Rabo Agrifinance, LLC v. Sukhraj Pamma, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 22, 2026·No. 2:24-cv-01392·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RABO AGRIFINANCE, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-01392-DJC-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SUKHRAJ PAMMA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Rabo Agrifinance, LLC has filed a motion for temporary restraining 18 order seeking the appointment of a temporary receiver. Plaintiff previously provided 19 loans to several Defendants to this action, and Plaintiff claims that they ultimately 20 defaulted on those loans. Plaintiff now seeks the appointment of a receiver to secure 21 collateral located at 6188 Luckehe Road, Live Oak, California 95953, as well as the 22 issuance of a temporary restraining order. 23 For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint a Temporary 24 Receiver and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order are granted. 25 BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff asserts that beginning around July 5, 2016, Plaintiff extended a 27 revolving line of credit to Defendant Sutter Buttes Mercantile LLC (“SBM”), which 28 operates a walnut processing plant. Defendant Sukhraj Pamma signed the loan 1 documents on behalf of Defendant SBM as its manager. SBM’s line of credit was 2 secured with various SBM property which includes the real property 6188 Luckehe 3 Road, Live Oak, California 95953, and items of personal property located there. There 4 does not appear to be a dispute that Defendant SBM defaulted under the terms of 5 two separate loan credit agreements and remains in default. Plaintiff and Defendants 6 later entered into a Forbearance Agreement where Plaintiff agreed to forebear any 7 further enforcement actions for a period of time and Defendants, including SBM, 8 acknowledged the amount and fact of their default. The forbearance period 9 ultimately lapsed without the loan obligations being satisfied. As a result, Plaintiff is 10 seeking to recover outstanding principal and accrued interest on the defaulted loans 11 through enforcement of the security agreements. The Court previously granted 12 Plaintiff’s request to attach the collateral located at the 6188 Luckehe Road address. 13 Plaintiff has now filed a Motion to Appoint a Temporary Receiver and Motion for 14 Temporary Restraining Order. Briefing on those Motions is now completed. (Mot. 15 (ECF No. 75-1); Opp’n (ECF No. 83); Reply (ECF No. 85).) On May 20, 2026, the Court 16 held oral argument, at the conclusion of which, this matter was submitted. 17 MOTION TO APPOINT TEMPORARY RECEIVER 18 I. Legal Standard 19 The appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is 20 applied with caution. Canada Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 844 (9th 21 Cir. 2009) (citing Aviation Supply Corp. v. R.S.B.I. Aerospace, Inc., 999 F.2d 314 (8th 22 Cir. 1993)). In determining whether a receiver should be appointed, courts look to a 23 variety of factors. Most commonly referenced is the non-exhaustive list of factors 24 provided by Canada Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter. Canada Life identifies the 25 following as relevant factors: 26 (1) whether the party seeking the appointment has a valid claim; (2) whether there is fraudulent conduct or the 27 probability of fraudulent conduct by the defendant; (3) 28 whether the property is in imminent danger of being lost, 1 concealed, injured, diminished in value, or squandered; (4) whether legal remedies are inadequate; (5) whether the 2 harm to plaintiff by denial of the appointment would 3 outweigh injury to the party opposing appointment; (6) the plaintiff's probable success in the action and the possibility 4 of irreparable injury to plaintiff's interest in the property; and, (7) whether the plaintiff's interests sought to be 5 protected will in fact be well-served by receivership. 6 Id. at 844 (cleaned up). Additionally, and of particular relevance in this case, while a 7 party’s prior consent to the appointment of a receiver is not dispositive of whether the 8 Court should appoint a receiver, such consent is still “a factor that commands great 9 weight” in the Court’s analysis. Sterling Sav. Bank v. Citadel Dev. Co., 656 F. Supp. 2d 10 1248, 1260 (D. Or. 2009) see also KS StateBank Corp. v. Peters, No. 25-cv-02576-PHX- 11 ROS, 2025 WL 3294967, *9 (D. Ariz. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases). 12 II. Discussion 13 As a starting point here, there is no dispute that Defendant SBM previously 14 agreed to terms that included consent to the appointment of a receiver and an 15 agreement to not oppose a request that a receiver be appointed.1 While this is not 16 dispositive, it is nevertheless a factor of substantial weight in weighing the other 17 Canada Life factors. 18 Turning to those other factors, first, there appears to be no dispute that Plaintiff 19 has a valid claim. Second, there is no clear direct indication of fraudulent conduct. 20 That said, it appears that Defendant Sukhraj Pamma, owner of SBM, may have failed to 21 include a lease on the subject property in his bankruptcy proceedings (see Reply at 4– 22 5), and the oral argument counsel for the Trustee assigned to the bankruptcy case 23 noted that the Trustee had faced difficulty in obtaining information from Mr. Pamma. 24 While not overwhelming evidence of the probability of fraudulent conduct, these 25 26

27 1 During oral argument, Defendant’s counsel conceded that opposing the present motion may itself constitute a contractual violation by Defendant. This is not of direct relevance to the present Motion 28 but is of some note. 1 actions in the bankruptcy proceeding heighten the Court’s concern of possible future 2 fraudulent conduct. 3 Third, the ongoing usage of the processing plant and its equipment necessarily 4 results in a reduction of the value of that collateral.2 Fourth, the availability of legal 5 remedies is a neutral factor; while it is undisputed that SBM’s liabilities are greater 6 than its assets, it is unclear at this point whether Plaintiff’s claims are oversecured or 7 undersecured at this stage. Fifth, the potential harm to Plaintiff in denial outweighs 8 the harm to Defendant in the appointment of a receiver. While there may be some 9 impact on third parties who will face a delay (but not spoliation) in their walnuts being 10 processed, Defendant has not established any harm to SBM in the appointment of a 11 receiver. 12 Sixth, it appears likely that Plaintiff will succeed in this action and that failure to 13 appoint a receiver might result in irreparable injury. Given the fact that Defendant 14 Sukhraj Pamma is presently in bankruptcy proceedings and SBM is likely insolvent, 15 there is substantial risk to Plaintiff’s ability to ever recover the amounts Defendant 16 owes. Seventh, a receivership is well suited to protect Plaintiff’s interests. While 17 Defendant may ultimately be correct that the receivership will be short-lived, it is 18 unclear at this stage whether that is true. Given the risks posed by SBM’s apparent 19 insolvency and the potential for the diminished value of collateral through the 20 ongoing operation of the plant, the interests will be well-served by a receivership. 21 The Court finds that all of the Canada Life factors are neutral or favor the 22 appointment of a receiver. With the additional factor of Defendant’s consent to a 23 receivership, to which the Court affords great weight, appointment of a receiver is 24

25 2 In their Motion, Defendants make passing mention to the possibility that certain items including “equipment, fixtures, accounts, contract rights, documents of title, instruments, inventory, general 26 intangibles, proceeds, and books and records relating to the Collateral” might be “concealed, transferred, moved and/or secreted.” (Mot.

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Rabo Agrifinance, LLC v. Sukhraj Pamma, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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