Quiwaneca Spikes v. I. Simpson, et al.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided November 12, 2025·No. 2:23-cv-02128·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Quiwaneca Spikes, Case No. 2:23-cv-02128-CDS-MDC

5 Plaintiff Order Denying Plaintiff’s Appeal of the Magistrate Judge’s Order, 6 v. Granting Unopposed Motions to Stay, and

Denying as Moot Motion to Proceed 7 I. Simpson, et al.,

8 Defendants [ECF Nos. 65, 67, 72, 75] 9 10 Pro se plaintiff Quiwaneca Spikes, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada 11 Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged civil rights 12 abuses she experienced during transportation to the correctional center. Now, Spikes appeals 13 United States Magistrate Judge Maximiliano D. Couvillier’s order denying her request to replace 14 defendant Ivonna Simpson with Warden William Ruebart and Director James Dzurenda.1 15 Order, ECF No. 69; Obj., ECF No. 72. Additionally, Spikes moves to stay the proceedings so that 16 she may retain legal counsel. Mots to stay., ECF Nos. 65, 67. She also seeks to “proceed against I. 17 Simpson through the [Attorney] General.” Mot., ECF No. 75. Spikes’s unopposed motions to 18 stay are granted, and the motion to proceed is denied as moot. Because I find no error in the 19 magistrate judge’s findings, Spikes’s appeal is denied. 20 I. Spikes’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s order 21 The U.S. Marshal attempted to serve Simpson in August 2025; however, the summons 22 was returned unexecuted. Return, ECF No. 52. For this reason, Spikes asked the court to 23 investigate and find Simpson’s current address, or, in the alternative, to serve NDOC Warden 24

25 1 The magistrate judge’s at-issue ruling is an order on a motion, not a recommendation, and thus must be appealed. This distinction matters because magistrate judges’ orders are subject to a lower standard of 26 review (clearly erroneous standard) than reports and recommendations (de novo review). Compare LR IB 3-1(a) with LR IB 3-2(b). Although properly filed as an objection, it is an appeal, so I apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. 1 William Ruebart and Director James Dzurenda in Simspon’s place. Mot., ECF No. 54. Judge 2 Couvillier granted in part and denied in part Spikes’s request. Order, ECF No. 69. He ordered 3 the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) to conduct further investigatory efforts to find 4 Simpson’s address but denied Spikes’s request to serve the warden and director in Simpson’s 5 place.2 Id. at 3–4. Spikes appeals the magistrate judge’s decision denying her request to serve 6 Ruebart and Dzurenda. Obj., 72. 7 A. Legal standard 8 “A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter . . . where it has been shown that 9 the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 10 “[R]eview under the clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring a definite 11 and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Sec. Farms v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 12 Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997). “And ‘[a]n order is ‘contrary 13 to the law’ when it ‘fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of 14 procedure.’” Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). 15 Under this district’s local rules, a party may appeal a magistrate judge’s ruling on a pretrial 16 matter by filing written objections. Local Rule IB 3-1(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). “The district judge 17 may affirm, reverse, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s order.” LR IB 3-1(b). 18 B. Discussion 19 Simpson is no longer employed by NDOC. ECF No. 45; ECF No. 69 at 1 n.1. Therefore, for 20 purpose of effectuating service, the OAG submitted Simpson’s last known address. ECF No. 46 21 (sealed). The U.S. Marshal attempted to serve Simpson but was unable to due to an “incorrect 22 address.” ECF No. 52. Spikes then filed a “motion to investigate” asking the court to find 23 Simpson’s current address, or, in the alternative, to serve NDOC’s warden and director in 24 Simpson’s place since “they are responsible for her action[s].” ECF No. 54 at 2. Spikes argues 25 2 Judge Couvillier construed Spikes’s alternative request as a motion to amend the complaint to replace 26 Simpson with Warden William Ruebart and Director James Dzurenda. ECF No. 69 at 4. This does not alter my analysis of Spikes’s appeal. 1 that they are “legally responsible” for the employees at each institution. Id. I find that the 2 magistrate judge did not err when he denied Spikes’s alternative request to serve Ruebart and 3 Dzurenda.3 The court cannot direct service of a complaint on individuals not actually named in 4 the complaint. Consequently, Spikes’s appeal is denied, and Judge Couvillier’s order is affirmed. 5 II. Spikes’s motions to stay 6 Spikes also moves to stay this matter until she is released from custody. ECF Nos. 65, 67. 7 Spikes explains that incarceration limits her ability to investigate and litigate her claims. ECF 8 No. 67 at 3. Spikes therefore seeks to stay this case until she is released from custody so that she 9 may hire an attorney. Id. Spikes anticipates her sentence will expire in March or May of 2026. Id. 10 at 4. Defendant Alberto Tito Buencamino filed a notice of non-opposition. ECF No. 66. 11 A. Legal standard 12 In determining whether to stay a civil proceeding, a district court should consider: (1) 13 the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the litigation or any particular 14 aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden which any 15 particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court 16 in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of 17 persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil 18 and criminal litigation. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1989). 19 B. Discussion 20 First, I consider Spikes’s interest in proceeding expeditiously and the risk of prejudice 21 from the stay. Although civil plaintiffs have an interest in having a case resolved quickly, Spikes 22 is the party moving for a stay, and there is no risk of prejudice. Further, Spikes asserts that her 23 interests would be better served by a stay, as she would have time to retain counsel. See generally 24 ECF Nos. 65, 67. This factor therefore weighs in favor of granting a stay. 25 26 3 “Otherwise may her hiring official be served in her place. . . .” ECF No. 54 at 2. 1 Second, I examine the burden on the defendants. As noted, Simpson is not served and 2 thus has not made an appearance in this action. Because Buencamino is not opposed, he 3 identifies no burden that he will suffer by granting a stay. Therefore, I find no indication a stay 4 poses any risk of prejudice at this stage in the litigation. Accordingly, this factor slightly favors a 5 stay. 6 Third, the court’s own interests and managing its docket, weighs against granting a stay. 7 “To be sure, expeditious resolution of cases is, as a general matter, preferable to delay of the 8 Court’s docket.” S.E.C. v. Alexander, 2010 WL 5388000, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010). Here, the 9 court has an interest in efficiently managing its civil docket, and a complete stay of this case 10 would directly impact this goal. However, the court is mindful that staying this proceeding will 11 conserve judicial resources.

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