[Cite as Rababy v. Safeco Ins. Co., 2025-Ohio-5763.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOSEPH RABABY, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115079 v. :
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, : ET AL., : Defendants-Appellees.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 24, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-24-109376
Appearances:
Mokhtari Law Firm, LLC, and Al A. Mokhtari, for appellant.
Weyls Peters + Chuparkoff, LLC, and Joseph P. Dunson, for appellees Henderson & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. and Brandon Henderson.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Rababy appeals from the trial court’s
dismissal of his declaratory-judgment claim against defendants-appellees Brandon Henderson and Henderson & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. (the “Firm”). Rababy raises one
assignment of error on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it granted
defendants-appellees’ motion to dismiss his declaratory-judgment claim against
Henderson and the Firm.
{¶ 2} After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it
dismissed Rababy’s claim for declaratory judgment against Henderson and the Firm
because Rababy’s counsel was a necessary party to the declaratory-judgment action.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶ 3} Rababy was injured in a car accident in December 2022. He hired an
attorney to represent him after the accident. Rababy subsequently filed a complaint
against Dianna Fulford, whom he alleged was uninsured and negligently caused the
accident; several insurance companies; several medical providers; Henderson; and
the Firm.
{¶ 4} Rababy asserted in his complaint that his attorney worked at
Henderson Mokhtari & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. when Rababy hired him. During the
pendency of the representation, however, Rababy’s counsel left Henderson
Mokhtari & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. Henderson Mokhtari & Weatherly Co., L.P.A.
became Henderson & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. Following Rababy’s counsel’s departure
from Henderson Mokhtari & Weatherly Co., L.P.A., Rababy elected to stay with his
counsel rather than the Firm.
{¶ 5} Rababy alleged in the fourth count of his complaint that Henderson
and the Firm “apparently claim a purported attorney charging lien, quantum meruit and/or other claim in relation to the settlement funds or verdict” that Rababy may
obtain in this matter. Rababy further alleged that “[a] real controversy exists as to
what amounts are owed to [the Firm] by [him] in this matter.” Rababy requested
the court to issue “a declaration that Law Firm Claimants have waived, abandoned
and forfeited all attorney charging lien, quantum meruit, and other lien claims with
respect to [him] and this crash, if such Defendants have not affirmatively asserted,
protected and proven such claims.”
{¶ 6} Henderson and the Firm moved to dismiss Rababy’s declaratory-
judgment claim against them pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) and
requested sanctions against Rababy’s counsel for bringing frivolous claims. Rababy
opposed their motion. The trial court granted Henderson and the Firm’s motion to
dismiss but “decline[d] to award sanctions” at the time of the dismissal.
{¶ 7} The trial court issued a judgment entry on March 20, 2025, stating
Rababy’s claims against Safeco “have been resolved.” Rababy subsequently filed a
notice of dismissal with prejudice regarding Safeco and a notice of dismissal without
prejudice with respect to the remaining defendants and appealed the trial court’s
judgment dismissing his declaratory-judgment claims against Henderson and the
Firm.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} In Rababy’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court
erred when it dismissed his declaratory-judgment action against Henderson and the
Firm because they are “proper parties” who allege a lien claim against him. Rababy states that Henderson and the Firm sent a letter to “defense counsel and/or the
underlying insurance company of the tortfeasor,” stating their intent to assert “an
attorney charging lien and [a] quantum meruit claim against any recovery” that he
may receive. Rababy maintains that because of that letter, he has the right “to
determine the validity and value of such claims” in a declaratory-judgment action.
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 9} In support of their motion to dismiss, Henderson and the Firm relied
on Civ.R. 12(B)(1), lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(B)(6), failure to state
a claim.
{¶ 10} When ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion, the trial court must
determine whether a plaintiff has alleged any cause of action that the court has
authority to decide. Rheinhold v. Reichek, 2014-Ohio-31, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). Our
standard of review on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction is de novo. Id. “The trial court is not confined to the allegations of the
complaint when determining its subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to a
Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, and it may consider material pertinent to such
inquiry without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Southgate
Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 211 (1976), paragraph
one of the syllabus.
