FILED Jun 28 2023, 9:44 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Renee M. Ortega Theodore E. Rokita Lake County Juvenile Public Defender’s Indiana Attorney General Office Indianapolis, Indiana Crown Point, Indiana Kyle Hunter Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of: R.G. (Minor June 28, 2023 Child), Court of Appeals Case No. Appellant-Defendant, 23A-JV-00011 Appeal from the Lake Superior v. Court The Honorable Thomas P. The State of Indiana, Stefaniak, Jr., Judge Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable Robert G. Vann, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 45D06-2207-JD-365 45D06-2207-JC-345
Opinion by Judge May Chief Judge Altice and Judge Foley concur.
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 1 of 9 [1] R.G. appeals the juvenile court’s order awarding guardianship of him to the
Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) following his violation of the
probation he was serving after his adjudication as a delinquent for acts that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute Level 6 felony theft of a firearm 1 and
Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. 2 R.G. argues the trial court
abused its discretion by sending him to DOC against the recommendations of
the State and the Probation Department (“Probation”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In the summer of 2022, the State had filed three separate delinquency petitions
against R.G. under cause numbers 45D06-2207-JD-000345 (“Petition 345”),
45D06-2207-JD-000365 (“Petition 365”), and 45D06-2207-JD-000366
(“Petition 366”). On July 5, 2022, under Petition 345, the State alleged R.G.
was a delinquent child for committing acts that, if committed by an adult,
would be Level 5 felony robbery, 3 Level 6 felony theft of a firearm, and Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. 4 On July 11, 2022, under Petition 365,
the State alleged R.G. was a delinquent child for committing acts that, if
committed by an adult, would be Level 6 felony battery of a public service
1 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). 2 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a)(1). 4 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 2 of 9 official, 5 Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class B misdemeanor
disorderly conduct, 6 and Class C misdemeanor refusal to give identifying
information. 7 On July 11, 2022, under Petition 366, the State alleged R.G. was
a delinquent child for committing an act that would be Class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement 8 if committed by an adult.
[3] On July 14, 2022, the parties reached an agreement whereby R.G. would admit
he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would be Level 6 felony theft
of a firearm as alleged in Petition 345 and Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement as alleged in Petition 365. In exchange, the State would dismiss
all other charges from Petition 345 and Petition 365 and the entirety of Petition
366. The court adjudicated R.G. a delinquent and placed him in Intensive
Probation with an electronic home monitor on August 11, 2022. On August 14
and August 22, 2022, R.G. posted pictures on Instagram of himself holding
handguns, which was in direct violation of the terms of his probation. (Tr. Vol.
2 at 5.) On August 23, 2022, the court issued an arrest warrant based on R.G.’s
probation violation.
[4] Probation began to investigate residential placements for R.G. because
“remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of [R.G.]” when he
5 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1). 6 Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2). 7 Ind. Code § 36-2-13-5(b). 8 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 3 of 9 continued to engage in dangerous behaviors while on probation. Rite of
Passage – South Bend denied R.G. entry into its residential program because
“he did not meet their criteria for admissions[.]” (Id. at 6.) “Youth Villages
also entered a denial for [R.G.] as inappropriate for their facilities.” (Id. at 35.)
“Lacking any other residential placement” alternatives, the placement team
recommended DOC on September 7, 2022. (Id. at 6.)
[5] On October 26, 2022, Probation reviewed the case with the Department of
Child Services (“DCS”) and amended their recommendation to residential
placement at Rite of Passage – DePaul (out-of-state). “Probation further
recommends that the youth remain detained pending placement as he poses a
danger to the community.” (App. Vol. 3 at 15.) Rite of Passage – DePaul
reevaluated R.G. and “determined he would be an appropriate fit for their
DePaul campus in state.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 35.) However, as of October 2022, Rite
of Passage – DePaul did not have “an opening until about mid-December, and
there [were] no other facilities in the state that did accept him.” (Id.) The State
and Probation recommended R.G. remain detained until residential placement
had an open spot because R.G. is “a flight risk and a danger to the
community.” (Id. at 36.)
[6] On November 1, 2022, in a Modified Dispositional Decree, the trial court
found R.G. was “released from Intensive Probation (Level 2) as failed.” (App.
Vol. 3 at 23.) The trial court rejected Probation’s recommendation of
placement for R.G. in a residential facility because
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 4 of 9 it is unreasonable under the circumstances and not in the best interests of the youth. Rather the court finds that the Department of Corrections [sic] is the most appropriate placement based upon the facts and circumstances herein. The DOC can provide the youth with the best opportunity to avoid criminal behavior as an adult.
(Id.) The trial court awarded wardship of R.G. to DOC and recommended the
following programs: “Core Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment, Moral Recognitive
Therapy and Why Try Learning Strategies Program.” (Id.)
