Rachel Lynn Sanning v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 26, 2024
• Docket: WD85886
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT RACHEL LYNN SANNING, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) WD85886 ) DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, ) Opinion filed: March 26, 2024 STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER K. LIMBAUGH, JUDGE

Division Four: Gary D. Witt, Chief Judge, Alok Ahuja, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

Rachel Sanning (“Sanning”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole

County (“trial court”) sustaining the suspension of her Missouri driver’s license imposed

by the Director of Revenue (“Director”). Finding that the trial court’s judgment is not

supported by substantial evidence, we reverse.

Background

On or about January 31, 2022, the Missouri Department of Revenue (“Department”)

notified Sanning that her driver’s license would be suspended beginning on March 3, 2022,

for thirty days, followed by a sixty-day period of restricted driving privilege. The Department’s letter stated that the suspension was based on the accumulation of eight

points resulting from a conviction for driving while intoxicated. The letter did not indicate

where or when this conviction had occurred.

Pursuant to section 302.311 RSMo,1 Sanning filed a Petition to Review the

Suspension of Her Driver’s License wherein she alleged that she “had not been convicted

of any offense by any court of competent jurisdiction that would justify the imposition of

penalty points” against her driver’s license. The Director answered the petition asserting

that the accumulation of points was based on Sanning’s conviction for “driving while

intoxicated on October 23, 2021, in the United States District Court Military Address

Pacific.”

At the hearing, the Director produced a copy of Sanning’s Missouri driving record

which included an assessment of eight points for a conviction for driving while intoxicated

dated October 23, 2021, in “Military Address Pacific by U.S. DISTRICT court MILITARY

ADDRESS PACIFIC[.]” The Director additionally produced a letter the Department had

received from the Office of the Provost Marshal, Registry of Motor Vehicles, United States

Army Europe and Africa, dated January 3, 2022 (“Provost Marshal’s letter”). The subject

line of the Provost Marshal’s letter stated “Revocation of U.S. Forces driving privileges

while stationed in Germany.” The letter explained, in part, that:

This letter pursuant to Department of Defense policy is your notification that the below listed person who is a member of the U.S. Forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, has been charged and

1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016. 2 sanctioned for driving under the influence of alcohol and his/her U.S. Forces driving privileges have been revoked. The following information is provided: Operator Name: SANNING RACHEL L ... Violation / Offense: He/she was apprehended driving a vehicle while intoxicated. His/her BAC result (blood-alcohol content) was 0.08 grams, or higher, of alcohol per 100 milliliters of whole blood. The actual result of the BAC was 0.1 grams/100 milliliters of whole blood. Violation / Offense Date: 2021-10-23 Adjudication / Action Date: 2021-10-23 ... During her testimony, Sanning acknowledged that she had been arrested for driving

while intoxicated in Ramstein, Germany, while not on a federal installation. However,

according to Sanning, she was never criminally charged by the United States government

or United States military, had never appeared before a military tribunal, and did not enter

a plea in a German court related to the arrest.

The trial court sustained the suspension of Sanning’s driver’s license finding that

she had admitted to being arrested for driving while intoxicated, and that “it is not disputed

that a DWI in Germany is an offense had it occurred in Missouri points would be assessed.”

The trial court concluded that the assertion in the Provost Marshal’s letter that Sanning had

been “charged and sanctioned by the federal government and that her license was revoked”

was sufficient to warrant the Department’s assessment of eight points and the suspension

of her Missouri driver’s license and that Sanning’s argument that the Director had failed to

establish the existence of the underlying conviction was an impermissible collateral attack

on that conviction.

3 This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“On an appeal from a petition for review under section 302.311, an appellate court

reviews the judgment of the trial court rather than the Director’s decision.” Folkedahl v.

Dir. of Revenue, 307 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). We will affirm the judgment

of the trial court “unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against

the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously

applies the law.” Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). All evidence is

viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment. Carlson v. Fischer, 149 S.W.3d 603,

605 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). We review questions of law de novo. See Peterman v. Dir. of

Revenue, 579 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

Analysis

In her single point on appeal, Sanning claims that the trial court’s judgment

upholding the Director’s suspension was not supported by substantial evidence, arguing

that the Provost Marshal’s letter, upon which the Director solely relied to assess points and

suspend her driver’s license, was legally insufficient to support a finding that she had been

“convicted” of driving while intoxicated.

Section 302.304.3 requires the Director to suspend the license and driving privileges

of a person who accumulates at least eight points on their driving record within an eighteen-

month period. Upon suspension or revocation of a driver’s license, a driver may request a

de novo review of the Director’s action in the circuit court where the driver resides. §

302.311. In this review, the trial court applies a three-part burden shifting scheme. First,

4 the driver must establish that she is entitled to a driver’s license. Kinzenbaw v. Dir. of

Revenue, 62 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Mo. banc 2001). Then, the burden shifts to the Director “to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the driver is not entitled to a license.”

Schnitzer v. Dir. of Revenue, 297 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009). To satisfy this

burden, the Director “must make a prima facie showing of the facts necessary to support

the suspension of a license.” Carlson, 149 S.W.3d at 606. If the Director makes this

showing, the burden shifts back to the driver to establish that the facts relied on by the

director are untrue or legally insufficient to support the suspension of her driving

privileges. See id.

There is no dispute that Sanning established that she was entitled to a driver’s

license. Thus, the burden shifted to the Director to show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, the facts necessary to support the suspension of Sanning’s driver’s license. In

order to satisfy this burden, the Director was required to establish that he had received

“notice of a conviction in another state or from a federal court, which, if committed in this

state, would result in the assessment of [eight] points[.]” § 302.160.