{¶ 11} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Before
a trial court can dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle him to the relief sought. O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc.,
42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245 (1975); LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin,
2007-Ohio-3608, ¶ 14. “The allegations of the complaint must be taken as true, and
those allegations and any reasonable inferences drawn from them must be
construed in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found.,
2015-Ohio-421, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss a
complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford,
2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5.
B. Declaratory Judgment
{¶ 12} “An action for declaratory judgment provides a means by which
parties can eliminate uncertainty regarding their legal rights and obligations.” Mid-
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Heasley, 2007-Ohio-1248, ¶ 8, citing Travelers
Indemn. Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 312 (1951). “The purpose of a
declaratory judgment action is to dispose of ‘uncertain or disputed obligations
quickly and conclusively,’ and to achieve that end, the declaratory judgment statutes
are to be construed ‘liberally.’” Id., quoting Ohio Farmers Indemn. Co. v. Chames,
170 Ohio St. 209, 213 (1959).
{¶ 13} R.C. 2721.12(A) provides that when a party seeks declaratory relief,
“all persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration
shall be made parties to the action or proceeding.” Therefore, “[t]he absence of a
necessary party constitutes a jurisdictional defect which precludes a Court of Common Pleas from properly rendering a declaratory judgment.” Cincinnati v.
Whitman, 44 Ohio St.2d 58 (1975), paragraph one of the syllabus.
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[Cite as Rababy v. Safeco Ins. Co., 2025-Ohio-5763.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOSEPH RABABY, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115079 v. :
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, : ET AL., : Defendants-Appellees.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 24, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-24-109376
Appearances:
Mokhtari Law Firm, LLC, and Al A. Mokhtari, for appellant.
Weyls Peters + Chuparkoff, LLC, and Joseph P. Dunson, for appellees Henderson & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. and Brandon Henderson.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Rababy appeals from the trial court’s
dismissal of his declaratory-judgment claim against defendants-appellees Brandon Henderson and Henderson & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. (the “Firm”). Rababy raises one
assignment of error on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it granted
defendants-appellees’ motion to dismiss his declaratory-judgment claim against
Henderson and the Firm.
{¶ 2} After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it
dismissed Rababy’s claim for declaratory judgment against Henderson and the Firm
because Rababy’s counsel was a necessary party to the declaratory-judgment action.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶ 3} Rababy was injured in a car accident in December 2022. He hired an
attorney to represent him after the accident. Rababy subsequently filed a complaint
against Dianna Fulford, whom he alleged was uninsured and negligently caused the
accident; several insurance companies; several medical providers; Henderson; and
the Firm.
{¶ 4} Rababy asserted in his complaint that his attorney worked at
Henderson Mokhtari & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. when Rababy hired him. During the
pendency of the representation, however, Rababy’s counsel left Henderson
Mokhtari & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. Henderson Mokhtari & Weatherly Co., L.P.A.
became Henderson & Weatherly Co., L.P.A. Following Rababy’s counsel’s departure
from Henderson Mokhtari & Weatherly Co., L.P.A., Rababy elected to stay with his
counsel rather than the Firm.
{¶ 5} Rababy alleged in the fourth count of his complaint that Henderson
and the Firm “apparently claim a purported attorney charging lien, quantum meruit and/or other claim in relation to the settlement funds or verdict” that Rababy may
obtain in this matter. Rababy further alleged that “[a] real controversy exists as to
what amounts are owed to [the Firm] by [him] in this matter.” Rababy requested
the court to issue “a declaration that Law Firm Claimants have waived, abandoned
and forfeited all attorney charging lien, quantum meruit, and other lien claims with
respect to [him] and this crash, if such Defendants have not affirmatively asserted,
protected and proven such claims.”
