R. U. Delapenha & Co. v. United States

38 Cust. Ct. 242
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedApril 12, 1957
DocketC. D. 1870
StatusPublished

This text of 38 Cust. Ct. 242 (R. U. Delapenha & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
R. U. Delapenha & Co. v. United States, 38 Cust. Ct. 242 (cusc 1957).

Opinion

Donlon, Judge:

The merchandise here is the French product known as Bar-le-Duc. It was described on entry as 25 cases containing jars of red currants in sugar sirup, imported from France.

The collector liquidated the Bar-le-Duc as berries, preserved, not specially provided for, with duty at 14 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 736 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (T. D. 51802).

Plaintiff’s protest, as originally filed, claims that this Bar-le-Duc should be taxed under paragraph 751, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (T. D. 51802), which provides duty at 10 per centum ad valorem on jellies and marmalades. Thereafter, plaintiff amended its protest to claim classification under the provision for currants in paragraph 742, as modified by the Annecy Protocol of Terms of Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (T. D. 52373), and the President’s proclamation of March 1, 1950 (T. D. 52423). That paragraph, as modified, became effective March 9, 1950, and provides for duty at 1 cent per pound on “currants, Zante or other.”

The evidence of record includes a small glass jar labeled “Bar-le-Duc.” Through the glass, its contents may be observed. This is plaintiff’s exhibit 1, and it is said to be representative of this merchandise.

On trial, the parties entered into a stipulation of agreed facts, as follows (B,. 3):

Mr. Honey: * * * At this time I offer to stipulate that the merchandise involved herein is manufactured in the Bar-le-Duc section of France and it derives its name from that section. It was made from red currants together with crystallized or refined sugar. The process of manufacture was as follows: The currants were picked in the surrounding territory of Bar-le-Duc and delivered to the place of manufacture where they were stemmed, cleaned, and the seeds removed by hand with the use of a very fine needle. The currants were then immersed in a very light syrup solution of sugar and water and processed by cooking until the material was concentrated to a light degree of soluble solids. The finished product was then packed in a glass container for shipment.
Mr. Vitale: After conferring with the customs officials, may it please the court, the Government is willing to so stipulate.

[244]*244Plaintiff's brief states (p. 1) that its contention here is “that the merchandise is dutiable under the eo nomine provision lor currants.” Nowhere in plaintiff’s brief is reference made to the original protest claim, nor is any of plaintiff’s argument addressed to that claim. Under the circumstances, the claim not having been prosecuted, we deem that the original protest claim, namely, that this product should be classified as a jam or jelly, has been abandoned. Indeed, plaintiff has prosecuted here only its claim in the protest amendment, as to currants. It is that claim, therefore, which we now proceed to consider.

Before doing so, it may be noted that plaintiff, in an earlier case, litigated the issue it has here abandoned. R. U. Delapenha & Co., Inc. v. United States, 36 Cust. Ct. 345, Abstract 59725. Decision there turned on section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by section 6 of the Customs Administrative Act of 1938. Section 315 provides a grace period of 30 days after publication before effect is given to an administrative ruling which imposes duty at a higher rate than the rate of duty theretofore applicable under an established and uniform practice. On the record before us in that case, we held that the higher duty rate assessed did not apply to the merchandise of that litigation, because the 30-day grace period had not elapsed, and so the administrative ruling could not have become effective at the time the merchandise was entered.

In this case, section 315 has no application.

We are of opinion that plaintiff has not overcome, by its proofs, the presumption of correctness which attaches to the collector’s liquidation. We do not decide whether the collector’s classification is or is not correct. It is not necessary for us to do so. We rule solely on the litigated issue and hold that this product is not entitled to classification as “currants, Zante or other.”

After longstanding administrative practice of classifying Bar-le-Duc as jams or jellies, defendant, in 1952, changed this practice and, by new administrative ruling, directed collectors to classify Bai’-le-Duc as berries, preserved. That is the classification which plaintiff’s protest challenges.

The term “currants” is not free of ambiguity. It may connote either, or both, of two dissimilar articles of growth and commerce. It is necessary to ascertain what Congress intended to comprehend within the classification “currants, Zante or other,” because it is congressional intention that will determine the issue. This was succinctly stated by our appeals court recently in United States v. Mercantil Distribuidora, S. A., Joseph H. Brown, 43 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 111, C. A. D. 617, at page 117, as follows:

If, however, the word in question has more than one common meaning, either of which may suitably fit the context, then the wording is ambiguous, and in the [245]*245case of tariff acts resort may be had to the legislative history to determine the intent of Congress, United States v. Jos. Riedel Glass Works, Inc., 32 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 201, C. A. D. 307, or in the case of trade agreements, to the trade agreement history to determine the intent of the negotiators, United States v. Weigert-Dagen, et al., 39 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 58, 64, C. A. D. 464.

While, as will be noted later, it is our opinion that one of the common meanings of “currants * * * other” in paragraph 742 does not “suitably fit the context,” we proceed to consideration of congressional intent.

Webster’s New International Dictionary, second edition, defines “currant” as:

currant, n. [AF. raisins de Corauntz, F. raisins de Corinthe, raisins of Corinth, currants (in sense 1), fr. Corinth in Greece, whence, probably, the raisins were first imported, the Ribes fruit receiving the name from its resemblance to these raisins. * * *.] 1. A small seedless raisin, grown chiefly in the Levant, used extensively in cookery and confectionery. 2. The acid berry of several species of Ribes. * * * These are eaten as dessert fruits, but their chief use is for jellies and jam. * * *.

In ascertaining congressional intention, it is appropriate to note the context in which the litigated provision occurs. Paragraph 742 of the Tariff Act of 1930 reads as follows:

Pas. 742. Grapes in bulk, crates, barrels or other packages, 25 cents per cubic foot of such bulk or the capacity of the packages, according as imported; raisins, 2 cents per pound; other dried grapes, 2)4 cents per pound; currants, Zante or other, 2 cents per pound.

The provision for berries is found elsewhere, in paragraph 736.

The provision for currants in paragraph 742 is not new in the tariff act. Currants have been specifically provided for as far back as the Tariff Act of 1790. From the 1790 act, to and including the Tariff Act of 1861, currants were eo nomine provided for simply as currants.

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Related

R. U. Delapenha & Co. v. United States
36 Cust. Ct. 345 (U.S. Customs Court, 1956)

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Bluebook (online)
38 Cust. Ct. 242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/r-u-delapenha-co-v-united-states-cusc-1957.