Rademacher v. Rademacher

178 P.2d 973, 27 Wash. 2d 482, 1947 Wash. LEXIS 299
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedApril 2, 1947
DocketNo. 30036.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 178 P.2d 973 (Rademacher v. Rademacher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rademacher v. Rademacher, 178 P.2d 973, 27 Wash. 2d 482, 1947 Wash. LEXIS 299 (Wash. 1947).

Opinion

*483 Jeffers, J.

This action was instituted by A. E. Rademacher and Margaret Rademacher, his wife, against Herbert S. Rademacher and Thelma Rademacher, his wife, in the superior court for Yakima county, on or about June 6, 1945.

The purpose of the action was to compel specific performance of an option to purchase contained in a written lease, dated December 8, 1943, which lease plaintiffs alleged was entered into by the parties to this action. The term of the lease was for a period beginning on November 20, 1943, and ending November 20, 1948. The particular provision contained in the lease relative to the option reads as follows:

“It is further agreed that the lessees under this contract shall have the option of purchasing the property described herein at an agreed price of $10,000.00, plus the cost of any capital investment which may be placed on the property by the lessors subsequent to the signing of this lease. The terms and conditions of said purchase to be agreed upon by the parties at the time of exercising said option. This option may not be exercised prior to November 20, 1944, nor after the 1st of June of any year during the term of this lease. Should the lessees desire to exercise this option after the first day of June of any year, the terms of this lease shall apply for that year and the crop then growing shall be divided according to the terms of this lease.”

Defendants, by their answer, admitted that plaintiffs were in possession of the premises described in the lease attached to and made a part of plaintiffs’ complaint; denied that plaintiffs were in possession by virtue of such lease; and admitted that on or about May 28, 1945, plaintiffs tendered to them the sum of thirteen thousand dollars and asked for a conveyance of the property, which tender defendants refused; Defendants admitted that they refused and still refuse to convey to plaintiffs the property described in the. complaint, and denied that plaintiffs have been damaged in the sum of thirteen thousand dollars or in any other sum.

As a further and affirmative defense, defendants in sub *484 stance alleged that, on or about December 8, 1943, defendants prepared and signed the written instrument a copy of which is attached to plaintiffs’ complaint, and tendered and delivered such instrument to plaintiffs for their signature and execution; that, shortly after such tender and delivery, plaintiffs notified defendants that they would not sign or execute such instrument and further stated that they were not interested in purchasing the property, nor in a lease for more than one year. Plaintiffs, however, retained possession of the instrument.

It is further alleged that, on or about May 1, 1944, the parties orally agreed that defendants should lease to plaintiffs the real property described in plaintiffs’ complaint for the year 1944, the terms of such oral lease being the same as those set forth in the instrument attached to plaintiffs’ complaint, except that no option to purchase was included therein; that plaintiffs, who were then in possession of the property, occupied and farmed the same under the terms of such oral lease during the year 1944.

It is further alleged that, on or about March 12, 1945, plaintiffs still being in possession of the premises, the parties entered into another oral lease for the year 1945, the terms of which were the same as those of the oral lease for 1944, with the following exceptions: By the terms of the 1945 lease, defendants (lessors) were to haul their one-third rental share of the crops, instead of plaintiffs delivering such one-third to defendants, as provided in the 1944 lease; and, by the terms of the 1945 lease, plaintiffs (lessees) were to supply the power for moving all of the fruit crop out of the orchard, instead of defendants supplying such power, as provided in the 1944 lease.

It is further alleged that defendants have performed, or now stand ready and willing to perform, all of their obligations as lessors under the oral lease of 1945; and that defendants are entitled to one third of all crops produced upon the premises for the year 1945. No accounting or settlement of the 1945 crop has been made.

*485 Plaintiffs, by their reply, denied and put in issue the affirmative matter set out in defendants’ answer.

The cause came on for trial before the court on January 3, 1946. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the cause under advisement and, on February 13, 1946, made and filed its memorandum decision, wherein the court stated that, in its opinion, plaintiffs were not entitled to specific performance of the option to purchase, or to damages, and that their action should be dismissed.

On February 13, 1946, plaintiffs filed a motion for decision notwithstanding the oral decision of the court or, in the alternative, for new trial. On March 16, 1946, the court entered an order denying this motion, and in this order it is specifically stated:

“It is now here ordered that the plaintiffs’ motion for decision notwithstanding decision of the court or in the alternative for new trial be denied on the ground that the parties hereto had never entered into the five-year lease as alleged by plaintiffs.” (Italics ours.)

On March 16, 1946, a judgment of dismissal was entered, from which judgment plaintiffs have appealed. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were made or entered.

Appellants make six assignments of error, but, as stated by appellants, they all relate to the main question, namely: Was the written lease and option to purchase, dated December 8, 1943, actually executed and entered into between the parties, and, if so, did it remain a valid and binding lease up to and including the time when appellants made their tender to take up the option to purchase?

This action involves a bearing orchard in the Yakima valley. A. E. Rademacher and Herbert Rademacher are brothers. There is a conflict in the testimony as to just when appellants actually signed the written lease and option, it being the general contention of respondents that appellants never operated the ranch under such written lease and did not sign it until shortly before May 28, 1945, at which time it was apparent there would be an unusually large crop of fruit produced upon the property.

*486 There is also a conflict in the testimony relative to whether or not any oral lease was made and entered into by and between the parties for the year 1944 and the year 1945.

We shall hereinafter refer to appellants as Austin and Margaret, and to respondents as Herbert and Thelma.

Herbert had owned and operated fruit ranches in the Yakima valley for a number of years prior to the time here involved. During the time with which we are here concerned, he owned and operated a fruit ranch in the Tieton district. In the spring of 1943, Herbert had purchased on contract what will be referred to as the Gromore orchard from Mr. and Mrs. Urquhart. This was a twenty-acre orchard and was about fifteen miles from Herbert’s home.

Margaret and Austin had both worked for Herbert during apple harvest on prior occasions, and he considered them good workers.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
178 P.2d 973, 27 Wash. 2d 482, 1947 Wash. LEXIS 299, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rademacher-v-rademacher-wash-1947.