Rachel A. Aranowski v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: February 2, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05315
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 RACHEL A. ARANOWSKI, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05315-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION 12 v. FOR ATTORNEY FEES (DKT. NO. 15) 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 14 Defendant. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to the 17 Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The Commissioner has responded 18 with no opposition to Plaintiff’s motion and instead “defers to the Court’s assessment.” (Dkt. 19 No. 17.) 20 Under the EAJA, the Court must award attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action 21 such as this unless it finds the government’s position was “substantially justified” or that special 22 circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA creates a 23 presumption that fees will be awarded to a prevailing party. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 24 1 (9th Cir. 1995); Zapon v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 53 F.3d 283, 284 (9th Cir. 1995). The 2 Supreme Court has interpreted the term “substantially justified” to mean that a prevailing party is 3 not entitled to recover fees if the government’s position is “justified to a degree that could satisfy 4 a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1992). Attorney fees under

5 EAJA must be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 6 (1983). 7 If a party obtains reversal and remand in a social security benefits case, they are the 8 “prevailing party” under the EAJA. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). 9 Thus, Plaintiff is the prevailing party. (See Dkt. No. 13, Order Reversing and Remanding for 10 Further Proceedings.) The Court’s finding, that the ALJ erroneously evaluated Dr. Maciel’s 11 testimony, indicates the ALJ’s position was not substantially justified. (Id. at 6.) Furthermore, 12 “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially justified.” Meier v. 13 Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir.2013). Defendant does not argue that the government’s 14 position was justified. (Dkt. No. 17.) Therefore, under these circumstances, the Court finds fees

15 should be awarded. 16 Plaintiff is entitled to “reasonable” fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Determining 17 reasonableness “will always depend on case-specific factors including, among others, the 18 complexity of the legal issues, the procedural history, the size of the record, and when counsel 19 was retained.” Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2012). 20 The fee applicant bears the burden of proving reasonableness. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); 21 Hensley, 461 U.S.at 437 (“[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an 22 award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.”). 23

24 1 Plaintiff applies for an award of $8,272.21, which represents compensation for the time 2 Plaintiff’s lawyers and paralegals spent on this action—32.45 hours of attorney work and 1.0 3 hour of paralegal work. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 1–2.) See Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 4 571, 590 (2008) (paralegal time is compensable under the EAJA.) Plaintiff provides an itemized

5 statement of the time expended and asserts the hours are reasonable because “(1) each time entry 6 reflects legitimate activity to provide quality service to Plaintiff and to this Court, and (2) 7 Plaintiff’s attorney prepared for this Court a substantial opening brief as well as a reply brief.” 8 (Dkt. No. 15 at 4.) The hourly rate for Plaintiff’s counsel is $251.84; the rate for paralegal 9 services is $100. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate is the statutory 10 maximum hourly rate under EAJA. (Id.; Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to 11 Justice Act, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited 12 January 30, 2026). The Commissioner does not object to this hourly rate or the number of hours 13 that Plaintiff’s counsel spent on this case. (Dkt. No. 17.) The Court finds that the requested 14 number of hours is reasonable, and that Plaintiff is entitled to the statutory hourly rate pursuant

15 to the EAJA. 16 Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that fees in the amount of $8,272.21 shall be awarded 17 to Plaintiff pursuant to the EAJA. Plaintiff assigned her EAJA fee award to her attorney in the 18 fee agreement. (Dkt. No. 15-2 at 1.) Accordingly, attorney and paralegal fees in the amount of 19 $8,272.21 will be paid to Plaintiff’s attorney, subject to verification that Plaintiff does not have a 20 debt which qualifies for offset against the awarded fees, pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program 21 as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). If Plaintiff has no such debt, then the 22 check shall be made out to Plaintiff’s attorney: H. Peter Evans at Evans & Evans, PC, 222 NE 23 Park Plaza Drive, Suite 113, Vancouver, WA 98684. If Plaintiff has a debt, then the check for

24 1 any remaining funds after offset of the debt shall be made out to Plaintiff and mailed to 2 Plaintiff’s attorney’s office. 3 Dated this 2nd day of February, 2026. 4 A 5 David G. Estudillo 6 United States District Judge

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