Rafael Gonzalez-Rincon v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Docket: 18-71897
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAFAEL GONZALEZ-RINCON, No. 18-71897 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-299-652 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 5, 2025** Portland, Oregon

Before: McKEOWN and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.***

Rafael Gonzalez-Rincon petitions for review of an order by the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his applications for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). He does not challenge the denial of his application for asylum as time-

barred. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial

evidence the agency’s factual findings underlying an order of removal, which “are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.

Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility finding by the

immigration judge (“IJ”), which derived from differences between Gonzalez-

Rincon’s 2014 and 2017 asylum applications and his failure to provide a consistent

explanation for omissions in the 2014 application. See Kalulu v. Bondi, 128 F.4th

1009, 1014–22 (9th Cir. 2024) (discussing substantial evidence standard for

reviewing an IJ’s adverse credibility determination).

Alternatively, the BIA affirmed the deportation order assuming, arguendo,

the truth of Gonzalez-Rincon’s testimony regarding his father’s murder in 1985

and the dangers his family faced. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Gonzalez-

Rincon failed to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal based on a

clear probability that he would be subjected to persecution as a member of his

proposed particular social groups. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding

that Gonzalez-Rincon’s fear of harm was too speculative to support a claim for

relief. See Gonzalez-Lara v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2024)

2 18-71897 (concluding that lack of past persecution of the petitioner and ongoing safety of

family members residing in their home country constitutes substantial evidence to

support the BIA’s denial of petition for asylum and withholding of removal).

We also deny the petition for review of the BIA’s denial of CAT protection.

The BIA considered “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future

torture.” Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914–15 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 8

C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that

Gonzalez-Rincon failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will

face torture if returned to Mexico. See Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175,

1183 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing standard of review and eligibility for CAT relief).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION DENIED.

3 18-71897