Rachael Brooks v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: July 6, 2023
• Docket: 2022 CA 000472
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 7, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-0472-MR

RACHAEL BROOKS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 16-CR-00096

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: This is an appeal from an order revoking the probation of

Rachael Brooks (“Brooks”). Also appealed are orders of the trial court requiring

Brooks to pay jail fees and reimburse the Commonwealth for extradition costs

from Oregon to Kentucky. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand. Brooks pled guilty in December 2016 to three theft counts and

received a sentence of up to 15 years, which was probated for five years. The

conditions of her probation included, among other things, that she commit no new

offenses during the probation period, not possess or consume drugs, report as

directed to probation, remain in Kentucky, notify the officer of any change in

address, undergo mandatory drug screenings, and complete recommended

treatment.

Within two months, in February 2017, Brooks was arrested in

Tennessee for a failure to appear for court in Kentucky. While she was

incarcerated, she was found to have concealed crystal methamphetamine and

brought it into the detention facility. She was charged with a felony offense in

Tennessee. She served approximately 11 months there, before being transferred

back to Fulton County for a probation revocation hearing in January 2018. At that

hearing, the trial court did not revoke her probation, but held that determination in

abeyance to allow Brooks to return to a drug treatment center in Tennessee.

However, in March 2018, Brooks was arrested and charged with

another felony offense of trafficking in methamphetamine and a misdemeanor

offense of possession of marijuana. At that point, her probation was revoked, but

she was granted shock probation to attend a second substance abuse treatment

-2- program, in part, because she was pregnant. The original order of probation was

reinstated.

Three years later, in 2021, probation and parole filed another report of

violations by Brooks. At that point, Brooks was living in Oregon. While a

summons was issued for her to appear in Fulton County, it was acknowledged in

open court that it may not have been served, and she did not initially appear.

Thereafter, a warrant was issued for her arrest, and Brooks agreed to be extradited

to Kentucky for a probation revocation hearing in March 2022. Before that

hearing, probation and parole again generated a report detailing several violations

by Brooks, including absconding supervision, failing to report, failing to attend

substance abuse treatment, a recent arrest, and charges for driving under the

influence (“DUI”), resisting arrest, and a hit and run. A supplemental report

advised of a conviction and sentence for the DUI in Oregon.

A probation revocation hearing was conducted on March 8, 2022, and

Brooks was appointed a public defender. She admitted to committing the

violations listed by the probation officer, but spoke of the difficulties of being an

addict, living with mental illness, and her desire to be near her young son in

Oregon. After considering the evidence, the trial court found Brooks had violated

the conditions of her probation and revoked the same, sentencing her to serve the

initial 15 years. It is not lost on this Court that the revocation hearing was held

-3- more than three months after the original probationary period would have expired

on the 2016 guilty plea.

This appeal followed, and Brooks presents three arguments on appeal.

First, she asserts that the trial court erred by imposing jail fees without evidence

that there was a jail reimbursement policy in place, as required by several appellate

court decisions. Secondly, she maintains that the trial court erred in ordering

reimbursement of extradition expenses, which has also been addressed and found

improper, by prior decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Thirdly, she argues

that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation without evidence

or a specific finding that she was a significant risk to the community at large.

As to the first argument, we easily find error. In its response brief, the

Commonwealth agrees that the jail fee issue should be remanded for presentation

of some evidence of a jail fee reimbursement policy pursuant to the Supreme Court

opinion in Capstraw v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2022).1 We need

not discuss that error further and so remand on that issue.

Similarly, as to the second argument regarding extradition expenses,

the Commonwealth again agrees that the law is well-settled that trial courts are

1 See also Frazier v. Commonwealth, No. 2022-CA-0484-MR, 2023 WL 1485344 (Ky. App. Feb. 3, 2023); Daniels v. Commonwealth, No. 2022-CA-0212-MR, 2022 WL 17724283 (Ky. App. Dec. 16, 2022); Campbell v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-0690-MR, 2021 WL 1051590 (Ky. App. Mar. 19, 2021); Marks v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Ky. App. 2018).

-4- without statutory authority to order a criminal defendant to pay restitution to the

state treasury for expenses of extradition. Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.3d

784, 786 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis added).2 We reverse on that issue.

Finally, Brooks, citing Helms v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 637, 641

(Ky. App. 2015), argues that Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 439.3106 requires

trial courts to specifically find whether a probationer constitutes a significant risk

to the community at large or to prior victims. Brooks correctly argues that KRS

439.3106 emphasizes rehabilitation over incarceration. Helms, 475 S.W.3d at 641.

However, we disagree that, here, the statutory requirements were not met.

The first step in analyzing a probation revocation claim is to determine whether the trial court properly considered KRS 439.3106(1) before revoking the defendant’s probation. [Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014)]. If the trial court considered the statute, we then review whether its decision to revoke probation was an abuse of discretion. Id. Accordingly, “we will disturb a ruling only upon finding that ‘the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 587 S.W.3d 627, 629 (Ky. 2019).

Here, the trial court referenced the statute and considered lesser

alternatives to imprisonment throughout Brooks’ case. The trial court granted

2 See also Culver v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-000209-MR, 2020 WL 1074785, at *2-3 (Ky. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

-5- shock probation for a prior violation. The trial court did not use the exact wording

“significant risk” to society, but did specifically state that Brooks demonstrated

violence by being charged and convicted of DUI and that she was a “danger to

others.” The trial court’s finding was clear that her conduct endangered the

community at large. As Helms explained, there must be proof by a preponderance

of evidence of a violation and evidence that the statutory criteria have been met.

Helms, 475 S.W.3d at 645. Here, the proof established – through witness

testimony, written documentation, and Brooks’ own admissions – that she was a

significant risk to the community. We do not find the trial court abused its

discretion in revoking the probation and on that point, we affirm.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Steven J. Buck Daniel Cameron Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Christina L. Romano Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

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