Radford v. Radford

433 S.E.2d 35, 16 Va. App. 812, 10 Va. Law Rep. 57, 1993 Va. App. LEXIS 318
CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedJuly 27, 1993
DocketRecord No. 1841-92-3
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 433 S.E.2d 35 (Radford v. Radford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Radford v. Radford, 433 S.E.2d 35, 16 Va. App. 812, 10 Va. Law Rep. 57, 1993 Va. App. LEXIS 318 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

Opinion

BARROW, J.

This appeal is from a decree terminating an award of spousal support. In affirming the decree, we hold that spousal support provided for in an agreement terminates upon the remarriage or death of the person to whom the support is payable, unless the agreement expressly provides for its continuation.

The parties agreed in writing that “the husband shall pay unto the wife the sum of $200.00 per month for a period of 5 years.” The agreement was incorporated into a decree of divorce.

The wife remarried before the end of the five year period referred to in the agreement. Because the agreement was silent regarding the effect of the death or remarriage of the wife, the trial court, relying on Code § 20-109, terminated the husband’s obligation to pay spousal support following the wife’s remarriage.

Code § 20-109 terminates spousal support “[u]pon the death or remarriage of the spouse receiving support . . . unless otherwise provided by stipulation or contract.” See also Code § 20-109.1. This language contemplates an expressed, not implied, provision that support shall not terminate upon death or remarriage. By resolving ambiguity, Code § 20-109 reduces litigation. To permit its mandate to be overcome by implication would introduce ambiguity, encourage litigation and, thereby, undermine the statute’s purpose.

The statute applies to periodic payments of spousal support, not to a lump sum award. Mallery-Sayre v. Mallery, 6 Va. App. 471, 473, 370 S.E.2d 113, 114-15 (1988). A lump sum award is one “for an amount certain which is due when awarded but for which the obligation of payment is deferred by future installments.” Id. The provision in this agreement, however, was not a lump sum award of spousal support. A “sum of $200.00 per month for a period of 5 years” is not “an amount certain which is due when awarded.” Id. The amount due from the husband at the time this agreement was entered into was not *814 the full amount due for the full five year period. The amount due became vested at the rate of $200 per month. See Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 342, 10 S.E.2d 893, 898 (1940).

Admittedly, one can infer from this agreement that the parties intended to arrive at a sum certain by multiplying the monthly obligation by sixty months. However, because we construe Code § 20-109 to require an expressed provision to avoid termination of spousal support upon death or remarriage, we cannot overcome the statute’s direction by inferring the intent of the parties.

Consequently, because the spousal support was not a lump sum award and the agreement contained no express provision for continuation upon the death or remarriage of the spouse receiving support, the spousal support terminated upon the wife’s remarriage. The trial court’s decree is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.

Moon, C.J., and Koontz, J., concurred.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Alice Jin-Yue Guan v. Bing Ran
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2017
Barbara Deanne Smith v. Eric Wendell Thompson
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2015
Waugh v. Waugh
79 Va. Cir. 120 (Fairfax County Circuit Court, 2009)
Phoenix Services Ltd. Partnership v. Johns Hopkins Hospital
892 A.2d 1185 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 2006)
Moore v. Jacobsen
817 A.2d 212 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2003)
Hardesty v. Hardesty
570 S.E.2d 878 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2002)
Rubio v. Rubio
549 S.E.2d 610 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2001)
James Van Shoaf, Jr. v. Joyce Hobson Shoaf
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2001
Hering v. Hering
533 S.E.2d 631 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2000)
Mullen v. Mullen
48 Va. Cir. 200 (Montgomery County Circuit Court, 1999)
Biddle v. Biddle
46 Va. Cir. 433 (Stafford County Circuit Court, 1998)
Langley v. Johnson
499 S.E.2d 15 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1998)
Dickson v. Dickson
474 S.E.2d 165 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1996)
Gayler v. Gayler
455 S.E.2d 278 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1995)
MacNelly v. MacNelly
437 S.E.2d 582 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
433 S.E.2d 35, 16 Va. App. 812, 10 Va. Law Rep. 57, 1993 Va. App. LEXIS 318, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/radford-v-radford-vactapp-1993.