Rachael Danker v. The City of Council Bluffs

53 F.4th 420
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedNovember 10, 2022
Docket21-3794
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 53 F.4th 420 (Rachael Danker v. The City of Council Bluffs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rachael Danker v. The City of Council Bluffs, 53 F.4th 420 (8th Cir. 2022).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 21-3794 ___________________________

Rachael Danker; Jesse Johnson; Samantha Johnson

Plaintiffs - Appellants

Stephanie Nelson

Plaintiff

Aubrey Wilhite

Plaintiff - Appellant

Don Williams; Julie Williams

Plaintiffs

v.

The City of Council Bluffs, Iowa

Defendant - Appellee ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Western ____________

Submitted: September 22, 2022 Filed: November 10, 2022 ____________ Before LOKEN, BENTON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. ____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Several dog owners—including Rachel Danker, Jesse Johnson, Samantha Johnson, and Aubrey Wilhite—sued the City of Council Bluffs challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting “pit bulls.” The district court 1 granted summary judgment to the City. The dog owners appeal. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

After an increase in dog bites during the early 2000s, the City enacted Municipal Code § 4.20.112. This Ordinance, effective January 1, 2005, prohibited “any person to own, possess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport, or sell within the city of Council Bluffs, Iowa, any pit bull.” A “pit bull” was defined as

Any dog that is an American Pit Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, or any dog displaying the majority of physical traits of any one (1) or more of the above breeds (more so than any other breed), or any dog exhibiting those distinguishing characteristics which substantially conform to the standards established by the American Kennel Club or United Kennel Club for any of the above breeds.

The dog owners sued the City for injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing the Ordinance violated their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They claimed the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and violated their right to substantive due process, equal protection, and procedural due process. The City moved for summary judgment on all counts. The district court granted its motion on all grounds, concluding that “the pit bull ordinance had the required rational

1 The Honorable John A. Jarvey, then Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, now retired.

-2- relationship to the health, safety, and public welfare interests of the city to survive rational basis review.” Danker v. City of Council Bluffs, 569 F. Supp. 3d 866, 881 (S.D. Iowa 2021). The dog owners appeal only the equal protection and substantive due process claims. This court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). On summary judgment, this court views all evidence and reasonable inferences most favorably to the non-moving party. Meier v. St. Louis, 934 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2019). Deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

The dog owners argue the Ordinance is not rationally related to the City’s legitimate government interest. A classification “that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). “On rational-basis review, a classification . . . comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis that might support it.’” Id. at 314-15, quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973). “[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Id. at 315. “A law supported by some rational basis does not offend the constitution merely because it is imperfect, mathematically imprecise, or results in some inequality.” Birchansky v. Clabaugh, 955 F.3d 751, 758 (8th Cir. 2020). When the legislature has to engage in line drawing, “the precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment [are] virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must

-3- be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally.” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 316.

On appeal, the parties agree the ordinance is subject to rational basis review because it does not infringe a fundamental right nor involve a suspect classification. See id. at 313. They further agree dog bites are a public health issue, so the Ordinance promotes the legitimate government interest of protecting the health and safety of the community.

The dog owners argue that their evidence negates every conceivable basis for the Ordinance’s rational relationship. They presented evidence from canine behavior experts and recent scientific studies about predicting a dog’s propensity to bite based on its breed. According to the dog owners, this evidence, viewed most favorably to them, negates every conceivable basis for the Ordinance by establishing: “(1) Pit Bull type dogs are no more or less dangerous than other breeds of dogs; (2) neither breed nor physical characteristics are predictive of a dog’s aggressiveness or propensity to bite; and (3) the city’s method of identifying dogs as Pit Bulls is inherently unreliable.”

As for dangerousness, the dog owners argue that experts in canine genetics and behavior currently acknowledge that pit bulls are no more or less dangerous than similarly sized dogs of other breeds. The City counters with findings from the Council Bluff Animal Patrol showing pit bulls accounted for a disproportionate number of dog bites in Council Bluffs during 2003 and 2004. After the Ordinance was enacted, from 2007 through 2020, the number of reported dog bites in Council Bluffs generally declined and remained 25 percent lower than in the years before the Ordinance.

As for the relationship between a dog’s breed or physical characteristics and its behavior, the dog owners’ evidence not only fails to negate every conceivable basis, but actually supports some connection. The dog owners say, “It is well accepted among canine geneticists that environment has a greater effect on

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53 F.4th 420, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rachael-danker-v-the-city-of-council-bluffs-ca8-2022.