Quintanilla v. Harchack

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Quintanilla v. Harchack

283 A.D.2d 475, 724 N.Y.S.2d 645, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4953

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 14, 2001

StatusPublished

This text of 283 A.D.2d 475 (Quintanilla v. Harchack) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Quintanilla v. Harchack, 283 A.D.2d 475, 724 N.Y.S.2d 645, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4953 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Je Suis, Inc., and Yankee Peddler appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Ort, J.), dated January 28, 2000, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs payable by the plaintiff-respondent, the motion is granted, the complaint and cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

After the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them should have been granted. O’Brien, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Je Suis, Inc., and Yankee Peddler appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Ort, J.), dated January 28, 2000, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs payable by the plaintiff-respondent, the motion is granted, the complaint and cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

After the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them should have been granted. O’Brien, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

283 A.D.2d 475, 724 N.Y.S.2d 645, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4953, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quintanilla-v-harchack-nyappdiv-2001.