Discussion and Decision [7] The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which
allows the court to step into the shoes of the parents. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d
631, 635 (Ind. 2004). The parens patriae doctrine gives juvenile courts power to
further the best interests of the child, “which implies a broad discretion
unknown in the adult criminal court system.” Id. The goal of the juvenile
process is rehabilitation so that the youth will correct his behavior and not
become a criminal as an adult. Jordan v. State,
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FILED Jun 28 2023, 9:44 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Renee M. Ortega Theodore E. Rokita Lake County Juvenile Public Defender’s Indiana Attorney General Office Indianapolis, Indiana Crown Point, Indiana Kyle Hunter Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of: R.G. (Minor June 28, 2023 Child), Court of Appeals Case No. Appellant-Defendant, 23A-JV-00011 Appeal from the Lake Superior v. Court The Honorable Thomas P. The State of Indiana, Stefaniak, Jr., Judge Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable Robert G. Vann, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 45D06-2207-JD-365 45D06-2207-JC-345
Opinion by Judge May Chief Judge Altice and Judge Foley concur.
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 1 of 9 [1] R.G. appeals the juvenile court’s order awarding guardianship of him to the
Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) following his violation of the
probation he was serving after his adjudication as a delinquent for acts that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute Level 6 felony theft of a firearm 1 and
Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. 2 R.G. argues the trial court
abused its discretion by sending him to DOC against the recommendations of
the State and the Probation Department (“Probation”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In the summer of 2022, the State had filed three separate delinquency petitions
against R.G. under cause numbers 45D06-2207-JD-000345 (“Petition 345”),
45D06-2207-JD-000365 (“Petition 365”), and 45D06-2207-JD-000366
(“Petition 366”). On July 5, 2022, under Petition 345, the State alleged R.G.
was a delinquent child for committing acts that, if committed by an adult,
would be Level 5 felony robbery, 3 Level 6 felony theft of a firearm, and Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. 4 On July 11, 2022, under Petition 365,
the State alleged R.G. was a delinquent child for committing acts that, if
committed by an adult, would be Level 6 felony battery of a public service
1 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). 2 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a)(1). 4 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 2 of 9 official, 5 Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class B misdemeanor
disorderly conduct, 6 and Class C misdemeanor refusal to give identifying
information. 7 On July 11, 2022, under Petition 366, the State alleged R.G. was
a delinquent child for committing an act that would be Class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement 8 if committed by an adult.
[3] On July 14, 2022, the parties reached an agreement whereby R.G. would admit
he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would be Level 6 felony theft
of a firearm as alleged in Petition 345 and Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement as alleged in Petition 365. In exchange, the State would dismiss
all other charges from Petition 345 and Petition 365 and the entirety of Petition
366. The court adjudicated R.G. a delinquent and placed him in Intensive
Probation with an electronic home monitor on August 11, 2022. On August 14
and August 22, 2022, R.G. posted pictures on Instagram of himself holding
handguns, which was in direct violation of the terms of his probation. (Tr. Vol.
2 at 5.) On August 23, 2022, the court issued an arrest warrant based on R.G.’s
probation violation.
[4] Probation began to investigate residential placements for R.G. because
“remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of [R.G.]” when he
5 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1). 6 Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2). 7 Ind. Code § 36-2-13-5(b). 8 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 3 of 9 continued to engage in dangerous behaviors while on probation. Rite of
Passage – South Bend denied R.G. entry into its residential program because
“he did not meet their criteria for admissions[.]” (Id. at 6.) “Youth Villages
also entered a denial for [R.G.] as inappropriate for their facilities.” (Id. at 35.)
“Lacking any other residential placement” alternatives, the placement team
recommended DOC on September 7, 2022. (Id. at 6.)
[5] On October 26, 2022, Probation reviewed the case with the Department of
Child Services (“DCS”) and amended their recommendation to residential
placement at Rite of Passage – DePaul (out-of-state). “Probation further
recommends that the youth remain detained pending placement as he poses a
danger to the community.” (App. Vol. 3 at 15.) Rite of Passage – DePaul
reevaluated R.G. and “determined he would be an appropriate fit for their
DePaul campus in state.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 35.) However, as of October 2022, Rite
of Passage – DePaul did not have “an opening until about mid-December, and
there [were] no other facilities in the state that did accept him.” (Id.) The State
and Probation recommended R.G. remain detained until residential placement
had an open spot because R.G. is “a flight risk and a danger to the
community.” (Id. at 36.)
[6] On November 1, 2022, in a Modified Dispositional Decree, the trial court
found R.G. was “released from Intensive Probation (Level 2) as failed.” (App.
