NUMBERS 13-11-00345-CR and 13-11-00346-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
QUINTIN A. MONTGOMERY, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 105th District Court of Kleberg County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
In cause number 13-11-00345-CR, appellant, Quintin A. Montgomery, pleaded
guilty to burglary of a habitation, a second degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
30.02 (West 2003). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication
and placed appellant on ten years of community supervision. On February 12, 2009,
the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision. On April 20, 2009, appellant was adjudicated guilty, and sentenced to ten years’ confinement in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, with placement at a
boot camp. On November 20, 2009, the trial court granted shock probation to appellant,
suspended his ten-year sentence, and placed him on community supervision for eight
years. On September 21, 2010, the State again filed a motion to revoke appellant’s
community supervision. On December 2, 2010, appellant pleaded true to the
allegations included in the State’s motion to revoke. The trial court found appellant
violated the conditions of community supervision, revoked his community supervision,
and sentenced appellant to ten years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department Criminal Justice.
In cause number 13-11-00346-CR, appellant was indicted for unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle, a state jail felony, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (West 2003); two
counts of credit card abuse, a state jail felony, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31 (West
2010); evading arrest with a vehicle, a state jail felony, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04
(West 2010); and criminal mischief, a state jail felony, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03
(West 2010). On May 28, 2009, appellant pleaded guilty to all counts, pursuant to a
plea agreement. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years’ confinement in the
State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, suspended the
sentence, and placed appellant on five years community supervision, to run concurrent
with his other sentences. On September 21, 2010, the State filed a motion to revoke
appellant’s community supervision. On December 2, 2010, appellant pleaded true to
the allegations included in the State’s motion to revoke. The trial court found appellant
violated the conditions of community supervision, revoked his community supervision, 2 and sentenced appellant to two years’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, to run concurrent with the sentences in his other
cases.
Appellant appealed both judgments.1 Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed
an Anders brief. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
In each case, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967),
appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with
this Court, stating that his review of the records yielded no grounds of error upon which
an appeal can be predicated. In each case, counsel’s brief meets the requirements of
Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance
‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to
the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins
v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority,
there are no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. In each case, counsel has
1 There being two judgments and two records, separate cause numbers were assigned to each case on appeal. These appeals, however, arise from a single revocation hearing. Although neither party has sought to consolidate these appeals, in the interest of judicial economy, we issue a single opinion disposing of both appeals.
3 informed this Court that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable
grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to
withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed appellant of his right to review the record and to
file a pro se response.2 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3;
see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of
time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response. See In re Schulman,
252 S.W.3d at 409.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). In each case, we have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s
brief, and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders
briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and
reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the
requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.
There is no reversible error in either record. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court
are affirmed.
2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
4 III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney asked this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he
must withdraw from representing the appellant.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NUMBERS 13-11-00345-CR and 13-11-00346-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
QUINTIN A. MONTGOMERY, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 105th District Court of Kleberg County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
In cause number 13-11-00345-CR, appellant, Quintin A. Montgomery, pleaded
guilty to burglary of a habitation, a second degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
30.02 (West 2003). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication
and placed appellant on ten years of community supervision. On February 12, 2009,
the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision. On April 20, 2009, appellant was adjudicated guilty, and sentenced to ten years’ confinement in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, with placement at a
boot camp. On November 20, 2009, the trial court granted shock probation to appellant,
suspended his ten-year sentence, and placed him on community supervision for eight
years. On September 21, 2010, the State again filed a motion to revoke appellant’s
community supervision. On December 2, 2010, appellant pleaded true to the
allegations included in the State’s motion to revoke. The trial court found appellant
violated the conditions of community supervision, revoked his community supervision,
and sentenced appellant to ten years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department Criminal Justice.
In cause number 13-11-00346-CR, appellant was indicted for unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle, a state jail felony, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (West 2003); two
counts of credit card abuse, a state jail felony, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31 (West
2010); evading arrest with a vehicle, a state jail felony, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04
(West 2010); and criminal mischief, a state jail felony, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03
(West 2010). On May 28, 2009, appellant pleaded guilty to all counts, pursuant to a
plea agreement. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years’ confinement in the
State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, suspended the
sentence, and placed appellant on five years community supervision, to run concurrent
with his other sentences. On September 21, 2010, the State filed a motion to revoke
appellant’s community supervision. On December 2, 2010, appellant pleaded true to
the allegations included in the State’s motion to revoke. The trial court found appellant
violated the conditions of community supervision, revoked his community supervision, 2 and sentenced appellant to two years’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, to run concurrent with the sentences in his other
cases.
Appellant appealed both judgments.1 Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed
an Anders brief. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
In each case, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967),
appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with
this Court, stating that his review of the records yielded no grounds of error upon which
an appeal can be predicated. In each case, counsel’s brief meets the requirements of
Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance
‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to
the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins
v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority,
there are no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. In each case, counsel has
1 There being two judgments and two records, separate cause numbers were assigned to each case on appeal. These appeals, however, arise from a single revocation hearing. Although neither party has sought to consolidate these appeals, in the interest of judicial economy, we issue a single opinion disposing of both appeals.
3 informed this Court that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable
grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to
withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed appellant of his right to review the record and to
file a pro se response.2 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3;
see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of
time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response. See In re Schulman,
252 S.W.3d at 409.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). In each case, we have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s
brief, and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders
briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and
reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the
requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.
There is no reversible error in either record. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court
are affirmed.
2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
4 III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney asked this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he
must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the
appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw in each case. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion,
counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant
and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP.
P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206
S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Gregory T. Perkes Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 16th day of February, 2012.
3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Effective September 1, 2011, any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 5