Quintana-Zepeda v. Kucharzyk

2025 IL App (1st) 242055-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-2055
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 242055-U

THIRD DIVISION November 12, 2025

No. 1-24-2055

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

SERGIO QUINTANA-ZEPEDA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 22 L 65010 ) KRYSTIAN KUCHARZYK, ) Honorable Thomas W. Murphy ) and Matthew J. Carmody, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judges Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lampkin and Rochford concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirming the decision of the circuit court to debar rejection of an arbitration award.

¶2 Plaintiff Sergio Quintana-Zepeda filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County,

and the matter was subsequently transferred to mandatory arbitration. After plaintiff failed to

appear at the arbitration hearing, the panel found in favor of defendant Krystian Kucharzyk.

Plaintiff filed a rejection of the arbitration award, and defendant filed a motion to debar the

rejection under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 90(g) (eff. Feb. 2, 2023) and Rule 91(b) (eff. Oct. 1,

2021). The circuit court granted the motion and denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 1-24-2055

On appeal, plaintiff primarily contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering

debarment. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Initiation of Litigation

¶5 In August 2021, plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile collision.

As defendant was a minor, plaintiff initially filed a verified complaint at law for negligence and

property damage against defendant’s mother, Dominika Kozik (Kozik), individually and as

defendant’s parent or guardian. Plaintiff was represented by attorney Raed Shalabi (Shalabi).

¶6 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Kozik and filed an amended complaint for negligence and

property damage solely against defendant—who was no longer a minor—in March 2023.

The matter was eventually transferred to the mandatory arbitration calendar following the

completion of discovery. In an order entered on January 23, 2024, an arbitration hearing was

scheduled for March 5, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.

¶7 Arbitration Hearing

¶8 On March 5, 2024, at 12 a.m., plaintiff—through attorney Shalabi—filed an emergency

motion to reschedule the arbitration hearing. The motion represented that plaintiff needed a

Spanish interpreter and that counsel was “still seeking a Spanish interpreter to be present during

the arbitration.” Plaintiff requested a continuation of the arbitration hearing to a date in April

2024 to allow him to “seek and hire” an interpreter. The notice of motion reflected that the

emergency motion was scheduled for presentment later that day, at 9:30 a.m.

¶9 Although plaintiff did not appear at the arbitration on March 5, 2024, attorney Fatima

Abuzerr (Abuzerr) signed in at 8:30 a.m. on plaintiff’s behalf; Abuzerr is employed by Shalabi’s

law firm. Defendant and his counsel were also present. As reflected in the written award, the

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arbitration hearing commenced at 8:45 a.m. and concluded at 8:46 a.m. The three-person panel

found in favor of defendant, noting that “[p]laintiff did not appear and the attorney for the

plaintiff did not proceed.” A box checked on the award indicated that “[a]ll parties participated

in good faith.” The circuit court denied the emergency motion to reschedule later that same day.

¶ 10 Rejection of Award and Motion to Debar Rejection

¶ 11 On March 27, 2024, plaintiff filed a rejection of the mandatory arbitration award and paid

the rejection fee. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to debar plaintiff’s rejection of the

arbitration award, asserting that plaintiff had failed to appear at the arbitration hearing even

though defendant filed and served a notice to compel his attendance pursuant to Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 237 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). Defendant noted that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 90(g) (eff.

Feb. 2, 2023) provides that “[r]emedies upon a party’s failure to comply with notice pursuant to

Rule 237(b) may include an order debarring that party from rejecting the award.” Defendant also

argued that plaintiff did not participate in the arbitration hearing in good faith and thus should be

debarred from rejecting the award under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 91(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

According to defendant, plaintiff did not submit a “packet of evidence” pursuant to Rule 90(c)—

e.g., property repair bills and other documents which are presumptively admissible—and his

attorney did not present evidence or cross-examine defendant.

¶ 12 The attachments to defendant’s motion to debar plaintiff’s rejection included the

defendant’s Rule 237 notice to plaintiff. Katherine E. Linehan (Linehan), one of defendant’s

attorneys, also submitted an affidavit regarding the arbitration hearing. Linehan averred, in part,

that Abuzerr “said her client was not coming because they did not have an interpreter.”

¶ 13 Response to Motion to Debar Rejection

¶ 14 Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to debar his rejection of the arbitration award.

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The response provided that plaintiff’s attorney—Shalabi—represented a party in an unrelated

matter which was originally scheduled for trial in the circuit court of Cook County on Thursday,

February 29, 2024. On that date, the judge in that other case informed Shalabi that the trial

would be rescheduled to Tuesday, March 5, 2024. According to plaintiff, the judge advised

Shalabi that the trial “trump[ed]” the arbitration and that “an arbitration court will have no issue

rescheduling the matter given the circumstances.”

¶ 15 According to the response, Shalabi intended to schedule plaintiff’s emergency motion for

hearing prior to the arbitration. Shalabi represented that he contacted the courthouse on Friday,

March 1, 2024, to reschedule the arbitration, and he also “notified” defendant’s counsel. As

Monday, March 4, 2024, was a court holiday (Casimir Pulaski Day), Shalabi maintained that

plaintiff’s motion to reschedule could not be heard until the day of the arbitration. Plaintiff thus

requested that the circuit court deny defendant’s motion to debar rejection of the arbitration

award, as “the only reason for the default was due to a scheduling conflict.”

¶ 16 Attached to the response was an email from the judge in the other matter, which stated

that Shalabi was engaged in a trial in her courtroom at the time of the arbitration hearing in this

case. The judge wrote: “Unfortunately, through no fault of attorney Shalabi, the trial before me

had to be rescheduled from Feb[ruary] 29, 2024[,] to the week of March 5, 2024[,] and was

required to proceed on that date. I understood attorney Shalabi had a conflict with the scheduled

arbitration[,] but I ordered him to proceed with the trial before me.”

¶ 17 Debarment Order and Reconsideration

¶ 18 During a hearing on June 25, 2024, the circuit court heard arguments on the motion to

debar rejection of the arbitration award. Defendant’s counsel represented that plaintiff’s counsel

contacted her office on Monday, March 4, 2024 (the court holiday), indicating that “they weren’t

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going to be proceeding on the arb[itration] that Tuesday” due to the lack of an interpreter. In her

written response to that communication, defendant’s counsel stated that she and her client would

attend the arbitration hearing, as no order had been entered which continued the arbitration

hearing. Shalabi argued, in part, that he was ordered to attend the trial in the other matter and

that his associate (Abuzerr) “had no idea what’s going on” with plaintiff’s case.

¶ 19 Following a second hearing on June 28, 2024, the circuit court granted defendant’s

motion to debar plaintiff’s rejection of the arbitration award. After noting that Rule 90(g)

requires “good cause shown not less than seven days prior to the hearing” to excuse a witness’s

failure to comply with a Rule 237(b) notice to appear, the circuit court observed that plaintiff

provided “conflicting statements” regarding the reason for his absence from the scheduled

arbitration hearing. The circuit court opined that plaintiff should have secured an interpreter “if

that was the reason” for his absence, or he should have “made other arrangements” if there was a

scheduling conflict.

¶ 20 Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, asserting that both the lack of an

interpreter and the existence of the scheduling conflict compromised his ability to participate in

the arbitration hearing. By this time, the judge who granted the motion to debar (Judge Thomas

W. Murphy) had retired, and a new judge (Judge Matthew J. Carmody) was assigned to the case.

¶ 21 In his response, defendant argued that reconsideration was inappropriate, as there had

been no newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, or errors in the circuit court’s

application of existing law. Defendant noted that the scheduling conflict was not mentioned in

plaintiff’s emergency motion to reschedule and that plaintiff was, in fact, represented by an

attorney—Shalabi’s colleague Abuzerr—at the arbitration hearing. Defendant also maintained

that plaintiff could have appeared at the arbitration hearing, even without an interpreter.

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Defendant further argued that plaintiff’s counsel did not submit a Rule 90(c) packet or otherwise

present evidence or cross-examine defendant. Finally, defendant asserted that plaintiff’s motion

to reschedule the arbitration hearing should have been filed and heard prior to March 5, 2024.

The attachments to defendant’s response to the motion to reconsider included the transcripts of

the hearings conducted on June 25, 2024, and June 28, 2024.

¶ 22 In his reply, plaintiff argued that the lack of an interpreter and the scheduling conflict

were “genuine obstacles” and did not reflect an “intentional disregard for the arbitration

process.” Plaintiff’s counsel represented that he informed plaintiff to not attend the arbitration,

given the judge’s order directing him to proceed with a trial in another matter on that date;

this absence “deprived [plaintiff] of a fair hearing.” The reply further posited that, without a

Spanish interpreter, plaintiff would not have meaningfully participated in the arbitration hearing.

¶ 23 In a written order entered on September 10, 2024, the circuit court denied plaintiff’s

motion to reconsider the prior order debarring plaintiff from rejecting the arbitration award.

Citing Balciunas v. Duff, 94 Ill. 2d 176 (1983), Judge Carmody opined that, as a “successor

[j]udge,” he should exercise “considerable restraint in reversing or modifying previous rulings.”

In the absence of newly discovered evidence, any applicable change in the law or error in the

application of the law, or any additional facts or information which would warrant a modification

or revision of Judge Murphy’s prior order, Judge Carmody declined to reconsider the order.

Plaintiff subsequently filed this timely appeal.

¶ 24 ANALYSIS

¶ 25 Plaintiff advances three primary arguments on appeal. He initially contends that the

arbitration panel violated his right to due process by disregarding the “emergency circumstances”

which allegedly necessitated postponement of the arbitration hearing. Plaintiff further asserts

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that the circuit court abused its discretion by debarring rejection of the arbitration award in the

absence of a finding of bad faith. Finally, plaintiff maintains that the “successor judge”

(Judge Carmody) erred by denying reconsideration and thus upholding the debarment.

¶ 26 As a threshold matter, we observe that plaintiff’s opening brief violates Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which governs the form and content of appellate briefs.

McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12. Among other things, his statement of facts

does not include consistent references to the pages of the record on appeal, and portions of his

argument lack citations to legal authorities. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 27 A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authorities

cited and cohesive legal arguments presented. Bartlow v. Costigan, 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 52.

The parties are reminded that our supreme court rules are not suggestions but have the force of

law and must be followed. Mitchell v. Michael’s Sports Lounge, 2023 IL App (1st) 220011,

¶ 23. Although we may strike portions of a brief or dismiss an appeal due to noncompliance

with the rules (Ittersagen v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 2021 IL 126507, ¶ 37),

the deficiencies of plaintiff’s brief do not warrant such action herein. We turn to the merits.

¶ 28 Arbitration Panel – Due Process

¶ 29 Plaintiff argues that the arbitration panel “violated due process by proceeding without

good cause.” For the reasons discussed below, we reject this contention.

¶ 30 The Illinois Supreme Court Rules have established “a nonbinding, court-annexed

arbitration system to resolve certain civil actions.” State Farm Insurance Co. v. Kazakova, 299

Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1032 (1998). See 735 ILCS 5/2-1001A et seq. (West 2024). See also Ill. S.

Ct. R. 86 (eff. Jan. 1, 1994) through Ill. S. Ct. R. 95 (eff. July 1, 2017). The arbitration herein

was conducted pursuant to this mandatory arbitration program.

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¶ 31 Rule 90, addressing the conduct of a mandatory arbitration hearing, provides in part:

“(g) Compelling Appearance of Witness at Hearing. The provisions of Rule 237, herein,

shall be equally applicable to arbitration hearings as they are to trials. The presence of a

party may be waived by stipulation or excused by court order for good cause shown not

less than seven days prior to the hearing. Remedies upon a party’s failure to comply with

notice pursuant to Rule 237(b) may include an order debarring that party from rejecting

the award.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 90(g) (eff. Feb. 2, 2023).

