Racine Education Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission

571 N.W.2d 887, 214 Wis. 2d 353, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2438, 1997 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1209
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 22, 1997
Docket97-0306
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 571 N.W.2d 887 (Racine Education Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Racine Education Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 571 N.W.2d 887, 214 Wis. 2d 353, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2438, 1997 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1209 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

SNYDER, P.J.

The Racine Education Association (REA) appeals from a circuit court order which affirmed a decision of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC). WERC had affirmed an opinion issued by a hearing examiner in which the examiner concluded that the Racine Unified School District's (the District) trial implementation of a year-round school calendar was not an issue subject to mandatory bargaining. WERC agreed, concluding that the issue is a permissive subject of bargaining because it relates primarily to educational policy and not to wages, hours and conditions of employment. On review, the circuit court found that there was a rational basis for WERC's conclusion and affirmed. REA now appeals this decision, claiming that WERC erred in its determination that the implementation of a year-round school calendar was primarily related to educational policy rather than to employee hours and working con *355 ditions. Because we conclude that WERC correctly balanced the competing interests, we affirm.

The District and REA have been parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements. At the time of the instant case, the parties were in a hiatus period after the expiration on August 24, 1992, of an agreement which had covered a two-year time period. In early 1991, while under the terms of this agreement, the District began to study the concept of year-round education.

The parties commenced negotiations over the terms of a successor bargaining agreement in the spring of 1992 and negotiations continued throughout 1992 and 1993. In February 1993, the District created a steering committee to examine the feasibility of implementing a year-round educational program beginning in 1994. In October 1993, the school board voted to approve the steering committee's ultimate recommendation to create two year-round schools with implementation of the plan on July 1,1994.

REA filed a complaint with WERC alleging that the District had committed prohibited practices in violation of § 111.70(3)(a)l, 3 and 4, Stats. 1 After holding a series of hearings, a hearing examiner dismissed the complaint, concluding that: (1) the year-round educational program implemented by the District primarily related to educational policy rather than to wages, hours and conditions of employment; (2) because of this, the institution of a year-round program was not a mandatory subject for bargaining; and (3) the District *356 had not violated its duty to bargain over the impact of the year-round educational program on employee wages, hours and conditions of employment. Upon review, the hearing examiner's findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision were affirmed by WERC. 2

REA petitioned the circuit court for review of WERC's decision. See § 227.53, Stats. The circuit court affirmed the decision of WERC in all respects and dismissed REA's petition. REA now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, we review WERC's decision, not the decision of the circuit court. See Jefferson County v. WERC, 187 Wis. 2d 647, 651, 523 N.W.2d 172, 174 (Ct. App. 1994). There are three levels of deference afforded conclusions of law and statutory interpretation in agency decisions. See Sauk County v. WERC, 165 Wis. 2d 406, 413, 477 N.W.2d 267, 270 (1991). "Great weight" is the first and highest amount of deference given to agency interpretations. See id. Under this standard, a reviewing court will defer to an agency interpretation unless "[it] is an irrational one." Id. This standard is the one generally applied in review of agency determinations and has been described as follows:

[I]f the administrative agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute, the agency's conclusions are entitled to deference by the court. Where a legal question is intertwined with factual determinations or with value or policy determinations or where the *357 agency's interpretation and application of the law is of long standing, a court should defer to the agency which has primary responsibility for determination of fact and policy.

Id. (quoting West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 357 N.W.2d 534, 539-40 (1984)).

A second level of review is a midlevel standard, the "due weight" or "great bearing" standard. See id. This is used if the agency's decision is "very nearly" one of first impression. See id. at 413-14, 477 N.W.2d at 270. Finally, for questions that are "clearly one of first impression" in which the agency has "no special expertise or experience" a de novo standard of review is applied. See id. at 414, 477 N.W.2d at 271. This is the least deferential standard. See id.

We initially consider the question of whether this court's review of WERC's decision should be the highly deferential standard urged by the District or whether either of the lower standards is applicable because, as WERC acknowledged, it "has not previously had occasion to consider duty to bargain issues surrounding a shift from a traditional school calendar to a year-round calendar."

Although WERC has not previously considered a duty to bargain within this particular context, determinations of questions of mandatory versus permissive bargaining are frequently considered by WERC. See West Bend Educ. Ass’n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 357 N.W.2d 534, 540 (1984). In each instance, WERC's determination hinges on the specific facts of the case. See Beloit Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 55, 242 N.W.2d 231, 236 (1976). As the supreme court noted in School District of Drummond v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 126, 133, 358 N.W.2d 285, 289 (1984):

*358 The district alleges the commission has no experience on the subject of anti-nepotism rules and their effect on labor relations. Though this may be true, that allegation ignores the experience of the commission in determining subjects of mandatory or permissible bargaining which is the issue in this action.

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571 N.W.2d 887, 214 Wis. 2d 353, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2438, 1997 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1209, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/racine-education-assn-v-wisconsin-employment-relations-commission-wisctapp-1997.