Rafael Sanchez v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: April 10, 2013
• Docket: A13A0213
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., BOGGS and MCFADDEN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. (Court of Appeals Rule 4 (b) and Rule 37 (b), February 21, 2008) http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/

April 10, 2013

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A13A0213. SANCHEZ v. THE STATE.

MCFADDEN, Judge.

After a jury trial, Rafael Sanchez was convicted for trafficking in

methamphetamine. He argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence that

police found an unidentified substance in his pocket at the time of his arrest. Because

the evidence was relevant to whether Sanchez committed the trafficking offense, we

find no error and affirm.

Viewed most favorably to the verdict, the evidence showed that, working with

a confidential informant, law enforcement officers arranged to purchase two ounces

of methamphetamine from a person named David. That person arrived at the

designated spot for the transaction driving a car owned by Sanchez, who was the front

seat passenger; a third person was in the back seat. Law enforcement officers arrested the three persons in the car, searched the car, and found two ounces of an off-white

substance in two baggies inside a flashlight that was on the back seat floorboard.

Subsequent testing identified this substance as methamphetamine. An officer also

searched Sanchez incident to his arrest and found in his front pocket a similar baggie

containing a white, granulated substance that the officer suspected to be

methamphetamine. Subsequent testing did not determine the identity of this substance

but revealed that it was “negative for common drugs of abuse.”

Sanchez argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude as

irrelevant any evidence about the substance found in his pocket. “The admission of

evidence is a matter which rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge;

and if an item of evidence has a tendency to establish a fact in issue, that is sufficient

to make it relevant and admissible.” (Citation omitted.) Alexander v. State, 239 Ga.

108, 110 (1) (1977). “Unless the potential for prejudice in the admission of evidence

substantially outweighs its probative value, the Georgia rule favors the admission of

any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 545, 547 (2) (2008).

The state presented evidence that the unidentified substance in Sanchez’s

pocket resembled methamphetamine or a substance with which methamphetamine

2 could be “cut” to increase the amount available for sale by weight, and evidence that

the substance was packaged in a similar manner to the methamphetamine found in the

flashlight. We agree with the state that this evidence could support a finding that

Sanchez had knowledge or familiarity with the methamphetamine trade and that,

consequently, the evidence tended to establish a fact that Sanchez had contested at

trial – whether he knew that trafficking in methamphetamine was occurring in his car

at the time of his arrest. See OCGA § 16-13-31 (e).

In his appellate brief, Sanchez points to facts that he argues undermined the

state’s theories that the substance could have been sold as counterfeit

methamphetamine or used to “cut” methamphetamine. These arguments go to the

strength of the evidence regarding the unidentified substance, not its relevance. We

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to allow the evidence. See

Whisnant v. State, 178 Ga. App. 742, 743 (1) (344 SE2d 536) (1986).

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur.