Quintez Talley v. PA Department of Corrections

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 19, 2025
• Docket: 20-2240
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 20-2240 __________

QUINTEZ TALLEY, Appellant

v.

PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; SECRETARY JOHN WETZEL; OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL; GOVERNOR TOM WOLF; WARDEN MARK CAPOZZA; SCOTT NICKELSON; RENE ADAMS; SHELLEY MANKEY; J. TREMPUS; CAPT. WESLEY TIFT; CAPT. SALVAY; PAUL AURANDT; MIKE OPPMAN; RHONDA HOUSE; LT. COLLINS; LT. WOODS; LT. JOHNS; DORINA VARNER; SCI- FAYETTE’S MAILROOM; SCI-FAYETTE’S SECURITY DEPT.; LT. BURTON; SECRETARY OF INMATE GRIEVANCES AND APPEALS; TRICIA SILBAUGH ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00308) District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 15, 2025

Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 19, 2025) ___________

OPINION * ___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM

Pennsylvania state prisoner Quintez Talley, a frequent pro se litigant in the federal

courts, appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania (“the WDPA”) dismissing his second amended complaint

(“SAC”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons

that follow, we will affirm that judgment.

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background

of this case, we discuss that background only briefly. Talley’s SAC (the operative

pleading in this case) was brought against, among others, the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (“DOC”) and various DOC officials. The allegations in the SAC stemmed

from a nine-day prison lockdown that the DOC had implemented to curb the introduction

of contraband into its prisons. The lockdown “halt[ed] both incoming and outgoing mail”

during that nine-day period. W.D. Pa. Dkt. No. 35, at 7. As a result of this temporary

mail freeze, there was a delay in the mailing of a legal filing that Talley had prepared for

one of his other cases — Case No. 3:15-cv-01170 (“Case 1170”) in the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (“the MDPA”). Talley’s prison

mailed that filing right after the lockdown ended. But by the time that filing arrived at

the MDPA a few days later, the MDPA had, in the interim, adopted a United States

Magistrate Judge’s report recommending that the MDPA dismiss what remained of Case

2 1170 for failure to prosecute. 1 In view of all this, Talley’s SAC in his WDPA case

alleged claims under the United States Constitution, as well as under federal and state

law. The SAC sought, inter alia, over $2 million in damages.

The defendants moved to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A

United States Magistrate Judge subsequently issued a report recommending that the

WDPA grant that motion and dismiss the case without affording Talley further leave to

amend. Talley objected to the report, but the WDPA overruled those objections, adopted

the report, granted the defendants’ motion, and dismissed the case. In doing so, the

WDPA indicated that it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Talley’s

state-law claims. This timely appeal followed. 2

II.

At the heart of the SAC is Talley’s claim alleging that the temporary mail freeze

infringed upon his right to access the courts — a right that arises from the First and

1 At the time of dismissal, only one defendant remained in Case 1170 (the other defendants in that case had previously settled with Talley). Talley eventually appealed from the MDPA’s dismissal of Case 1170. But he filed that appeal more than three-and- a-half years after the MPDA’s dismissal order, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (setting a 30- day appeal deadline in a case like that one), and he ultimately elected to voluntarily dismiss that appeal, see Talley v. Wetzel, C.A. No. 22-2052. 2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6).” Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). And we may affirm such a decision on any basis supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 3 Fourteenth Amendments. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per

curiam). To state an access-to-the-courts claim, a plaintiff must allege facts

demonstrating that, as a result of the defendants’ actions, he (1) “lost a chance to pursue a

nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim,” and (2) he has “no other remedy that may be

awarded as recompense for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.”

Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 915 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Talley failed to make this showing. As explained in the Magistrate Judge’s report,

which the WDPA adopted, Case 1170 “was dismissed not because of any impediment

which may have occurred as a result of the mail suspension, but because [Talley] refused

to follow Court Orders.” W.D. Pa. Dkt. No. 39, at 7. The public docket for Case 1170

reflects that, on multiple occasions over the course of about a year, it was explained to

Talley that his failure to file a third amended complaint in Case 1170 could result in that

case being dismissed. See M.D. Pa. Dkt. Nos. 94, 96, and 107. Nevertheless, Talley did

not submit a third amended complaint in that case. And nothing in his filing that was

delayed due to the mail freeze indicated that he had intended to submit a third amended

complaint. 3 Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb the WDPA’s dismissal of Talley’s

access-to-the-courts claim.

3 Talley’s delayed filing objected to the Magistrate Judge’s report recommending the dismissal of Case 1170 for failure to prosecute. But in that filing, Talley stated that he “has chosen not to [a]mend his Complaint.” M.D. Pa. Dkt. No. 111, at 3. 4 To the extent that the SAC included a separate First Amendment claim alleging a

violation of Talley’s right to freedom of speech, he did not allege facts demonstrating that

the temporary mail freeze — a freeze that briefly delayed one piece of his outgoing mail

— ran afoul of that right. 4 Cf. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1452 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We

decline to hold that a single instance of damaged mail rises to the level of constitutionally

impermissible censorship . . . .”), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343 (1996); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n isolated

incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”).

Furthermore, to the extent that the SAC otherwise sought relief under the Constitution or

federal law based on the temporary mail freeze at issue here, we see no viable claim.

And since all of Talley’s constitutional and federal claims were subject to dismissal, it

was appropriate for the WDPA to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his

state-law claims. See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).

In view of the above, we will affirm the WDPA’s judgment. 5 To the extent that

Talley seeks any other relief in this case, that relief is denied.

4 To the extent that Talley’s First Amendment claim concerned the temporary freeze’s effect on his incoming mail, he has voluntarily withdrawn that part of this claim. See Talley’s Br. 18 n.8. 5 Defendants’ appellate brief argues that some of them are shielded from Talley’s claims by the Eleventh Amendment. We need not, and do not, reach that argument. See Bowers v. NCAA, 346 F.3d 402, 418 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A] court may reserve judgment on Eleventh Amendment issues even when advanced by a state where it can resolve the case on other grounds and the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party if immunity were recognized.”). 5