Rachelle Nichole Howell v. Kentucky Bar Association

Kentucky Supreme Court·Decided February 16, 2021·No. 2020 SC 0608·Unknown

Opinion

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2020-SC-0608-KB

RACHELLE NICHOLE HOWELL MOVANT

V. IN SUPREME COURT

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION RESPONDENT

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING REINSTATEMENT

Rachelle Nichole Howell was admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky on October 7, 2003. Her Kentucky Bar Association (“KBA”) member number is 89867, and her bar roster address is 305 Circle Drive, Shepherdsville, Kentucky 40165. She was suspended from the practice of law on March 14, 2019, and now seeks reinstatement. Both the Character and Fitness Committee of the Kentucky Office of Bar Admissions (“Committee”) and the KBA Board of Governors (“Board”) recommend approval of this application. Having reviewed the record developed below, we agree with the Committee and Board and grant Howell’s application for reinstatement with conditions.

STANDARDS FOR REINSTATEMENT Kentucky Supreme Court Rule (“SCR”) 2.300 sets forth certain “reinstatement guidelines” to be applied to applications for reinstatement to the practice of law for someone who has been suspended pursuant to a disciplinary case. Pursuant to this rule, the applicant in a reinstatement case “has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he/she possesses the requisite character, fitness and moral qualification for readmission to the practice of law.” See SCR 2.300(6) (citing SCR 3.330). Whether the applicant possesses these qualifications is the primary concern when determining whether a suspended attorney should be reinstated. See Doan v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 423 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Ky. 2014). To aid in resolving that question, SCR 2.300(6) provides a non-exhaustive list of issues to be considered, including:

(a) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing evidence that he/she has complied with every term of the order of suspension or disbarment.

(b) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing evidence that his/her conduct while under suspension shows that he/she is worthy of the trust and confidence of the public.

(c) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing evidence that he/she possesses sufficient professional capabilities to serve the public as a lawyer.

(d) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing evidence that he/she presently exhibits good moral character.

(e) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing evidence that he/she appreciates the wrongfulness of his/her prior misconduct, that he/she has manifest contrition for his/her prior professional misconduct, and has rehabilitated himself/herself from past derelictions.

The applicant’s “[f]ailure to meet any of these criteria may constitute a sufficient basis for denial of a petitioner’s application.” SCR 2.300(6).

Furthermore, an applicant for reinstatement “will be held to a substantially more rigorous standard than a first-time applicant for an initial admission to the Bar.” SCR 2.300(7). “The prior determination that he/she engaged in professional misconduct continues to be evidence against him or her, and the proof presented must be sufficient to overcome that prior adverse judgment.” Id. Thus, in addition to the criteria listed in SCR 2.300(6), other “considerations to be weighed” include:

The nature of the misconduct for which the applicant was suspended or disbarred.

The applicant’s conception of the serious nature of his or her act.

The applicant’s sense of wrongdoing.

The applicant’s previous and subsequent conduct and attitude toward the courts and the practice, including the element of time elapsed since disbarment.

The applicant’s candor in dealing with the Character and Fitness Committee.

The relevant knowledge of witnesses called by the applicant.

SCR 2.300(7).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Howell was admitted to practice law in October 2003. She initially worked for the Louisville Public Defender’s Office before starting in private practice. Her initial foray into private practice was brief before she accepted employment with the Department of Public Advocacy’s (“DPA”) Post-Conviction

Branch. In 2010, in lieu of resignation, Howell accepted a demotion from Staff Attorney II to Staff Attorney I. Shortly after that, she left DPA to start a solo practice which operated until her suspension in 2019.

I. Prior Disciplinary History To provide a complete and thorough picture of the events giving rise to the present reinstatement application, we find it necessary to briefly discuss Howell’s disciplinary history.

A. Private Admonitions Howell received three private admonitions before her 2019 suspensions.

The first was issued in 2010 due to Howell's failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing several clients and failing to keep them informed of the status of their matters. Howell’s second admonition was in 2015, again for failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, as well as providing financial assistance to a client for pending litigation and for disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal. Howell’s final private admonition was issued in 2016, again for failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client as well as failing to promptly comply with a reasonable request of information and failing to take reasonable steps to protect a client’s interest upon termination.

B. First 2019 Suspension On order of this Court, Howell was suspended on March 14, 2019, for 181 days. The suspension was the result of a consolidated case including ten separate KBA complaints against Howell. The ten complaints resulted in the

Board recommending to this Court that we find Howell guilty of violating SCR 3.130-1.3 (nine counts); 3.130-1.4(a)(3); 3.130-1.4(a)(4) (nine counts); 3.130- 1.15(e); 3.130-1.16(d) (ten counts); and 3.130-8.1(b). For these violations, the Board had recommended a 181-day suspension with ninety days to serve and ninety-one days probated for two years. The Board’s recommendation also included conditions of participation in the Kentucky Lawyers Assistance Program (“KYLAP”), additional continuing education, attendance at the Ethics Professional Enhancement Program (“EPEP”), making restitution within two years of her probation, and payment of the costs associated with the disciplinary proceeding. We accepted the Board’s recommendation of a finding of guilt but rejected the Board’s recommended sanctions.

This Court exercised its right to review the Commission and Board’s recommendations de novo. Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Jacobs, 387 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Jones, 759 S.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Ky. 1988)). We unanimously held the Board’s recommended sanction was inadequate in that a ninety-day suspension permitted Howell’s automatic reinstatement pursuant to SCR 3.510(2). In light of Howell’s prior admonitions and charges, we held reinstatement should be subject to the Committee’s approval as required by SCR 3.510(1). Therefore, we suspended Howell for one hundred eighty-one days with the following additional conditions: that she continue with her KYLAP monitoring agreement; that she receive, at her own expense, at least three hours of continuing legal education on topics relevant to law office management; that she immediately make restitution to her impacted

clients totaling $7,197 plus interest; that she promptly notify and protect her clients pursuant to SCR 3.390; that she cancel any advertising for the duration of the suspension; that she not accept any new clients during the period of suspension; and that she pay the costs of the action totaling $6,725.93.

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Related

Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jones
759 S.W.2d 61 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1988)
Kentucky Bar Association v. Edward L. Jacobs
387 S.W.3d 332 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2012)
Doan v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n
423 S.W.3d 191 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2014)