R. E. Rappeport & Sons v. Bowles

153 F.2d 445, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 1941
CourtEmergency Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 4, 1946
DocketNo. 250
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 153 F.2d 445 (R. E. Rappeport & Sons v. Bowles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Emergency Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
R. E. Rappeport & Sons v. Bowles, 153 F.2d 445, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 1941 (eca 1946).

Opinion

McALLISTER, Judge.

This case involves the reduction of rentals in complainant’s apartment hotel under Section-5 (c) (1) of the Miami, Fla., Area Rent Regulation, in accordance with which the Price Administrator is authorized to decrease rentals which are higher than those prevailing during a given base period for comparable accommodations in the area.

The firm of R. E. Rappeport & Sons is the owner of the Stratosphere Apartment Hotel in Miami Beach, Fla. On March 17, 1944, the Area Rent Director of the Office of Price Administration for the Miami Defense-Rental Area, served notice of a proposal to reduce the rentals then being received for complainant’s various apartments, in specified amounts for certain periods of the year. The owner filed objections to the proposal, and after conferences between the local representatives of the Office of Price Administration and the owner, the Area Rent Director, on October 7, 1944, issued final orders decreasing the rents and establishing a schedule of weekly maximum rents for the various apartments. Thereafter, on November 10, 1944, the owner submitted additional evidence of rents received for certain other premises in the general location of the Stratosphere Apartment Hotel, on the ground that such rents were for comparable premises, and requested reconsideration of the prior orders establishing rentals for the apartments in question. On November 16, 1944, the Area Rent Director stated that upon reconsideration, no change should be made. The owner subsequently filed protest on December 8, 1944, and after a request for consideration thereof by a Board [446]*446of Review, and a report and recommendations by such Board adverse to the contentions of the owner, an order was entered by the Price Administrator, dismissing in part, and denying the remainder of the protest. Complaint was thereafter filed against the Administrator in this court on July 19, 1945.

Complainant’s protest and complaint are based upon the claim that the Area Rent Director, and the Administrator, decreased its rents without' proper consideration of comparable rents, in violation of the Regulation, the terms of which will be hereafter, generally, considered.

The circumstances surrounding the rental regulations and the premises in question in this case are unique. Complainant operates a luxury type apartment hotel at Miami Beach, Fla. Its patrons are wealthy tourists who reside in Florida during the winter and spring months of January, February, March, and April. During that time, complainant’s apartments have, before the reduction of rents by the Administrator, rented for $200 to $250 per week, or approximately $2,500 to $3,500 per “season.” For the other months of the year, there is little demand for such accommodations. The result of. the order decreasing the rents of the apartments was to reduce them to an aggregate of $1,600 to $2,000 per season. It is the contention of complainant that the rents which it had been charging were not higher than -prevailing rentals for comparable accommodations at Miami Beach during the base period.

According to the rent regulation, seasonal or varying maximum rents are based upon the rent received for the particular unit during the corresponding month of the base period, which is September 1, 1942-August 31, 1943. If the unit for which the rent is to be established was not rented during any month of the base period, the maximum rent for the corresponding month in subsequent years is fixed at the rent received on September 1, 1943. If the premises were not rented on that date, the maximum rent is fixed at the “first rent” received thereafter.

A “first rent”, on a year around basis, Is established by a renting after September 1, 1943. A “first rent”, on a seasonal basis, is a rent received for the first time subsequent to the months of the base period— -that is, a rent not originally based upon the rent received for an apartment during the corresponding month of the year September 1, 1942-August 31, 1943. There “first rents”, as mentioned above, constitute the maximum rents, in those cases where premises are first rented after the base period.

The case before us is a “first rent” case. None of the apartment units in question were rented up to September 1, 1943, but were thereafter rented at amounts generally averaging $200 per week.

While such “first rents” constitute maximum rents, under the regulation, nevertheless, a maximum rent fixed on the basis of a “first rent”, may, in accordance with Section 5 of the regulation, be decreased upon a finding by the Administrator that such first rent is higher than the rent generally prevailing in the defense rental area for comparable housing accommodations during the base period — which period, in the case of seasonal first rents (as in the controversy before us) is the corresponding month or months of the year ending on August 31, 1943.

In this case, the Price Administrator decreased the maximum rents of complainant, under the authority of Section 5 of the regulation, on the ground that such rents were in excess of prevailing rents for comparable accommodations during the base period — that is, during the corresponding months of the year September 1, 1942-August 31, 1943.

The chief issue in the case arises over the nature and kind of accommodations which were selected and used by the Administrator as “comparable” to the premises of complainant, in fixing maximum rents therefor.

In arriving at his determination to decrease the rents in question, and in establishing the maximum rents to be charged for the different months, the Area Rent Director (whose action was sustained by the Price Administrator) sought to ascertain the prevailing rents for comparable accommodations during the base period. With respect to the matter of comparability, we must consider — as did the Administrator — what complainant’s apartment hotel is like, and with what premises it may be compared. The first consideration is that it is located on the ocean front of Miami Beach. The only other apartment hotel which had an ocean front on Miami Beach —and which was rented during the base period — was the Forde Ocean Villas. It does not appear in what respects the Forde Villas resemble, or differ from complain[447]*447ant’s premises; but in the various hearings and proceedings in this controversy, it was assumed by everyone connected with the case that they were comparable; and the Price Administrator found that the accommodations of the Forde Ocean Villas were, of all the premises in the Miami Defense-Rental Area, the most nearly comparable to complainant’s apartments. With this finding, complainant agrees, and accordingly, submits that, since the Forde Ocean Villas were the accommodations most nearly comparable to those of complainant (and the only comparable ones which were rented during the base period), the rents received by the Forde Villas should be considered the generally prevailing rents for accommodations comparable to those of complainant, in establishing complainant’s maximum rents, under the regulation.

If, at this point, we digress to observe the difference between the Hotel Regulation and the Housing Regulation, it may serve to clarify the issue here presented. Under the Hotel Regulation, a “freeze date rental” may be subsequently reduced by the Administrator to the level of rents generally prevailing for comparable accommodations during the base period. For units under the Housing Regulation, “freeze date rentals” may not' be reduced by the Administrator to such a level of prevailing rents for comparable accommodations.

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Related

Kuskin & Rotberg, Inc. v. Porter
153 F.2d 1016 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1946)

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Bluebook (online)
153 F.2d 445, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 1941, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/r-e-rappeport-sons-v-bowles-eca-1946.