Radigan v. O'Connell

280 A.D. 92, 111 N.Y.S.2d 695, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3399
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedApril 8, 1952
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 280 A.D. 92 (Radigan v. O'Connell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Radigan v. O'Connell, 280 A.D. 92, 111 N.Y.S.2d 695, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3399 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1952).

Opinion

Shientag, J.

This is a proceeding to review a determination of the State Liquor Authority canceling the petitioners’ liquor license and ordering a forfeiture of the petitioners’ $1,200 license fee for the balance of the statutory period. The action of the State Liquor Authority was taken after a hearing and on the basis of four charges each of which the Authority found was sustained:

(1) the failure to conduct a bona fide restaurant;

(2) the failure to keep adequate books and records;

(3) the sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated or apparently intoxicated person, and

(4) permitting the licensed premises to become disorderly.

The determination of the State Liquor Authority was made

as the result of a visit to the licensed premises by one of its investigators on three occasions: on July 25, 1951, between 5:35 p.m. and 7:45 p.m. ; on August 1, 1951, between 7:10 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. ; and again on August 2, 1951, between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m.

Petitioners are copartners, owning and operating a restaurant, bar and grill at premises 1438 Fulton Street in the borough of Brooklyn, city of New York. The establishment is a very small one, containing seven tables and having a total seating capacity of twenty persons. The premises are described by the investigator as ‘ ‘ located in a section of Brooklyn inhabited by Negroes and the clientele is comprised of that race it is patronized in large part by longshoremen and laborers.

The premises have been licensed continuously since 1934 and have never been refused a renewal of license. In March, 1948, petitioners received their license by way of transfer of ownership. At no time since then has there been any occasion to institute any prior proceedings to revoke, cancel or suspend petitioners’ license. Apparently the main cause for the revoca[94]*94tion of the license was based on Charge 1 “ That the licensees have ceased to conduct on the licensed premises a bona fide restaurant, within the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law ”. This opinion will later deal fully with that charge, but before doing so I shall refer, more or less briefly, to the remaining three charges. Each of the four charges is separate and distinct and must stand or fall on the evidence relating to it.

The fourth charge is that the licensees ‘ suffered or permitted premises to become disorderly in that there was the use of foul and profane language therein on July 25, August 1 and August 2,1951.” The investigator testified, without giving any particulars, that “ the deportment of the patrons during my visits was generally unsatisfactory. The use of profanity was audible to all present; it was commonplace, and ignored by the management.” On this subject he testified as follows:

Q. Now, as far as the clientele of this restaurant, would you say that they are, as you said before, in a rather low income group? A. Yes, and perhaps not schooled in the best of the King’s English.
‘5 Q. What did you observe about them, when you were there, about the patrons that came in and out? A. Well, as I said earlier in my report, there was profanity used pretty broadly by the patrons, and this language was audible. The room is a relatively small one, and it was audible throughout the room. As you say they are of the low income group; it was apparent from their dress which was shabby, and in most cases they were not educated refined people in any sense. They were distinctly on the uncouth side, those that were present at least during my visits.
“ Q. Would you say that those particular types of patrons would be in keeping with the neighborhood where this bar and grill is located? A. On the whole, I would.”
On cross-examination the investigator gave the following testimony :
Q. Mr. Johnson, this profanity you spoke of, when you were there, it was ignored by the management, is that right? A. That’s correct.
“ Q. And ignored generally by all the customers, there? A. Yes.
“ Q. It was common ordinary language used by people at that type of gatherings, is that so? A. No one entered any objection to it, if that’s what you mean.
[95]*95“ Q. It wasn’t offensive to anybody there? A. It didn’t appear to be.
Q. The people were peaceful, is that right? A. Nobody was angry at anybody else there, no.
1 ‘ Q. The profanity which you heard was used in the ordinary conversation, was it not, among the group there? A. It was in ordinary conversational tones, but they were audible throughout the premises, if that is what you’re driving at.
“ Q. Was the profanity used in connection with any violence or fighting? A. No, there was no violence.
‘ ‘ Q. All peaceable and happy among themselves, is that right? A. That’s true.”

Surely, on the basis of the foregoing, it can hardly be said that the State Liquor Authority established by substantial evidence that these licensed premises were being conducted in a disorderly manner, and that charge should be dismissed.

The third charge is that the licensees violated Section 65, of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law in that they sold, delivered or gave away or permitted to be sold, delivered or given away alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person or to a person or persons actually or apparently under the influence of liquor, on August 1, 1951.” What is the basis of this charge which resulted in the revocation of the liquor license? The investigator testified: On August 1, 1951, I made a second visit to these premises at 7:10 p.m., remaining until 8:30 p.m. On this occasion I found Badigan [one of the licensees] working alone. I ordered a drink from him, and stood at the bar. During this visit a colored man, dressed in shabby clothes entered the premises with another man. The shabbily dressed man staggered badly, his eyes were bloodshot, he was talking incoherently in part. During his speech to his companion, he leaned heavily on the bar for support. He ordered a large bottle of beer from Badigan, and Badigan without any question or hesitation served this man who was apparently intoxicated, a bottle of beer and gave him 2 glasses. The man staggered to a table where, with his companion he consumed the beer. The bottle of beer was ordered and paid for by the apparently intoxicated person.” On cross-examination he gave the following testimony:

Q. You testified that a man came in there, and appeared to you to be intoxicated, is that right? A. That’s correct.
‘ ‘ Q. Did you at any time get close enough to smell his breath? A. That I did not.
“ Q. He appeared to be staggering, his eyes were somewhat bloodshot, and that he went to the bar? A. That’s right.
[96]*96“ Q, He ordered a quart bottle of beer, paid for it, and sat down at a table with two glasses?' A. That’s right.
“ Q. And the companion with him, did he appear to be perpectly normal? A. He seemed to be sober, yes.
“ Q. He walked from the bar to the table by himself, did he not? A.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
280 A.D. 92, 111 N.Y.S.2d 695, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3399, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/radigan-v-oconnell-nyappdiv-1952.