and he was referred 10 for a credible fear determination and transferred to the La Palma Correctional Center in 11 Eloy, Arizona. (Doc. 1-2 at 5, 26-27). 12 On August 20, 2019, Petitioner appeared before an asylum officer (“AO”) for a 13 credible fear interview. (Doc. 1-2 at 5). The AO found Petitioner failed to establish a 14 credible fear of persecution or torture if removed to India. (Id. at 4, 8). Petitioner requested 15 review by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b)(1)(b)(iii)(III). The 16 Immigration Judge affirmed the AO’s negative credible fear determination and, on August 17 21, 2019, Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States pursuant to § 235(b)(1) 18 of the INA. (Doc. 1 at 5-6, 9; Doc. 18 at 2). On September 29, 2019, Raghav was 19 transferred from the Eloy detention facility to the Adams County Detention Center in 20 Natchez, Mississippi. (Doc. 18-1 at 2). 21 Petitioner’s Count One asserts that the Asylum Office and Immigration Court 22 violated his due process rights by ignoring evidence of his conditions in India and 23 erroneously applying the law. (Doc. 1 at 11-17). In Count Two, Petitioner alleges that he 24 is entitled to final agency review of the Asylum Office’s negative credible fear 25 determination pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 704 of the Administrative Procedures Act. (Id. at 17- 26 1 Petitioner’s Objection to the R&R spans 18 pages, in violation of LRCiv 7.2(e)(3), which 27 provides that “unless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” There are 28 grounds to strike the non-compliant Objection. Nonetheless, the Court has considered the arguments made in the Objection but cautions counsel against such actions in the future. 1 19). 2 Petitioner asks the Court to assume jurisdiction over this matter, issue a writ of 3 habeas corpus, conduct a hearing, declare that he is being detained in violation of law 4 because the removal order violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights, 5 vacate the expedited removal order, order that he be provided an additional meaningful 6 opportunity to apply for asylum and other relief from removal, and award him reasonable 7 costs and attorney’s fees. (Doc. 1). 8 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively to transfer the matter. (Doc. 9 18). On June 26, 2020, Respondents filed a notice of supplemental authority advising the 10 Court of the United States Supreme Court’s June 25, 2020, decision in Thuraissigiam II. 11 (Doc. 21). Respondents argue that in reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court 12 confirmed the constitutionality of jurisdiction stripping provisions of relevant federal 13 statutes related to expedited removal procedures, therefore divesting courts of jurisdiction 14 over these types of cases. (Id.) 15 II. The R&R 16 Magistrate Judge Bibles determined that this Court does not have subject matter 17 jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims, and they are therefore barred. (Doc. 30). The R&R 18 recommends that the Petition be denied and the case dismissed.2 (Id.) 19 A. Standard of Review 20 “A district judge may reconsider a magistrate’s order in a pretrial matter if that order 21 is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th 22 Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)); See also Grimes v. City & County of S.F., 23 951 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The district court shall defer to the magistrate’s orders 24 unless they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”) (citing Fed. R.Civ. P. 72(b)). “‘The 25 clearly erroneous standard applies to the magistrate judge’s factual findings while the 26 contrary to law standard applies to the magistrate judge’s legal conclusions, which are 27 2 The R&R discussed other grounds by which to grant the relief requested by Respondents, 28 including transferring venue. Because the Court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it will not discuss these alternative grounds. 1 reviewed de novo.’” Lovell v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (D. Haw. 2 2010) (quoting Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007)). 3 Under the “clearly erroneous” standard, “‘a reviewing court must ask whether, ‘on the 4 entire evidence,’ it is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 5 committed.’” In re Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litigation, 801 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 6 2015) (internal quotes omitted); accord. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001). 7 “A decision is contrary to law if it applies an incorrect legal standard or fails to consider 8 an element of the applicable standard.” Lovell, 728 F. Supp. at 1101 (internal quotations 9 omitted). 10 Moreover, in every case, it is presumed that a case is outside the jurisdiction of the 11 federal courts unless it is proven otherwise. Kokkonen v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Raghav v. Wolf, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raghav-v-wolf-azd-2021.