Quintanilla v. Archibishop of Agana

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: February 9, 2018
• Docket: CV0552-16
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 7 OF GUAM 8 ROY T. QUINTANILLA, et al., ) Case No. CV0552- 16 9 ) Plaintiffs, ) 10 ) vs. 11 ) ARCHBISHOP OF AGANA, a Corporation) DECISION & ORDER 12 Sole, et al., ) Defendants ) 13 ) 14 ) ) 15

16 INTRODUCTION 17 This matter came before the Honorable Michael J. Bordallo on Defendant Archbishop of 18 Agama's Motion to Dismiss. Attorney John Terlaje represents Defendant Archbishop of Asana 19 ("Archbishop"),l and Attorney Jacqueline Terlaje represents Defendant Anthony Apuron 20 ("Apuron"). Attorney David Lujan represents Plaintiffs Roy Quintanilla, Walter Denton, Roland 21 Sondia, and Doris Concepcion. Having reviewed and considered the moving papers, arguments, 22 record, and applicable law, the Court issues the following Decision and Order denying in part 23 and granting in part Defendant Archbishop of Agana's Motion to Dismiss. 24 BACKGROUND 25 This matter arises out of Plaintiffs' July 1, 2016 Complaint, in which Plaintiffs accused 26 Defendants Archbishop and Apuron of libel and slander. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a First 27

28 1 Attorney Jeffrey Cook represented Defendant Archbishop prior to Attorney John Terlaje's substitution on November 8, 2017. Attorney Cook filed the Motion to Dismiss on behalf of Defendant Archbishop. Page 1 of 8 mum

1 Amended Complaint on July 19, 2016. On September 12, 2016, Defendant Archbishop tiled the 2 present Motion to Dismiss. On the same day, Defendant Apuron joined in the motion. Defendant 3 contends primarily that the statements that formed the basis for Plaintiffs' defamation claims are 4 non-actionable because they are privileged as responsive denials made in self-defense. Mot. at 7. 5 Additionally, Defendant asserts that the slander cause of action must be dismissed because 6 Plaintiffs fail to allege the essential statutory element of special damages. Plaintiffs filed an 7 Opposition in response to the motion on October 28, 2016. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's 8 statements exceed mere denials or opinions and are thus, actionable. Opp'n at 2-3. Defendant 9 Archbishop filed a reply on November 14, 2016, maintaining its position that its responsive 10 statements are privileged and non-actionable. After several judges were disqualified from 11 presiding over this matter, it was assigned to this Court on March 2, 2017. At a status hearing on 12 August 9, 2017, over the objection of Attorney Jacqueline Terlaje, the Court issued a temporary 13 stay in this matter pending developments in mediation and settlement discussions. On December 14 5, 2017, the Court heard oral arguments on the motion and subsequently took the matter under 15 advisement. 16

17 ISSUES 18 1. Whether Defendant's statements are protected by the privileges of reply or self-defense. 19 2. Whether Plaintiffs must allege special damages in their cause of action for slander. 20

21 FACTS 22 1. On May 17, 2016, Plaintiff Roy Quintanilla held a recorded press conference in front of 23 the Archdiocese of Asana Chancery Office in Hagatna, Guam where he asserted that 24 Defendant Apuron molested him when he was 12-year old altar server at the Agat Parish 25 where Defendant Apuron served as a priest. 26 2. On the same day, Defendant Apuron, in his capacity as Archbishop of Asana, released a 27 video statement denying all allegations of sexual abuse made by Plaintiff Quintanilla and 28 characterizing the accusations as false.

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1 3. On May 30, 2016, Doris Concepcion provided a recorded interview to the media in which 2 she stated that her deceased son, Joseph Qui rata, revealed to her that Defendant Apuron 3 molested him when he served as an altar server at the Agat Parish. 4 4. On May 31, 2016, Defendant Apuron denied Concepcion's allegations and stated that 5 they were false. In a media release, Apuron claimed that "another malicious and 6 calumnious accusation" had surfaced from "the mother of a man who has been deceased 7 for eleven years." 8 5. On June 7, 2016, Plaintiff Walter Denton claimed at a recorded press conference that 9 Defendant Apuron raped him when he was a 13-year old altar server at the Agat Parish. 10 Defendant Apuron did not respond to this statement. 11 6. On June 15, 2016, Plaintiff Roland Sondia claimed that Defendant Apuron sexually 12 abused him when he was a 15-year old altar server at the Agat Parish. Apuron did not 13 respond to this accusation. 14

15 PRINCIPLES OF LAW 16

17 Motion to Dismiss and the Qualified Privilege of Reply or Self-Defense 18 Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is "not proper 19 unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 20 which would entitle him to relief." First Hawaiian Bank v. Manley, 2007 Guam 2 'll 9 (quoting 21 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (internal quotations omitted). Under this standard,

22 the Court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff" and "take the 23 facts asserted therein as true." Gibson v. Boy Scouts of America, 360 F.Supp.2d 776, 780 (D.

24 Va. 2005). However, the Court need not accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. 25 Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 19 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 26 Many courts recognize the rule of self-defense from libel or slander. See, e.g., Cartwright 27 v. Herald Pub. Co., 68 S.E.2d 415, 417 (S.C. 1951), Pfeifer v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 871 (Wyo. 28 1968), Novecon Ltd. v. Bulgarian-American Enterprise Fund, 190 F.3d 556, 566 (D.C. Cir.

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1 1999). Under this rule, "statements made in an honest endeavor to vindicate one's character or

2 to protect one's interests are usually regarded as qualifiedly privileged, even though they are 3 false, if they are made in good faith and without malice." Cartwright, 68 S.E.2d at 417 (citing 33 4 Am. Jur. 133, 134, Libel and Slander). However, such a defensive communication will lose its 5 privileged character if the statement goes "beyond the scope of the original attack or indulges in 6 language that is unnecessarily defamatory." Q. 7 "A motion to dismiss on grounds that the alleged defamatory statement is privileged 8 should only be granted if the privilege is an absolute one and should not be granted when a

9 conditional privilege is asserted." Woodruff v. Trepel, 725 A.2d 612, 617 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 10 1999) (quoting Leese v. Baltimore Countv, 497 A.2d 159, 176-77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) 11 (overruled on other grounds)), see also McNamee v. Clemens, 762 F.Supp.2d 584, 608 12 (explaining that "[a] claim of privilege is an affirmative defense, which, if applicable at all, is far 13 better suited to a motion for summary judgment than a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 14 claim."). Conditional or qualified privileges are affirmative defenses and are to be raised in a 15 defendant's answer. Wilcox v. Neward Vallev Cent. School Dist., 74 A.D. ad 1558, 1562 (N.Y. 16 App. Div. 2010). The Wilcox court explained the procedural implications of a motion to dismiss 17 based on a qualified privilege: 18 Notwithstanding defendants' assertion to the contrary, dismissal of plaintiff' s 19 slander claim on the basis of qualified privilege is not appropriate at this juncture. A claim of qualified privilege is an affirmative defense to be raised in defendants ' 20 answer and does not lend itself to a preanswer motion to dismiss. Rather, 21 defendants must plead the privilege as an affirmative defense and thereafter move for summary judgment on that defense, supporting the motion with competent 22 evidence establishing a prima facie showing of qualified privilege. In the event that defendants make such a showing, the burden would then shift to plaintiff to 23 demonstrate that [defendant's] statements were uttered with malice, either under 24 the common law or constitutional standard. By asserting that the allegations of the complaint establish a qualified privilege as a matter of law, defendants 25 attempted to short-circuit that procedure by improperly placing the burden on plaintiff to make competent allegations of malice in anticipation of the affirmative 26 defense. 27 L. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, a motion to dismiss based on a qualified 28 privilege should not be granted before the affirmative defense is raised in an answer.

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4 Pleading Special Damages in Slander Per Quod Cause of Action 5 Guam's defamation statute for slander is derived from California's Civil Code Section 6 46. Thus, California decisions interpreting that statute are persuasive sources. See Sumitomo 7 Construction Co., Ltd. v. Zhong Ye, Inc., 1997 Guam 8 'll 5 (explaining that when Guam statues 8 mirror a deriving source, Guam courts characterize authorities interpreting those statutes as 9 persuasive sources). Guam's slander statute provides five instances in which the cause of action 10 may lie: ll S l a n d e r is a false and unprivileged publication other than libel, which: (a) Charges any person with crime, or with having been informed against, convicted, 12 or punished for crime, 13 (b) Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease, 14 (c) Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the 15 office or the other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with 16 reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits, 17 (d) Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity, or 18 (e) Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage. 19 G.C.A. § 2104. "A slander that falls within the first four subdivision of Civil Code section 46 19 is slander per se and requires no proof of actual damages. A slander that does not fit into those 20 four subdivisions is slander per quod, and special damages are required for there to be any 21 recovery for that slander.2" Regalia v. Nethercutt Collection, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 882, 886-87 (Ct. 22 App. 2009) (citing Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc., 15Cal.Rptr.3d 215, 224 (Ct. App. 23 2004) and 5 Witldn, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, §§ 552-555, pp. 807-814)). 24

