Quinton Cox v. Director, TDCJ Bobby Lumpkin, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. Texas
• Decided: March 3, 2026
• Docket: 6:25-cv-00396
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 6:25-cv-00396 Quinton Cox, Plaintiff, V. Director, TDCJ Bobby Lumpkin, et al., Defendants.

ORDER Plaintiff, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil-rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who issued a report rec- ommending that the court dismiss plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amend- ment deprivation-of-property claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Doc. 12 at 4. Plaintiff filed written objections. The court reviews the objected-to portions of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Vettles ». Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Douglass vy. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Furthermore, a party’s entitlement to de novo review does not en- title it to raise arguments that were not presented to the magis- trate judge without a compelling reason. See Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 535 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff first objects that his Fourteenth Amendment claim should not be dismissed because it “is not wholly based” on the property deprived but rather “on the content[s] specifically de- prived [e.g.,] stated religious items; stated vital life necessit[ies;] stated legal material.” Doc. 15 at 1. However, plaintiff’s First

-l-

Amendment claim regarding the alleged violation of his religious liberties is proceeding under a separate order. See Doc. 13 at 1. Further, as noted in the report, “property restriction . . . is not sufficient to trigger a liberty interest protected by due process.” Williams v. Bush, 95 F.3d 44, 1996 WL 405407, at *1 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (citing Luken ». Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 192-93 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam)). Plaintiff’s first objection is overruled. Plaintiff also objects that a hearing is required before any of his personal property may be taken. Doc. 15 at 2. That misstates the law and is overruled. See Sanchez v. Allen, 611 F. App’x 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“This claim of ‘punishment’ without notice and a hearing fails .. . . [Plaintiff’s] claim that certain... property was taken from him does not state a claim under § 1983.”). Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s report de novo and be- ing satisfied that it contains no error, the court overrules the plain- tiff’s objections and accepts the report’s findings and recommen- dations. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deprivation-of-prop- erty claim is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Plaintiff's remaining claims shall proceed consistent with the magistrate judge’s recommendations and subsequent orders. See Docs. 12, 13. So ordered by the court on March 3, 2026.

J: CAMPBELL BARKER United States District Judge

-2-