Quinton A. Rush v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 10, 2019
• Docket: 19A-CR-697
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED court except for the purpose of establishing Dec 10 2019, 10:46 am the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Steven Knecht Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana Lafayette, Indiana Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Quinton A. Rush, December 10, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-697 v. Appeal from the White Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 91D01-1602-F2-72

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 1 of 10 Case Summary [1] In April of 2016, White County Sheriff’s Deputy Matthew White initiated a

traffic stop of a vehicle being driven by Quinton Rush after observing multiple

traffic infractions. A search of the vehicle led to the discovery of plastic baggies,

a handgun, large amounts of cash, electronic scales, 920.29 grams of marijuana,

and 26.82 grams of cocaine. The State charged Rush with, inter alia, Level 2

felony cocaine dealing, Level 6 felony marijuana dealing, and Class C

misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the body. In

March of 2018, a jury trial was held, after which Rush was found guilty as

charged. Rush contends that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence

obtained from the search of his vehicle because Deputy White lacked

reasonable suspicion to stop Rush’s vehicle. Rush also contends that the trial

court erroneously admitted the statements he made to Deputy White during the

traffic stop because they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] At approximately 2:31 a.m. on April 10, 2016, Deputy White was assisting

Deputy Josh Shoemaker on a traffic stop when he observed a northbound

vehicle being driven by Rush. As Deputy White left the traffic stop and began

following Rush’s vehicle, he noticed the rear right-side taillight had a lightbulb

that was not illuminated. Deputy White radioed dispatch in order to have it run

Rush’s vehicle registration. Dispatch confirmed that the vehicle was a black

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 2 of 10 2011 Ford Fusion, registered to Quinton Rush. Deputy White asked dispatch to

confirm that the vehicle registration stated that the vehicle was black, because

the vehicle he was following was “bright electric blue.” Tr. p. 149. Dispatch

confirmed that the vehicle was registered as black in color. At trial, Deputy

White testified that “as I’m looking at this vehicle, it’s a bright electric blue. It is

the middle of the night, but it’s not – I like to give people the benefit of the

doubt, but it’s not a dark navy blue color, it’s bright electric blue[.]” Tr. p. 149.

Deputy White initiated a traffic stop and approached the driver’s side of Rush’s

vehicle. The moment that the driver’s-side window was rolled down, Deputy

White smelled burnt marijuana. Deputy White asked Rush why he smelled

marijuana, to which Rush replied that he had “just smoked a joint earlier.” Tr.

p. 151. Deputy White also explained to Rush that he had stopped him because

of the color discrepancy of his vehicle, and Rush indicated that the vehicle color

had never been changed. At that point, Deputy White had Rush and his

passenger Tameka Thomas exit the vehicle and called Deputy Shoemaker for

assistance. Before Deputy Shoemaker arrived, Deputy White patted down Rush

for officer safety and located a roll of cash in his pants pocket.

[3] Upon Deputy Shoemaker’s arrival, Deputy White conducted a search of Rush’s

vehicle. In the center console, Deputy White located a pipe with burnt residue

that smelled like marijuana, a loaded handgun, and a loaded magazine. In the

backseat of the vehicle, Deputy White found a bag containing a smoking device

which contained a brown and green leafy substance that he believed to be

marijuana and a jacket containing a large roll of cash. After searching the inside

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 3 of 10 of the vehicle, Deputy White began to search the trunk. Deputy White

discovered a blue duffel bag containing two one-gallon plastic baggies and

inside the baggies were stacks of smaller plastic baggies. Deputy White also

discovered a glass jar full of marijuana and marijuana buds.

[4] After finding the marijuana, Deputy White explained to both Rush and

Thomas that he would be taking both of them to jail because they were both

within reach of the two pipes found in the vehicle. Thomas asked why they

were both going to jail, and Deputy White again stated that it was due to both

Rush and her being in proximity to the pipes. Rush stated, “I guess I’ll take it.”

Ex. 20.

[5] Once Rush was placed into custody, Deputy White completed the search of the

vehicle. After resuming his search of the trunk, Deputy White found two scales,

marijuana, and a jar containing a white powdery substance that field-tested

positive for cocaine. Subsequent testing confirmed that Deputy White

discovered an aggregate of 920.29 grams of marijuana and 26.82 grams of

cocaine from Rush’s vehicle.

[6] On May 17, 2016, the State charged Rush with Level 2 felony cocaine dealing

and Level 6 felony marijuana dealing. On August 2, 2016, Rush moved to

suppress both the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle and the

statements he made to police, both of which motions were denied. On April 12,

2017, the State also charged Rush with Level 4 felony possession of cocaine,

Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 4 of 10 body, Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession, and Level 6 felony

marijuana possession. On March 13 and 14, 2018, a jury trial was held, after

which Rush was found guilty as charged. The trial court merged the possession

convictions with the dealing convictions. On February 27, 2019, the trial court

sentenced Rush to seventeen and one-half years for the cocaine-dealing

conviction, one year for the marijuana-dealing conviction, and sixty days for

the operating-a-vehicle-with-a-controlled-substance-in-the-body conviction, all

to be served concurrently.