{¶ 6} Henderson and the Firm moved to dismiss Rababy’s declaratory-
judgment claim against them pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) and
requested sanctions against Rababy’s counsel for bringing frivolous claims. Rababy
opposed their motion. The trial court granted Henderson and the Firm’s motion to
dismiss but “decline[d] to award sanctions” at the time of the dismissal.
{¶ 7} The trial court issued a judgment entry on March 20, 2025, stating
Rababy’s claims against Safeco “have been resolved.” Rababy subsequently filed a
notice of dismissal with prejudice regarding Safeco and a notice of dismissal without
prejudice with respect to the remaining defendants and appealed the trial court’s
judgment dismissing his declaratory-judgment claims against Henderson and the
Firm.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} In Rababy’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court
erred when it dismissed his declaratory-judgment action against Henderson and the
Firm because they are “proper parties” who allege a lien claim against him. Rababy states that Henderson and the Firm sent a letter to “defense counsel and/or the
underlying insurance company of the tortfeasor,” stating their intent to assert “an
attorney charging lien and [a] quantum meruit claim against any recovery” that he
may receive. Rababy maintains that because of that letter, he has the right “to
determine the validity and value of such claims” in a declaratory-judgment action.
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 9} In support of their motion to dismiss, Henderson and the Firm relied
on Civ.R. 12(B)(1), lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(B)(6), failure to state
a claim.
{¶ 10} When ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion, the trial court must
determine whether a plaintiff has alleged any cause of action that the court has
authority to decide. Rheinhold v. Reichek, 2014-Ohio-31, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). Our
standard of review on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction is de novo. Id. “The trial court is not confined to the allegations of the
complaint when determining its subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to a
Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, and it may consider material pertinent to such
inquiry without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Southgate
Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 211 (1976), paragraph
one of the syllabus.
{¶ 11} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Before
a trial court can dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle him to the relief sought. O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc.,
42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245 (1975); LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin,
2007-Ohio-3608, ¶ 14. “The allegations of the complaint must be taken as true, and
those allegations and any reasonable inferences drawn from them must be
construed in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found.,
2015-Ohio-421, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss a
complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford,
2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5.
B. Declaratory Judgment
{¶ 12} “An action for declaratory judgment provides a means by which
parties can eliminate uncertainty regarding their legal rights and obligations.” Mid-
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Heasley, 2007-Ohio-1248, ¶ 8, citing Travelers
Indemn. Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 312 (1951). “The purpose of a
declaratory judgment action is to dispose of ‘uncertain or disputed obligations
quickly and conclusively,’ and to achieve that end, the declaratory judgment statutes
are to be construed ‘liberally.’” Id., quoting Ohio Farmers Indemn. Co. v. Chames,
170 Ohio St. 209, 213 (1959).
{¶ 13} R.C. 2721.12(A) provides that when a party seeks declaratory relief,
“all persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration
shall be made parties to the action or proceeding.” Therefore, “[t]he absence of a
necessary party constitutes a jurisdictional defect which precludes a Court of Common Pleas from properly rendering a declaratory judgment.” Cincinnati v.
Whitman, 44 Ohio St.2d 58 (1975), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 14} Dismissal of a claim for declaratory relief is appropriate without
addressing the merits of the case “if there is (1) neither a justiciable issue nor an
actual controversy between the parties requiring speedy relief, or (2) the declaratory
judgment will not terminate the uncertainty or controversy.” M6 Motors, Inc. v.
Nissan of N. Olmsted, L.L.C., 2014-Ohio-2537, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing Haley v. Bank
of Am., 2012-Ohio-4824, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 15} Rababy contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his
declaratory-judgment claim against Henderson and the Firm because they are
proper parties under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the dispute is justiciable.
He further asserts that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the claim.