Vol. 3 at 23.) The trial court rejected Probation’s recommendation of
placement for R.G. in a residential facility because
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 4 of 9 it is unreasonable under the circumstances and not in the best interests of the youth. Rather the court finds that the Department of Corrections [sic] is the most appropriate placement based upon the facts and circumstances herein. The DOC can provide the youth with the best opportunity to avoid criminal behavior as an adult.
(Id.) The trial court awarded wardship of R.G. to DOC and recommended the
following programs: “Core Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment, Moral Recognitive
Therapy and Why Try Learning Strategies Program.” (Id.)
Discussion and Decision [7] The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which
allows the court to step into the shoes of the parents. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d
631, 635 (Ind. 2004). The parens patriae doctrine gives juvenile courts power to
further the best interests of the child, “which implies a broad discretion
unknown in the adult criminal court system.” Id. The goal of the juvenile
process is rehabilitation so that the youth will correct his behavior and not
become a criminal as an adult. Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987).
“Juvenile judges have a variety of placement choices for juveniles who have
delinquency problems,” none of which are considered sentences. Id.
[8] R.G. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it awarded
guardianship of him to the DOC. A decision is an abuse of discretion if it is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial
court or against “the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 5 of 9 from those facts and circumstances. K.S. v. State, 114 N.E.3d 849, 854 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018), trans. denied. While juvenile courts have “‘wide latitude and great
flexibility’” in fashioning dispositions for delinquents, id. (quoting C.T.S. v.
State, 781 N.E.2d 1193, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), our legislature
delineated factors the trial court should consider as it makes its decision:
If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:
(1) is:
(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and
(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;
(2) least interferes with family autonomy;
(3) is least disruptive of family life;
(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6.
[9] R.G. argues the trial court abused its discretion when it did not follow the
recommendation of Probation and the State to place R.G. in a residential
placement that would be less restrictive than DOC. R.G. argues “residential
placement was clearly available to the Trial Court.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 6 of 9 However, R.G. was denied placement in all but one residential facility and that
placement was not going to have an opening for R.G. for at least six to eight
weeks. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
R.G. to be placed in the DOC, where he could immediately begin programs
that the trial court believed would benefit R.G. See K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d
538, 544 (Ind. 2006) (“After repeated probation violations, the juvenile court
reasonably concluded that commitment to the DOC, where counseling and
educational programs were to continue, served everyone’s best interests.”).
[10] Nevertheless, R.G. brings our attention to C.H. v. State, 201 N.E.3d 202 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2022), and argues the same result should be reached here as well. In
C.H., we held a juvenile’s commitment to DOC was not appropriate. C.H. was
adjudicated a delinquent child for acts that, if committed by an adult, would
constitute Level 6 felony theft of a firearm, Class A misdemeanor carrying a
handgun without a license, Class C misdemeanor operating without a license,
and Class C infraction for speeding. “[T]his was not only C.H.’s first
delinquency adjudication but the first time a delinquency petition had been filed
against him.” Id. at 205. C.H. was denied probation in his mother’s home
pending disposition. In drawing the comparison with C.H., R.G. fails to
recognize that C.H.’s behavior at the Vigo County Detention Center “was
exemplary” while the case was pending. Id. at 202. In a letter from the director
of C.H.’s detention center, C.H. was described as having made “‘remarkable
progress’ and ‘amazing strides’ and that C.H. ‘is well liked by his peers and gets
along with everyone, always avoiding confrontations when they arise.’” Id. at
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 7 of 9 204. R.G., on the other hand, violated probation by posting pictures on
Instagram of himself with firearms and by being “in a few physical altercations
while in detention.” (Ex. Vol. 3 at 9.) Furthermore, C.H.’s Indiana Youth
Assessment System (“IYAS”) score showed a “low risk of reoffending.” 201
N.E.3d at 205. In contrast, R.G.’s IYAS score revealed a high risk of
reoffending, and Probation believed R.G. was a “danger to the community.”
(App. Vol. 3 at 15.) The pre-dispositional report states that “[R.G.] was
previously ordered home based services, and through his actions have [sic]
shown that he is not amenable to service provided in a home environment and
would benefit from the secure setting at the Department of Corrections [sic].”
(Ex. Vol. 3 at 10.) For all these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it placed R.G. in the DOC. See J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173,
1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
juvenile’s placement to DOC following probation violations for gun-related
offenses, even though a less-restrictive option of residential placement was
available), trans. denied.
Conclusion [11] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it placed R.G. in DOC when
R.G. failed to abide by probation requirements, he engaged in physical
altercations while in detention, and the only residential placement facility that
accepted R.G. did not have an opening for six to eight weeks. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 8 of 9 [12] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-00011 | June 28, 2023 Page 9 of 9