Discussion and Decision [7] Rush contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the items

seized from his vehicle during the traffic stop and the statements he made to

police. We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of

discretion. Ware v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1167, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The trial

court’s decision is an abuse of discretion if it is clearly against the logic and

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

I. Traffic Stop [8] Rush contends that because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his

vehicle pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

and Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution, the trial court

erroneously admitted the items seized by police during the search of his vehicle.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 5 of 10 Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a seizure in the form of a traffic stop is permissible if an officer has at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law, or other law has been violated. Whether reasonable suspicion for a seizure existed requires examination of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. The reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe illegal activity has occurred or is about to occur.

Johnson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 955, 957–58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[9] When a defendant also challenges an investigatory stop under Article 1, Section

11, of the Indiana Constitution, the burden falls on the State to establish that

the police conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind. 2019). Although police may stop

a vehicle when they observe minor traffic law violations, they still must do so in

accordance with Article 1, Section 11. Id. To determine whether a traffic stop

was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances we evaluate: (1) the

degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the

degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s

ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id.

[10] Indiana Code subsection 9-18.1-3-1(a) provides that a person who desires to

register a vehicle must provided certain information in his application to the

Bureau of Motor Vehicles, including, inter alia, a “brief description of the

vehicle to be registered, including the identification number and the color of the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 6 of 10 vehicle.” (emphasis added). Indiana Code subsection 9-18.1-3-1(d) provides that

a “person that makes a false statement in an application to register a vehicle

under this article commits a Class C infraction.” Deputy White observed

Rush’s vehicle to be bright electric blue, but the vehicle was registered as black;

therefore, we conclude that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, Deputy White

had a reasonable suspicion that Rush had committed a Class C infraction, at

the very least. See Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)

(concluding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic

stop upon observing that the license plate on defendant’s blue and white vehicle

was registered to a yellow vehicle.), trans. denied.

[11] Moreover, we conclude that Deputy White’s traffic stop was reasonable

pursuant to Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution. First, based on

the color discrepancy, Deputy White had a high degree of suspicion that Rush

had committed a Class C infraction. Second, the degree of intrusion that the

traffic stop cause to Rush’s ordinary activities was minute. This was a routine

traffic stop for a traffic infraction which only turned into a prolonged procedure

once Deputy White smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from inside

Rush’s vehicle. If this traffic stop was intrusive to Rush in any way, it was

caused by his own criminal wrongdoing. Third, as our Indiana Supreme Court

has acknowledged, “law enforcement has at least a legitimate, if not a

compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety law[.]” Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262.

[12] Rush directs our attention to U.S. v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2013) in

support of his argument that a color discrepancy of a vehicle, alone, is

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 7 of 10 insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Uribe, however, is

easily distinguishable from this matter. In Uribe, the court concluded that color

discrepancy, alone, was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that a

vehicle was stolen. 709 F.3d at 654. The court, however, did not reach a

conclusion as to whether an Indiana registered vehicle’s color discrepancy

could provide reasonable suspicion of a violation of Indiana’s vehicle

registration statute. Rather, the court noted that the government had not shown

that the Indiana statute applied in the case before it, because Uribe was driving

a vehicle registered in Utah. Id. at 653. The court noted that “since the

[Indiana] registration provision asserted by the government does not apply to

the Utah-registered vehicle Uribe was driving, a suspected violation of it could

not be the criminal activity at the heart of the objective reasonable suspicion

analysis.” Id. at 654. Here, however, we are being asked to determine whether

the color discrepancy of a vehicle registered in Indiana provides a reasonable

suspicion that a violation of Indiana law has occurred, and we conclude that it

does. Deputy White had reasonable suspicion that Rush was in violation of

Indiana Code section 9-18.1-3-1, a Class C infraction. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic

stop.1

1 Because we conclude that the color discrepancy was sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, we need not address Deputy White’s second reason for stopping Rush, which was an unilluminated taillight, a reason which Rush argues is contrary to the police officer’s body camera footage. Moreover, we need not address whether Rush’s admission regarding the taillight was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 8 of 10 II. Miranda [13] Rush contends that because the statements he made to Deputy White were

obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, the trial court erroneously admitted

them into evidence. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we conclude

that any Miranda violation in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Not every error in the admission of evidence requires a reversal. Carr v. State,

934 N.E.2d 1096, 1107 (Ind. 2010). “And before a federal constitutional error

can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotations and citations

omitted). “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the

reviewing court is satisfied that the conviction is supported by substantial

independent evidence of guilt so that there is no substantial likelihood that the

challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.” Meadows v. State, 785

N.E.2d 1112, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

[14] In this matter, Rush’s statements aside, the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.

Upon first contact with Rush’s vehicle, Deputy White smelled burnt marijuana

emanating from inside. A search of Rush’s vehicle led to the discovery of pipes,

plastic baggies, a handgun, electric scales, large amounts of cash, 920.29 grams

of marijuana, and 26.82 grams of cocaine. Moreover, it is undisputed that Rush

was the driver of the vehicle and that it was registered in his name. This

evidence, alone, overwhelmingly supports Rush’s convictions.

[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 9 of 10 Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-697| December 10, 2019 Page 10 of 10