Radford v. Kachman

Ohio Court of Appeals

Radford v. Kachman

160 N.E. 875, 27 Ohio App. 86, 5 Ohio Law. Abs. 742, 1927 Ohio App. LEXIS 418

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedOctober 15, 1927

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 160 N.E. 875 (Radford v. Kachman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Radford v. Kachman, 160 N.E. 875, 27 Ohio App. 86, 5 Ohio Law. Abs. 742, 1927 Ohio App. LEXIS 418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1927).

Pincite

Opinion

OPINION OF COURT.

The following is taken, verbatim, from the opinion.

MAUCK, J.

Whether the plaintiff was entitled to exempt the property turns upon the question of whether or not the plaintiff was the owner of a homestead at the time his right to an exemption accrued.

From the record we gather that on July 28, 1925, suit was filed against the plaintiff bv the defendant Radford and the personal property involved was attached, that at that time the plaintiff and his wife were owners of the tract of land mentioned, which they subsequently conveyed to The Athens Lumber Co., and that, contemporaneously therewith, The Athens Lumber Co. gave back to the plaintiff, a contract by which the plaintiff could re-acquire the legal title to the land. It further appears *743 that this conveyance was, in effect, a _ mortgage only; that the lumber company did not, in fact, purchase the property but took legal title thereto for the purpose of securing its pay for erecting, thereon, a dwelling house to replace one that had been destroyed by fire. On July 28th, when the suit before the justice of the peace was begun and the personal property was seized by attachment, the plaintiff had both legal and equitable title to the land now claimed to have been his homestead. On Sept. 12th, when the judgment and order of sale were obtained against the plaintiff, the latter owned the equitable but not legal title to that real estate. The first question that arises, therefore, is whether the right to have exemption depends upon the status of the claimant at the time the order of sale was issued, on Sept. 12th, or at the time the property was attached, on July 28th.

This question, so far as an execution levy was concerned, was considered in Johnson Electric Co. v. Spence, 28 Oh. Ap. 44, where it was held that the right to claim the property in lieu of a homestead was fixed as of the date of the levy. That case can be said, therefore, to have determined that, as against execution, the rights of parties are fixed at the time, the execution is levied. To like effect is Nixon v. Van Dyke, 2 C. C. 63. It is argued, however, that while the rights of the parties as against an execution are to be determined at the time the property is seized, a different rule prevails as against an order of attachment; that in the latter case the attachment is not, in fact, levied until money has been raised by the attachment.

This precise question was determined in principle by Selders v. Lane, 40 OS. 345. In that case the judgment debtor demanded his exemption after the sale of the attached property, on the ground that he was then a married man. He was not such married man at the time the levy was made. The court held him not to be entitled to exemption because his rights were fixed at the time of the levy and not at the time of the sale. The levy, in this case, was therefore made at the time the property in question was reduced to the possession of the constable under the writ of attachment and at that time the rights of the parties were fixed.

In this view of the case it'is probably not important that we determine the effect of the deed made by the plaintiff to the lumber company. It seems, from the testimony of the representative of the lumber company, that that company had no substantial interest in the property when it accepted the deed and that the only purpose of the conveyance was to secure the lumber company on a small past due obligation and for material to be thereafter supplied. Manifestly Kachman was the owner of the equitable title to the property.' The well nigh universal holding is that an equitable title is sufficient to support a homestead.

The judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered with the direction that the right of the plaintiff to an exemption be determined as of the date when the property in question was seized by the constable under the order of attachment.

(Middleton, J., concurs. Sayre, PJ., not sitting.)

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OPINION OF COURT.

The following is taken, verbatim, from the opinion.

MAUCK, J.

Whether the plaintiff was entitled to exempt the property turns upon the question of whether or not the plaintiff was the owner of a homestead at the time his right to an exemption accrued.

From the record we gather that on July 28, 1925, suit was filed against the plaintiff bv the defendant Radford and the personal property involved was attached, that at that time the plaintiff and his wife were owners of the tract of land mentioned, which they subsequently conveyed to The Athens Lumber Co., and that, contemporaneously therewith, The Athens Lumber Co. gave back to the plaintiff, a contract by which the plaintiff could re-acquire the legal title to the land. It further appears *743 that this conveyance was, in effect, a _ mortgage only; that the lumber company did not, in fact, purchase the property but took legal title thereto for the purpose of securing its pay for erecting, thereon, a dwelling house to replace one that had been destroyed by fire. On July 28th, when the suit before the justice of the peace was begun and the personal property was seized by attachment, the plaintiff had both legal and equitable title to the land now claimed to have been his homestead. On Sept. 12th, when the judgment and order of sale were obtained against the plaintiff, the latter owned the equitable but not legal title to that real estate. The first question that arises, therefore, is whether the right to have exemption depends upon the status of the claimant at the time the order of sale was issued, on Sept. 12th, or at the time the property was attached, on July 28th.

This question, so far as an execution levy was concerned, was considered in Johnson Electric Co. v. Spence, 28 Oh. Ap. 44, where it was held that the right to claim the property in lieu of a homestead was fixed as of the date of the levy. That case can be said, therefore, to have determined that, as against execution, the rights of parties are fixed at the time, the execution is levied. To like effect is Nixon v. Van Dyke, 2 C. C. 63. It is argued, however, that while the rights of the parties as against an execution are to be determined at the time the property is seized, a different rule prevails as against an order of attachment; that in the latter case the attachment is not, in fact, levied until money has been raised by the attachment.

This precise question was determined in principle by Selders v. Lane, 40 OS. 345. In that case the judgment debtor demanded his exemption after the sale of the attached property, on the ground that he was then a married man. He was not such married man at the time the levy was made. The court held him not to be entitled to exemption because his rights were fixed at the time of the levy and not at the time of the sale. The levy, in this case, was therefore made at the time the property in question was reduced to the possession of the constable under the writ of attachment and at that time the rights of the parties were fixed.

In this view of the case it'is probably not important that we determine the effect of the deed made by the plaintiff to the lumber company. It seems, from the testimony of the representative of the lumber company, that that company had no substantial interest in the property when it accepted the deed and that the only purpose of the conveyance was to secure the lumber company on a small past due obligation and for material to be thereafter supplied. Manifestly Kachman was the owner of the equitable title to the property.' The well nigh universal holding is that an equitable title is sufficient to support a homestead.

The judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered with the direction that the right of the plaintiff to an exemption be determined as of the date when the property in question was seized by the constable under the order of attachment.

(Middleton, J., concurs. Sayre, PJ., not sitting.)

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160 N.E. 875, 27 Ohio App. 86, 5 Ohio Law. Abs. 742, 1927 Ohio App. LEXIS 418, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/radford-v-kachman-ohioctapp-1927.

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