Quyen Vinh Phan Le v. Commonwealth of Virginia

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedOctober 21, 2014
Docket1711134
StatusUnpublished

This text of Quyen Vinh Phan Le v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Quyen Vinh Phan Le v. Commonwealth of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Quyen Vinh Phan Le v. Commonwealth of Virginia, (Va. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Alston, Huff and Chafin UNPUBLISHED

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

QUYEN VINH PHAN LE MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 1711-13-4 JUDGE TERESA M. CHAFIN OCTOBER 21, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Brett A. Kassabian, Judge

Justin Daniel (Whitestone, Brent, Young, & Merril, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.

Susan Baumgartner, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

At the conclusion of a four-day jury trial held in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County

(“circuit court”), Quyen Vinh Phan Le (“Phan Le”) was convicted of three counts of possession

of child pornography in violation of Code § 18.2-374.1:1. On appeal, Phan Le challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Specifically, Phan Le argues that the

images he possessed depicting a nude seventeen-year-old girl were not “sexually explicit visual

material” under Code § 18.2-374.1 and, therefore, did not constitute child pornography. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm Phan Le’s convictions.

I. BACKGROUND

“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth,

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). So viewed, the evidence established that Phan Le

operated a martial arts training school. C.K., the victim in the present case, began training with

Phan Le when she was six or eight years old. She excelled in tae kwon do under Phan Le’s

coaching, and reached high levels of achievement in that discipline. When C.K. was sixteen or

seventeen years old, she and Phan Le began having a sexual relationship.1

C.K. frequently participated in tae kwon do tournaments throughout the United States and

in other countries, and Phan Le and C.K.’s mother traveled to these tournaments with her. In

order to minimize travel expenses, Phan Le occasionally stayed in the same hotel room as C.K.

and her mother. C.K. participated in a tournament in Florida in May of 2008 when she was

seventeen years old. C.K. testified that she had to “cut weight” before this tournament to be able

to participate in her weight class. After she arrived in Florida, C.K. engaged in a grueling

process to help her lose water weight that involved running, starving, and sweating.

During the weight cutting process, Phan Le called C.K. into his hotel room and told her

to take off her clothes. C.K. did so, and lay down on a bed. Phan Le then proceeded to create

images using the camera on his cell phone of C.K. lying on the bed completely nude. When

C.K. told Phan Le to stop, he told her he would ruin her life and threatened to show the images to

others. While Phan Le did not instruct C.K. to lie down on the bed or otherwise tell her how to

pose, he groped her breast during this process. After Phan Le finished creating the images, C.K.

dressed, left the room, and continued to prepare for the tournament.

On October 26, 2011, officers from the Fairfax County Police Department seized two

laptop computers from Phan Le’s home. Upon forensic analysis, detectives discovered nude

images of C.K. on both computers. Two images depicted C.K. lying on a bed completely nude,

with her genitalia and breasts fully exposed. One of these images, introduced at trial as

1 Phan Le was thirty-six or thirty-seven years old at this time.

-2- Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, was taken from a closer distance than the other, and it clearly

showed C.K.’s face. The other image, introduced at trial as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, showed

C.K.’s entire body. While her face was visible in this image, the image focused on C.K.’s

genitalia and body. C.K.’s legs were slightly spread in this image. A third image, introduced at

trial as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 3, showed C.K. sitting up on the bed. Like the other two

images, it depicted C.K. completely nude. Unlike the other images, however, it was taken from

the side of the bed and therefore provided a side view of C.K. rather than a frontal view of her.

C.K.’s legs were spread to an even greater degree in this image, with one of her feet extending

off the edge of the bed.

At trial, Phan Le made a motion to strike at the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence

and argued that the images of C.K. did not constitute sexually explicit visual material or child

pornography. The circuit court denied Phan Le’s motion, placing emphasis on the sexual

relationship between C.K. and Phan Le at the time the images were created and the fact that Phan

Le groped C.K.’s breast while creating the images. Phan Le then put on defense evidence. At

the close of all evidence, Phan Le made another motion to strike based on the same argument.

The circuit court again denied his motion. The jury convicted Phan Le of three counts of

possession of child pornography, and he appealed his convictions to this Court.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Phan Le contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to strike

because the evidence failed to establish that the images he possessed were child pornography.

When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we “presume the judgment of the

trial court to be correct” and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is “plainly wrong or without

evidence to support it.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77

(2002); see also McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261

-3- (1997) (en banc). Under this standard, “a reviewing court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes

that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Crowder v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 662, 588 S.E.2d 384, 387 (2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). It asks instead whether “‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Kelly v. Commonwealth,

41 Va. App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

We do not “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact” even if our opinion were to

differ. Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002). “This

familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts

in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to

ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

Phan Le argues that the images of C.K. did not constitute sexually explicit visual material

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Related

Jenkins v. Georgia
418 U.S. 153 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Crowder v. Commonwealth
588 S.E.2d 384 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2003)
Kelly v. Commonwealth
584 S.E.2d 444 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2003)
Davis v. Commonwealth
570 S.E.2d 875 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2002)
Wactor v. Commonwealth
564 S.E.2d 160 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2002)
Archer v. Commonwealth
492 S.E.2d 826 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1997)
McGee v. Commonwealth
487 S.E.2d 259 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1997)
Martin v. Commonwealth
358 S.E.2d 415 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1987)
Asa v. Commonwealth
441 S.E.2d 26 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1994)
Dickerson v. City of Richmond
346 S.E.2d 333 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1986)
Foster v. Commonwealth
369 S.E.2d 688 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)
Frantz v. Commonwealth
388 S.E.2d 273 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1990)

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