Rababy alleged in his complaint that following his attorney’s departure from the
Firm, he terminated any relationship with the Firm and elected to stay with his
attorney. Rababy further alleged that Henderson and the Firm assert an attorney
charging lien and quantum meruit claim against the settlement funds that he may
receive in this case and that he has a right to know what their claim is “for purposes
of ensuring [that] any closing statement/settlement distribution is inclusive of all
claimed liens, interest and debts” against him.
{¶ 16} Henderson and the Firm argue that the trial court properly dismissed
Rababy’s claim for declaratory judgment against them because he did not name his
attorney in the lawsuit. They assert that “the dispute is really between [Rababy’s] [c]ounsel and [Henderson and the Firm] over attorney fees and unreimbursed case
expenses on contingency files transitioned by [Rababy’s counsel] to his new law
office.” They state that Rababy’s counsel “obviously has an interest in the outcome
of the requested declaratory judgment. In fact, he claims that he has the only
legitimate interest in the outcome as he wants all the money.” Therefore, they argue
that Rababy’s counsel is a necessary party to the declaratory-judgment claim.
{¶ 17} We agree with Henderson and the Firm that Rababy’s counsel is a
necessary party to the declaratory-judgment action. The trial court could not
determine what Rababy must pay Henderson and the Firm without also knowing
what portion of the settlement funds that Rababy’s counsel is entitled to receive.
Rababy’s counsel, Henderson, and the Firm all have an interest in any declaration
the trial court would make regarding the amount of attorney fees that Rababy owes
each of them from the settlement funds in the case.
{¶ 18} However, while a trial court does not have jurisdiction to declare
rights between persons when everyone who has an interest in the declaration is not
named in the lawsuit, that does not mean the case must be dismissed. The Ohio
Supreme Court has held, “In an action for declaratory judgment in which it becomes
apparent that not all interested persons have been made parties, the party seeking
relief may join the absent party by amending its pleading in accordance with
Civ.R. 15.” Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 83 v. Union Local School Dist. Bd.
of Edn., 86 Ohio St.3d 318 (1999), syllabus. The Court explained that while
“R.C. 2721.12 provides the substantive requirement that all interested persons be made parties,” that does not mean that it “purport[s] to govern the procedural
method by which this is accomplished, and it certainly does not limit parties to their
initial pleadings.” Id. at 322.
{¶ 19} But in this case, Rababy did not move to amend his complaint after
Henderson and the Firm filed its motion to dismiss. Moreover, in his brief in
opposition to Henderson and the Firm’s motion, Rababy did not argue that he
should be permitted to amend his complaint. Instead, Rababy countered that
Henderson and the Firm were the only parties necessary to determine the amount
of attorney fees they are entitled to from any recovery that he receives.
{¶ 20} Rababy filed his complaint on December 6, 2024. Henderson and the
Firm moved to dismiss on January 14, 2025. Rababy had until January 23, 2025, to
amend his pleading “as a matter of course.” Civ.R. 15(A). After January 14, 2025,
he could have sought written consent from Henderson and the Firm or leave from
the court to amend his pleading. Id. Even if Henderson and the Firm refused to
give consent, Civ.R. 15(A) provides that leave to file an amended pleading “shall be
freely given when justice so requires.” Instead, Rababy filed his brief in opposition
on January 29, 2025, without arguing that he should be permitted to amend his
complaint.
{¶ 21} Henderson and the Firm, as Rababy’s previous attorneys, are
presumably entitled to the value of their services rendered up to the point when
Rababy discharged them from representing him. Rababy’s new counsel is also
presumably entitled to attorney fees from at least the time he represented Rababy after he left the Firm. Thus, Rababy’s new counsel is a party who has a claim or
interest in any declaration of rights or obligations made by the trial court between
Rababy and any counsel seeking compensation from any recovery in the case.
Therefore, Rababy should have moved to amend his complaint once Henderson and
the Firm filed their motion to dismiss. Because he did not do so, we affirm the trial
court’s dismissal of Rababy’s claim against Henderson and the Firm.
{¶ 22} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR