Radushinsky v. Itskovich

127 A.D.3d 838, 4 N.Y.S.3d 890
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedApril 8, 2015
Docket2013-03845
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 127 A.D.3d 838 (Radushinsky v. Itskovich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Radushinsky v. Itskovich, 127 A.D.3d 838, 4 N.Y.S.3d 890 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), dated February 25, 2013, as granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss so much of the first and second causes of action as related to a parking space, and the defendants cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of the same order as denied those branches of their motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss so much of the first and second causes of action as related to a storage area.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

*839 The plaintiffs purchased a condominium unit from the defendants, together with an interest in the common elements appurtenant thereto. Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for fraud, alleging, among other things, that the defendants failed to disclose information with respect to a storage area and a parking space that were included in the common elements.

The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss so much of the first and second causes of action as related to the parking space, and properly denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss so much of the first and second causes of action as related to the storage area. “New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no liability on a seller for failing to disclose information regarding the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller which constitutes active concealment” (Simone v Homecheck Real Estate Servs., Inc., 42 AD3d 518, 520 [2007]; see Margolin v IM Kapco, Inc., 89 AD3d 690, 691 [2011]). “To maintain a cause of action to recover damages for active concealment in the context of a fraudulent nondisclosure, the buyer must show, in effect, that the seller thwarted the buyer’s efforts to fulfill the buyer’s responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor” (Simone v Homecheck Real Estate Servs., Inc., 42 AD3d at 520; see Margolin v IM Kapco, Inc., 89 AD3d at 691). Here, the verified complaint, along with the affidavit the plaintiffs submitted in opposition to the motion, contain allegations of conduct that might have thwarted the plaintiffs’ efforts to fulfill their responsibilities imposed by the doctrine of caveat emptor with respect to the storage area, but not with respect to the parking space.

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit.

Mastro, J.P., Dickerson, Cohen and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Striplin v. AC&E Home Inspection Corp.
218 A.D.3d 513 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2023)
Razdolskaya v. Lyubarsky
2018 NY Slip Op 2817 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2018)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
127 A.D.3d 838, 4 N.Y.S.3d 890, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/radushinsky-v-itskovich-nyappdiv-2015.