27 2 Slander per sh is "slander for which special damages need not be proved because it imputes to the plaintiff any one of the following: (1) a crime involving moral turpitude, (2) a loathsome disease (such as a sexually transmitted 28 disease), (3) conduct that would adversely affect one's business or profession, or (4) unchastity (esp. of a woman). Slander per quod, on the other hand, is "slander that does not qualify as slander per Se, thus forcing the plaintiff to prove special damages." Black's Law Dictionarv, slander (10th ed. 2014). Page 5 of 8 1 Under the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure, claims of special damages must be specifically stated. .2 Guam R. Civ. P. 9(g). 3 "Special damages consist of the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value

4 which must flow directly from the injury to reputation caused by the defamation, not from the 5 effects of defamation, and it is settled law that they must be fully and accurately identified with

6 sufficient particularity to identify actual losses." Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 235 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (citing Restatements, Torts ad § 575, cormnent b, Lincoln First Bank of 8 Rochester v. Siegel, 60 A.D.2d 270, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)). Further, the requirement to 9 plead special damages is not satisfied by general allegations of a dollar amount. See id., see also 10 Jolly v. Academy Collection Service, Inc., 400 F.Supp.2d 85 l, 863 (D. N.C. 2005) (explaining

that special damages are not successfully pled when they are not listed, enumerated, or 12 explained). Thus, in an action for slander per quod, failure to satisfactorily plead special 13 damages warrants the dismissal of the action. See, e.g., Brown v. Barnes, 296 P.2d 739, 741 14 (Colo. 1956) (en banc), Jollv v. Academy Collection Service, Inc., 400 F.Supp.2d 851, 863-64 15 (D. N.C. 2005), Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572, 574-75 (Ct. App. N.C. 1994), Rich for

16 Rich v. Kentucky Countrv Day. Inc., 793 S.W.2d 832, 837 (Ct. App. Ken. 1990). 17

18 ANALYSIS 19 Motion to Dismiss Libel Claim 20 Defendant moves this Court to dismiss the libel claims on the basis that the statements 21 are privileged under self-defense. The Court finds that Defendant made these statements in 22 immediate response to serious allegations of sexual abuse. Thus, the Court determines that the 23 statements were made to protect Defendant's interests, and therefore, are entitled to qualified 24 privilege. However, because the privilege of self-defense is a qualified privilege, not an absolute 25 privilege, the Court concludes that dismissal at this juncture is inappropriate. Defendant may 26 raise the qualified privilege as an affirmative defense in his Answer, and may subsequently 27 submit a Motion for Summary Judgment. Raising the affirmative defense on the present Motion 28 to Dismiss improperly places on Plaintiffs the burden of pleading facts that defeat the qualified

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1 privilege before the affirmative defense is pled. Thus, the Court holds that dismissal is not 2 appropriate at this time. 3

4 Motion to Dismiss Slander Claim 5 Defendant also moves this Court to dismiss the slander claim on the basis that Plaintiffs 6 failed to allege special damages in their Complaint. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's May 17, 7 2016 statement were "of a nature which, by natural consequence, would cause and did, in fact, 8 cause actual damage." First Am. Con pl. at 15 (July 19, 2016). This allegation does not fall into 9 one of the four specific subdivisions in the statute and thus, requires reference to additional facts. 10 Accordingly, Court finds that Plaintiffs' cause of action is one of slander per quod and Plaintiffs 11 must allege special damages. 12 , The damages Plaintiffs allege include only "losses to their reputation, shame, 13 mortification, and hurt feelings and losses with respect to their occupations." gt, at 16. Plaintiffs 14 did not allege any specific pecuniary or economic losses caused by Defendant's statements. 15 Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled only general damages, not the special damages 16 required for a claim of slander per quod. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs failed to plead special 17 damages, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the 18 Court holds that dismissal of the slander claim is appropriate. 19

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Page 7 of 8 1 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART 3 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' claims of libel under 19 G.C.A. § 2103 survive the 4 5 Motion to Dismiss. However, because Plaintiffs failed to allege special damages, their slander

6 claim under 19 G.C.A. § 2104 is DISMISSED.

8 SO ORDERED, this day of 2018. 9

12 'ABLE MICHAEL J. BORDALLO 13 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 14

SERVICE VIA COURT BOX 26 I acknowledge that a copy of the original hereto was placed in lM 27 c u r l box of: _ it.Tert a .5/"' IG.C 28 Tvrla' L m QOW Date: el' l Time: 412

Deputy cl¢m CouN of Guam Page 8 of 8