Quinteros v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 25-857
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM ERNESTO QUINTEROS, No. 25-857 Agency No. Petitioner, A095-788-611 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 10, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

William Ernesto Quinteros, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for

review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an

appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for

withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel previously granted the Respondent’s unopposed motion to submit this case on the briefs [Dkt. 26]. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Where, as here, the

BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Rodriguez-Zuniga

v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Garcia-Martinez v.

Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018)). We deny the petition.

1. To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an applicant must

show that he will face persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground. See

Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 886 (9th Cir. 2019). Here, the only statutorily

protected ground that Petitioner asserted to support his withholding of removal

claim was membership in the proposed particular social group: “Persons Who

Oppose Gang Violence.” The agency did not err in concluding that this proposed

particular social group is not cognizable.

A cognizable particular social group must be: “(1) composed of members

who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and

(3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Villegas Sanchez v. Garland,

990 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The applicant bears the

burden of demonstrating the existence of a cognizable particular social group.

Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016).

Here, the agency correctly determined that Petitioner’s proposed particular

social group lacked both sufficient particularity and social distinction. First, as the

BIA explained, the proposed group lacks particularity because “‘oppose’ is a

2 subjective term,” and thus the proposed group lacks clear criteria or parameters for

inclusion. See Ngyuyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2020)

(concluding that “known drug users” was not a cognizable particular social group

because the group “lack[ed] definable boundaries” and was “amorphous,

overbroad, diffuse, or subjective”); Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 890

(9th Cir. 2021) (concluding that “minor Christian males who oppose gang

membership” was not sufficiently particular). Second, Petitioner failed to put forth

evidence showing that Salvadoran society recognizes “persons who oppose gang

violence” as a socially distinct group. The record contains ample evidence

detailing the serious problem of gang violence in El Salvador. However, none of

this evidence shows that Salvadoran society recognizes those who oppose gang

violence as a distinct group. See Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1240,

1243 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that Petitioner had failed to establish a socially

distinct group of “people who report the criminal activity of gangs to police” where

the record discussed the problem of gang violence, but failed to show that society

recognized those who reported the violence as a distinct group).

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. “To

be eligible for relief under CAT, an applicant bears the burden of establishing that

[]he will more likely than not be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a

public official if removed to h[is] native country.” Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962

3 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, the agency denied CAT relief based on a

lack of acquiescence by the Salvadoran government. The agency reviewed country

conditions reports and found that the Salvadoran government has made aggressive

efforts to combat gang activity. Although Petitioner put forth generalized evidence

of corruption in the Salvadoran government, this evidence is not specific to the

government’s response to gang violence and does not compel the conclusion that a

Salvadoran official would participate in or acquiesce to Petitioner’s torture if

Petitioner is removed to El Salvador. See id. (“[F]or this court to reverse the BIA

with respect to a finding of fact [underlying an applicant’s eligibility for CAT

relief], the evidence must compel a different conclusion from the one reached by

the BIA.” (quoting Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2011))).1

PETITION DENIED.

1 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. See Dkt. No. 2. The motion for stay of removal is otherwise denied. See Dkt. No. 8.