Radcliffe v. Sunrise Family Resource Center

Vermont Superior Court·Decided June 5, 2019·No. 310-10-17 Bncv·Published

Opinion

Radcliffe v. Sunrise Family Resource Center, 310-10-17 Bncv (Barra, J., June 5, 2019) [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]

STATE OF VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Bennington Unit Docket No. 310-10-17 Bncv

Darrell Radcliffe, Plaintiff

v. DECISION ON MOTION Sunrise Family Resource Center, Defendant

This matter is before the court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed tort claims arising from sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Defendant’s former employee when Plaintiff was enrolled in its facility in 1988. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations in 12 V.S.A. § 522, governing actions based on childhood sexual abuse, and by the equitable doctrine of laches. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Radcliffe was born on June 30, 1984. In 1988, he was enrolled in daycare at Sunrise Family Resource Center. He claims that a former employee of Sunrise sexually abused him while he attended that facility. Mr. Radcliffe filed his Complaint on October 30, 2017, bringing claims of battery, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, for which he seeks compensatory and exemplary damages.

Mr. Radcliffe has a long history of mental health problems and has received treatment with multiple healthcare providers. There is evidence before the court that at various points in his life he was diagnosed with ADD, ADHD, PTSD, anxiety, and depression. Mr. Radcliffe maintains that he has always known that he was sexually abused at Sunrise. He has discussed the sexual abuse with several mental healthcare providers. Mr. Radcliffe alleges that although he knew he was sexually abused at Sunrise, and although he discussed the abuse with mental health providers, he did not know that his psychological conditions were caused by the sexual abuse until 2016. That year, he saw a physician’s assistant, Shawn May, of Battenkill Valley Family Health, who explained to him the connection between the abuse and his conditions. Prior to 2016, Mr. Radcliffe claims that he associated his conditions with a multitude of other characteristics of his life, such as anger towards his father, poverty, relationship difficulties, bad luck, and problems in school. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(a). The record evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, who receives the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences. Stone v. Town of Irasburg, 2014 VT 43, ¶ 25, 196 Vt. 356; Robertson v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 2004 VT 15, ¶ 15, 176 Vt. 356.

Sunrise first argues that Mr. Radcliffe’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations in 12 V.S.A. § 522, which provides:

A civil action brought by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within six years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or six years of the time the victim discovered that the injury or condition was caused by that act, whichever period expires later. The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse or exploitation incidents caused the injury.

12 V.S.A. § 522(a). The statute is applicable to this matter by virtue of the retroactivity provision in the enacting legislative act, which provides that the statute applies to all causes of action commenced after July 1, 1990, “so long as either the act of sexual abuse or the discovery that the injury or condition was caused by the act of sexual abuse occurred on or after July 1, 1984.” See 1989, No. 292 (Adj. Sess.), § 4(b); Earle v. State, 170 Vt. 183, 188 (1999). The sexual abuse in this case is alleged to have occurred in 1988.

Additionally, § 522 is tolled until a plaintiff turns eighteen years of age if the action accrued prior to his eighteenth birthday. 12 V.S.A. § 551; Earle, 170 Vt. at 192. Here, Mr. Radcliffe was born on June 30, 1984 and turned 18 on June 30, 2002. If the action accrued before he turned 18, the six-year limitations period expired on June 30, 2008. However, it is possible that the action accrued under the discovery prong of § 522 after his eighteenth birthday, and within six years of the filing of the Complaint on October 30, 2017. Thus, at issue is whether there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the action accrued within six years of the filing of the Complaint.

The word “act” in § 522 does not “refer solely to the alleged act of sexual abuse, but could refer also to the alleged act of negligence by a third party.” Earle, 170 Vt. at 188. The date of accrual under the statute of limitations turns on “the point at which a plaintiff should have discovered the basic elements of a cause of action: an injury caused by the negligence or breach of duty of a particular defendant.” Id. at 193. The six-year limitations period begins to run “when a plaintiff ‘had information, or should have obtained information, sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that a particular defendant may have been liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.’” Id. (quoting Rodrigue v. VALCO Enterprises, Inc., 169 Vt. 539, 541 (1999)). The statute of limitations does not provide:

Page 2 of 6 [L]imitless causes of action, accruing every time a new condition is discovered. Normally, a plaintiff cannot claim that an additional limitations period is inaugurated when additional injuries arising from the same incident are discovered later. A cause of action is generally deemed to accrue at the earliest point at which a plaintiff discovers an injury and its possible cause.

Earle v. State, 170 Vt. 183, 190 (1999).

“[T]he question of when an injury reasonably should have been discovered ‘is one of fact to be determined by the jury.’” Clarke v. Abate, 2013 VT 52, ¶ 10, 194 Vt. 294 (quoting Lillicrap v. Martin, 156 Vt. 165, 172 (1989)). The court may determine the accrual-date issue only “when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party on that issue.” Id. (quoting Turner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, Vermont, 2009 VT 101, ¶ 48, 186 Vt. 396).

Here, Sunrise points to specific references in Mr. Radcliffe’s medical records obtained during discovery and argues that they demonstrate that he was aware of the sexual abuse, the injuries and conditions resulting therefrom, and Sunrise’s breach of a duty for more than two decades before filing the Complaint. These references, however, are small parts of broader narratives and descriptions of Mr. Radcliffe’s many psychological problems and only prove that he discussed his alleged sexual abuse with mental health professionals at various points of his life. They do not prove as a matter of law that Mr. Radcliffe had information, or should have obtained information, sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the sexual abuse caused his psychological conditions or that Sunrise—as opposed to the alleged perpetrator—breached a duty of care, thereby accruing his cause of action six years before the filing of the Complaint. A jury may well make that finding, but Sunrise has failed to prove that there is no genuine dispute as to this material fact.

Sunrise’s first reference to the medical records is from a 1995 psychological report prepared be a psychologist of the Bennington School District in connection with Mr. Radcliffe’s need for special education.

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Related

Clarke v. Abate
2013 VT 52 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2013)
In Re Estate of Lovell
2011 VT 61 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2011)
Turner v. Roman Catholic Diocese
2009 VT 101 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2009)
Earle v. State
743 A.2d 1101 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1999)
Lillicrap v. Martin
591 A.2d 41 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1991)
Stamato v. Quazzo
423 A.2d 1201 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1980)
Rodrigue v. VALCO Enterprises, Inc.
726 A.2d 61 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1999)
Robertson v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.
2004 VT 15 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2004)
Stone v. Irasburg, Town of
2014 VT 43 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2014)
Comings v. Powell
122 A. 591 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1923)