Quintanilla-Rivas v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 15, 2025
Docket24-2293
StatusUnpublished

This text of Quintanilla-Rivas v. Bondi (Quintanilla-Rivas v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Quintanilla-Rivas v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 15 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERTO ANTONIO QUINTANILLA- No. 24-2293 RIVAS; HILDA LISSETH CANJURA- MANCIA; J.M.G.; D.A.Q., Agency Nos. A220-605-172 Petitioners, A220-939-890 A220-939-891 v. A220-939-892

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 11, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, PAEZ, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Roberto Antonio Quintanilla-Rivas, his partner Hilda Lisseth Canjura-

Mancia, their minor son D.A.Q., and Ms. Canjura-Mancia’s minor son J.M.G., all

natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of the Board of Immigration

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appeals’ (“the Board”) dismissal of their appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural

history of the case, we need not recount it here.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Our review is limited to

the [Board]’s decision, except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly

adopted.” Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 651 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Khudaverdyan v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2015)). We review legal

conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence, only overturning

factual findings “when any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude

to the contrary.” Id. (quoting Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir.

2021)).

We assess the family’s applications together based on Mr. Quintanilla-

Rivas’s application, following the Board’s approach. The children are derivative

beneficiaries of their parents’ applications and the family agreed at their hearing

that Ms. Canjura-Mancia had “the same claim” as Mr. Quintanilla-Rivas. Mr.

Quintanilla-Rivas was the only family member to submit a declaration and testify,

and no other family member presented evidence of separate harms. There is thus

no need to independently evaluate the family’s applications.

2 I

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Mr. Quintanilla-Rivas

did not suffer harm rising to the level of past persecution or establish a well-

founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Mr. Quintanilla-

Rivas alleged two sources of harm before the agency: 1) past and future harm from

the MS-13 gang and a member named “Demente” and 2) future harm from the

network of human traffickers he is testifying against.

First, the death threat that Mr. Quintanilla-Rivas received from Demente is

not, on its own, severe enough to compel a finding of past persecution. Threats

alone rarely constitute persecution and are more likely to rise to that level when

they are “repeated, specific and ‘combined with confrontation or other

mistreatment.’” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, the single vague

threat from Demente was accompanied by no other mistreatment and does not

compel a finding of past persecution. See id. (finding no past persecution where

petitioner received two death threats from a group of “hitmen” without any

accompanying acts of violence).

Second, substantial evidence supports the finding that any future harm Mr.

Quintanilla-Rivas fears from Demente and MS-13 lacks a nexus to a protected

3 ground. Mr. Quintanilla-Rivas did not provide sufficient evidence that any harm

would be on account of his or his family’s membership in a family-based particular

social group because he and Ms. Canjura-Mancia both have family members

residing safely in El Salvador. See Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 889-

90 (9th Cir. 2021) (affirming the Board’s finding that the “inference of a nexus” to

a family-based social group was “undermined by the fact that other family

members continue to reside” safely in the petitioner’s home country).

Additionally, by refusing to assist MS-13 or pay extortion money, Mr. Quintanilla-

Rivas neither became a member of a cognizable particular social group (“persons

taking concrete steps to oppose criminal activity”) nor expressed an “anti-gang”

political opinion. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (a

noncitizen’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or

random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Mr.

Quintanilla-Rivas also has not exhausted his claim of a nexus to his religious

identity. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023).

Finally, substantial evidence supports the finding that Mr. Quintanilla-Rivas

lacked an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution by the human trafficker

network. See Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029 (petitioner must “show[] both a

subjective fear of future persecution, as well as an objectively ‘reasonable

4 possibility’ of persecution” (citation omitted)). Any harm was speculative and

unsupported by specific evidence, given that no one from the network had

attempted to contact anyone in his family or in any way threatened him. See

Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner’s fear of a

political party regaining power was “too speculative to be credited” because there

was “no specific evidence”).

The Board’s denial of asylum is thus supported by substantial evidence.

II

For similar reasons, the Board’s denial of withholding of removal is also

supported by substantial evidence. Because Mr. Quintanilla-Rivas cannot establish

past persecution by MS-13, or a well-founded fear of future persecution by the

human trafficker network, he cannot meet the more stringent standard for

withholding of removal. Singh, 57 F.4th at 658. Additionally, while the nexus

standard for withholding is less stringent, Mr. Quintanilla-Rivas’s claim of future

harm by MS-13 still fails because there was no evidence of nexus at all. See

Barajas-Romero v.

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Related

Zetino v. Holder
622 F.3d 1007 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Hayk Khudaverdyan v. Eric Holder, Jr.
778 F.3d 1101 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Raul Barajas-Romero v. Loretta E. Lynch
846 F.3d 351 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Jose Duran-Rodriguez v. William Barr
918 F.3d 1025 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Justin Santos-Ponce v. Robert Wilkinson
987 F.3d 886 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Abdi Ali Aden v. Robert Wilkinson
989 F.3d 1073 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Josue Umana-Escobar v. Merrick Garland
69 F.4th 544 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

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