In support of his position, the Director introduced two documents at the hearing:

Sanning’s driving record and the Provost Marshal’s letter. The information the Director

entered on Sanning’s driving record concerning the incident in Germany was based solely

on the information contained in the Provost Marshal’s letter. Thus, whether the Director

made his prima facie showing must be evaluated through the contents of the Provost

Marshal’s letter.

5 “There are no specific requirements describing the type of documentary evidence

the director must present to the trial court in order to sustain [his] burden of presenting a

prima facie case for the suspension of a driver’s license based on an out-of-state

conviction.” Schnitzer, 297 S.W.3d at 607. However, a notice received by the Director of

a conviction entered in a foreign jurisdiction must, at a minimum, include the

“identification of the court in which the action was taken.” West v. Dir. of Revenue, 184

S.W.3d 578, 582 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006) (internal marks omitted). This requirement exists

so an aggrieved driver “receives reasonable notice as to why the Director has revoked a

driver’s operating or commercial driver’s license, and by which such driver may

meaningfully exercise his appeal rights accorded by section 302.311.” Id. In this instance,

the notice received by the Director through the Provost Marshal’s letter failed to identify

the court in which the purported conviction was entered and thus was insufficient under

West.2

Even looking past the failure of the notice received by the Director to identify the

court in which the alleged conviction was entered, we would still find the Director’s

evidence to be insufficient to support the suspension of Sanning’s driver’s license.

2 Sanning’s driving record indicates that the conviction was entered in “Military Address Pacific by U.S. DISTRICT court Military Address Pacific[.]” While the information entered into the driving record was obtained from the Provost Marshal’s letter, we note there is no mention in that letter to “Military Address Pacific,” a “U.S. DISTRICT court” or a “conviction” having been entered against Sanning. In fact, the reference to “Military Address Pacific” is confusing, given the event occurred in Germany and the notice received by the Director was issued by the Office of the Provost Marshal, Registry of Motor Vehicles for the United States Army Europe and Africa on letterhead containing an Army Post Office designation of AE which refers to Armed Forces Europe.

6 As an initial matter, we must address the trial court’s finding that Sanning’s

argument—that no criminal conviction exists concerning the events of October 23, 2021—

constituted an impermissible collateral attack of a conviction. In support of this finding,

the trial court relied on Carlson which is readily distinguishable from the present case. In

Carlson, the Director produced a copy of the ticket issued to the driver, a record of

conviction, and sentencing entry form—each from the Gahanna Mayor’s Court, Franklin

County, Ohio. Carlson, 149 S.W.3d at 604. The ticket and the record of conviction both

indicated that the driver had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and

the sentencing entry form contained details of the penalties imposed. Id. at 605. In Carlson,

this Court found the driver’s argument challenging the propriety of the actions of the Ohio

court was an impermissible collateral attack on the previously entered convictions. Id. at

607 (“The propriety of the Ohio court’s action cannot be raised in a proceeding under

section 302.311.”).

Significantly, unlike in Carlson, Sanning is not challenging the legitimacy or

propriety of an underlying conviction entered by a court; rather, she is challenging the

existence of such a conviction. Sanning accurately points out that the Provost Marshal’s

letter made no mention of her having been convicted of any offense. In fact, unlike the

abundance of evidence plainly establishing the existence of the underlying prosecution and

conviction in Carlson, the Provost Marshal’s letter—constituting the only notice received

by the Director—is devoid of any specific reference to an underlying criminal prosecution

let alone whether such a prosecution resulted in a conviction. Sanning was clearly within

her rights to point out these deficiencies in the Director’s prima facie case by arguing the

7 Director had failed to establish the existence of an underlying conviction and it was error

for the trial court to find this effort to be an improper collateral attack of a conviction.

Turning to the merits, the Director argues that reference in the Provost Marshal’s

letter to Sanning having been “charged” and “sanctioned” in connection with an “arrest”

for “driving under the influence” provided a sufficient basis to conclude that she had, in

fact, received a criminal conviction for that conduct. We disagree. As explained above, the

Provost Marshal’s letter never states that Sanning was convicted of a criminal offense and

identifies no court in which such a prosecution was initiated. In fact, the notion that the

intention of the Provost Marshal’s letter was to provide the Director with notice of a

criminal conviction is contradicted by the subject line of the letter which stated

“Revocation of U.S. Forces driving privileges while stationed in Germany.” The subject

line and lack of any reference to a conviction in the body of the letter indicates the purpose

of the Provost Marshal’s letter was to inform the Director of an administrative sanction that

had been imposed against Sanning’s “U.S. Forces driving privileges.” This conclusion

finds additional support from the letter’s assertion that the “violation/offense” and

“adjudication/action” occurred on the same date. The Director fails to explain how Sanning

could have been “convicted” of a criminal offense in a “U.S. DISTRICT court” on the same

day she allegedly committed the offense. The apparent swiftness of the

“adjudication/action” identified in the Provost Marshal’s letter more logically aligns with

an “administrative sanction” of the type identified in the letter’s subject line (and never

disputed by Sanning)—the revocation of Sanning’s driving privileges while stationed in

8 Germany—an action that would not provide the Director a basis to assess the points

necessary to suspend Sanning’s driver’s license.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Director failed to present sufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s finding that Sanning received a conviction for an offense that

would support the assessment of points on her driving record and the resulting suspension

of her driver’s license.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter

is remanded with instructions to set aside the suspension of Sanning’s driver’s license,

order the Director to remove from Sanning’s driving record the purported conviction dated

October 23, 2021, and to reinstate her driving privileges to the extent she is otherwise

eligible.

__________________________________ EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR., JUDGE All concur.