R. L. MacK Joe E. Williams, Jr., Charlie F. Jackson and James D. Dowers v. United States
This text of 268 F.2d 931 (R. L. MacK Joe E. Williams, Jr., Charlie F. Jackson and James D. Dowers v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellant Mack was, during the school year 1956-1957, principal of Tift County Industrial High School, and appellants Williams, Jackson and Dowers were students at this school receiving training allowances from the United States Veterans Administration. In Count One of *932 the indictment, under which Mack and Williams were convicted of violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 1 said appellants were charged with having certified to the Veterans Administration false and fraudulent statements as to the enrollment and attendance of said Williams during the month of April, 1957. 2 3 Other counts covered the attendance of appellants Jackson and Dowers in identical language, except the name of the student covered by each individual count. 3 All four appellants were convicted and sentenced, and have appealed assigning four specifications of error, all having to do with the admission over objection of certain testimony of witnesses Treadwell and Allen. We agree that the testimony given by the witnesses was improperly admitted and was calculated to be highly prejudicial to the interests of appellants.
It was the practice of those in charge of this' school of approximately 1800 students (less than one per cent of whom were veterans) that each veteran would execute a form each month answering Yes or No to the question: “Are you still enrolled in and pursuing your course?”; and that Principal Mack would sign a certificate covering subpara-graphs 1 through 4 of the indictment, Footnote 2 supra, and upon these certificates the veterans would receive the payments to which they were entitled under the Acts of Congress popularly known as the G. I. Bill of Rights. The specific falsity charged against each of the veterans was that he certified that he was still enrolled in and pursuing his course. And the specific falsity charged against Principal Mack was that he falsely certified that, during the period covered by the indictment, each veteran was enrolled in and pursued his approved program, that his conduct and progress were satisfactory “according to the established standards and practice of this institution,” and that his program of education *933 and training and the pursuit thereof continued to meet the requirements of applicable V.A. Regulations.
At the base of each of the statements alleged to be false lay the queries, what were the established standards and practices of this school and what were the requirements of applicable V.A. Regulations? Without evidence from which these fundamental questions could be answered, it was not possible for the jury to determine from proof of the conduct of the individual defendants whether that conduct had violated those practices and regulations. The burden was on the Government to make this proof by competent testimony.
Neither of these basic essentials was established by any competent proof offered by the Government. The Regulations of the Veterans Administration were undoubtedly in writing and susceptible of easy proof. The established standards of the school were provable by some writing or set of writings, by tradition, by custom and usage, or by other legal methods of proof. At all events, the Government made no effort to prove the ingredients of the standards it claimed had been broken by any competent evidence.
Instead, it adopted the expedient of asking Treadwell, an official of the Veterans Administration, and Allen, County Superintendent of Schools, questions calling for the conclusion on the part of each witness as to whether, based upon his knowledge of facts not placed before the jury and answers contained in the certificates referred to, said answers were true or false. 4
Thereupon the government attorney asked Treadwell whether the standard practices of the Tift County Industrial High School were the standards and practices which governed the Veterans Administration. When defendants objected upon the ground that the Veterans Administration official could not testify as to what the standards of the Tift County Board of Education were and that the witness had no authority to speak for the Veterans Administration, the court overruled the objection and the witness was permitted to state: “* * * the regulations contemplate that the Vet *934 erans Administration will follow the established standards and practices of that Institution as it is enforced by its governing body and accredited associations.” Upon cross-examination, Tread-well testified that the Veterans Administration relied on the “standard fixed by the accredited associations, as administered by the local public officials.” He further stated that he did not know what those standards were, and they were not proven by any other witness.
The witness Allen, Superintendent of Public Schools of the county, was questioned in similar manner. 5 Upon cross-examination, he responded that what he had given was merely his opinion “based on my feeling as an educator.” He further answered that he knew of no prescribed standards which should be followed by school principals, or any rule of the Veterans Administration which would have furnished a standard of attendance.
It is, in our opinion, too plain for argument that this method of questioning witnesses and of attempting to prove basic and material elements of the crime charged was improper and without precedent. 6 We have dealt with the duty of government attorneys in somewhat similar situations in Ginsberg v. United States, 5 Cir., 257 F.2d 950; Nalls v. United States, 5 Cir., 240 F.2d 707; and Handford v. United States, 5 Cir., 249 F.2d 295, and see same case, 5 Cir., 260 F.2d 890; 359 U.S. 120, 79 S.Ct. 722, 3 L.Ed.2d 673.
Appellants argue that, without the improper testimony, the Government failed to make a case against them. We do not consider this point, as it was not mentioned among the Specifications of Error and no motions for verdicts of acquittal were made in the court below. The evidence referred to was wrongfully admitted and was intrinsically prejudicial. Whether the Government can make out a case without the use of such improper evidence can be determined on another trial.
Reversed and remanded.
. “Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency-
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268 F.2d 931, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 3441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/r-l-mack-joe-e-williams-jr-charlie-f-jackson-and-james-d-dowers-v-ca5-1959.