Race v. Krum

162 A.D. 911, 146 N.Y.S. 197
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 15, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 162 A.D. 911 (Race v. Krum) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Race v. Krum, 162 A.D. 911, 146 N.Y.S. 197 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1914).

Opinion

Woodward, J.

(dissenting): Originally two causes of action were alleged in the complaint, one based upon negligence, the other upon a breach of warranty, the latter being the one which was sent to the jury and upon which the verdict in favor of the plaintiff was found. The cause of action surviving is based upon a complaint which alleges upon information and belief that at “all the times hereinafter mentioned the defendant was the proprietor, engaged in the business of carrying on a drug store,” and that the defendant “ as a part of his said business, had in his said drug store a counter at which he drew and sold soda waters and sold ice cream, to be, and which was largely, consumed at said counter in said store, and which were sold by the defendant as fit and proper for human consumption; that on the 22d day of June, 1911, the plaintiff went to said store and, at said counter therein, ordered from an employee of the defendant in charge of said counter, ice cream which the defendant and said defendant’s employee well knew was to be eaten by the plaintiff at once and upon said premises; that said ice cream was taken from a receptacle within, or near, said counter, and by said employee of the defendant, and was handed to and served to the plaintiff, who thereupon at once, at said counter, in said store, in the presence of the employee of the defendant serving the same, ate said cream; that said ice cream thus served and delivered to the plaintiff by said employee of the defendant was not wholesome or fit for human consumption, but on the contrary was poisonous, filled with poisonous ptomaines and was highly injurious and poisonous to any one eating the same, which fact was known to the defendant, or should have been known by him, [912]*912in the conduct of his said business.” The complaint then alleges in detail the sufferings of the plaintiff, due, as he alleges, to the eating of the ice cream, the expense to -which he has been put in dealing with his illness, and continues: “ That when the defendant sold said cream herein-before mentioned to the plaintiff, he warranted and represented that the same was wholesome and fit and proper for human consumption, and the plaintiff relied upon such warranty and accepted and ate it as aforesaid in reliance on such warranty, and the plaintiff had no knowledge that said cream was not wholesome and suitable for him to eat; that said warranty of the defendant was broken as hereinbefore set out and the plaintiff has suffered great damage thereby.” The answer to this cause of action admits the allegations in relation to the defendant’s doing business; denies knowledge or information as to the alleged purchase by the plaintiff, and the results thereof; denies the allegations in reference to the alleged unwholesomeness of the ice cream, and of its being poisonous; denies the illness of the plaintiff and the expenses incurred by him, and admits the warranty alleged as to the wholesomeness of the ice cream, but denies that the warranty was broken. The only issues presented by the pleadings, therefore, are such as relate to the alleged unwholesomeness of the ice cream, and whether the plaintiff actually purchased the same, and the results to him of partaking thereof, with his expense growing out of the illness which he claims resulted therefrom. The very interesting question of how far the purveyor of ice cream impliedly warrants the product to be free from poisons which can be detected only by bacteriological and chemical analysis, if at all, is not presented by this record, for the answer admits a general warranty as broad as that alleged in the complaint, and rests upon a denial of the breach of such warranty. Whether, under a proper pleading, this court would be willing to hold that a person selling ice cream impliedly warranted the same to be free from poisonous ptomaines which could not be detected in the practical conduct of the business, and which no reasonable care could exclude, is purely academic here, for the defendant has consented by his pleadings to stand upon the broad proposition that he did warrant the quality in the same degree that the plaintiff has alleged, and that he has been guilty of no breach of that warranty, and the case must be determined upon the pleadings as they are now before this court. It is entirely evident from the remarks of the learned court in denying a motion for a new trial that the court was not satisfied with the justice of the determination; that it was not convinced that the evidence warranted the conclusion reached by the jury, and we will examine the case with a view to determining whether the verdict is supported by the evidence, for this is the one question which appears to demand consideration at this time. The plaintiff, who is an attorney at law, thirty-two years old, testified to the effect that on the 22d day of June, 1911, he ate supper at a restaurant at about five o’clock in the evening; that his supper consisted of a small steak, fried potatoes, bread and butter, and tea without milk or sugar; that subsequently he walked about the city, and at about eight o’clock in the evening met some young ladies by appointment, and that at about half-past ten or eleven o’clock in the [913]*913evening of that same day he, with the young ladies, went into the defendant’s store and that he there ordered ice cream with fresh strawberries, as distinguished from canned strawberries, poured over the same; that he ate about half a dish of the ice cream and put it aside, afterward walking home with the ladies; that after traversing a few blocks he was taken with pains in his abdominal region, and that it became necessary for the ladies to help him to walk, though both of the ladies deny this when called in his behalf, though one of them says that he complained of nausea when he had reached her home. Plaintiff further testified that on reaching home he was taken with fits of vomiting and purging, and that the matter thrown up was of a creamy appearance, streaked with red, and that the vomiting and purging continued until both were of a watery nature. The plaintiff gave his experiences in detail, and testified that the day was the hottest ever known in Albany, or words to that effect, while the report of the weather bureau showed that the temperature did not get above seventy-three degrees at any time during the 22d day of June, 1911, and that it was below seventy during the evening, so that his testimony is to be taken with some degree of allowance. With the testimony of the plaintiff as a foundation, we will examine the evidence of his doctors, and see how much of substantial fact was before the jury in support of the theory that the plaintiff was poisoned by something in the ice cream. The general contention of the plaintiff was that he was a victim of ptomaine poisoning; that this poison was in the ice cream, rather than in the meat which he had eaten at an earlier hour in the evening; and it appearing that ptomaine poison is to be found in meats and fish equally with milk and its products, there was an effort to further classify the poison as tyrotoxicon, which is claimed to belong to the general class of ptomaines, but to be found exclusively in milk and its products.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
162 A.D. 911, 146 N.Y.S. 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/race-v-krum-nyappdiv-1914.