In this case, defendant sent a Rule 237 notice to plaintiff, which (in pertinent part) compelled

plaintiff’s presence at the arbitration hearing. To excuse plaintiff’s presence at the arbitration

hearing, Rule 90(g) required either a stipulation of the parties or a “court order for good cause

shown not less than seven days prior to the hearing.” Id. Despite the absence of such stipulation

or court order in this case, plaintiff maintains that “it is Illinois common practice and standard to

take into consideration an attorney’s availability, especially in cases that involve hearings or

trials.” To the extent that plaintiff is suggesting that the arbitration panel could have unilaterally

excused plaintiff’s noncompliance with the Rule 237 notice, he has provided no legal support for

this proposition. See Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370 (2010) (noting that “[b]oth

argument and citation to relevant authority are required” under Rule 341).

¶ 32 Plaintiff also cites section 5(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which provides, in part,

that “arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as necessary and, on request of a

party and for good cause, or upon their own motion may postpone the hearing***.” 710 ILCS

5/5(a) (West 2024). As defendant accurately observes, however, the Code of Civil Procedure

expressly states that the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act “shall not be applicable to the

proceedings” under the mandatory arbitration system. 735 ILCS 5/2-1006A (West 2024).

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¶ 33 The remainder of plaintiff’s contentions are equally unavailing. He asserts that the

arbitration panel was provided “three justifiable excuses as to why a continuance was needed, yet

the panel proceeded with the arbitration.” 1 As discussed above, there is no indication that the

arbitration panel had the authority to postpone the hearing. We further observe that the record,

including the uncontroverted affidavit from defendant’s counsel Linehan regarding the

arbitration hearing, suggests that the scheduling conflict of plaintiff’s counsel was not relayed to

the arbitration panel.

¶ 34 Plaintiff also argues that, despite his absence and his counsel’s failure to present a case,

“the arbitration panel pursuant to Illinois [l]aw should have proceeded with [d]efendant’s case

and evidence[;] however, that is not what occurred.” We disagree with this assessment. Without

the presentation of plaintiff’s case in chief to the arbitration panel, defendant had no “case” to

present. Peach v. McGovern, 2019 IL 123156, ¶ 53 (providing that “[i]n an automobile

negligence case, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish a negligence cause of action,” i.e.,

“[t]he plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent and that the defendant’s negligence

was a direct and proximate cause of an injury sustained by the plaintiff”); Government

Employees Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d 930, 934 (2002) (concluding that the

plaintiff “failed to produce the necessary witness and documentation with regard to damages” at

the arbitration hearing and thus “failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence”).

¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we reject plaintiff’s challenges directed against the conduct of

the arbitration panel. We next consider his challenges to the circuit court’s debarment ruling.

1 Although not entirely clear, the brief appears to suggest that the three purported reasons were (a) plaintiff’s language barrier and the lack of an interpreter; (b) plaintiff’s counsel’s scheduling conflict; and (c) the filing of the emergency motion which was scheduled for presentation later that morning. 9 1-24-2055

¶ 36 Circuit Court Ruling

¶ 37 Plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in debarring his rejection of the arbitration

award. The decision whether to debar a party from rejecting an arbitration award rests within the

sound discretion of the circuit court. Easter Seal Rehabilitation Center for Will-Grundy

Counties, Inc. v. Current Development Corporation, 307 Ill. App. 3d 48, 50 (1999). “A court of

review will not reverse a circuit court’s decision to debar a party from rejecting an arbitration

award unless the decision was an abuse of discretion, that is, arbitrary or exceeding the bounds of

reason.” Anderson v. Mercy, 338 Ill. App. 3d 685, 688 (2003).

¶ 38 Plaintiff directs us to Rule 91(b), which provides in part:

“(b) Good-Faith Participation. All parties to the arbitration hearing must participate in

the hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner. If a panel of arbitrators

unanimously finds that a party has failed to participate in the hearing in good faith and in

a meaningful manner, the panel’s finding and factual basis therefor shall be stated on the

award. Such award shall be prima facie evidence that the party failed to participate in the

arbitration hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner and a court, when presented

with a petition for sanctions or remedy therefor, may order sanctions as provided in

Rule 219(c), including, but not limited to, an order debarring that party from rejecting the

award[.]” Ill. S. Ct. R. 91(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

Subsection (b) was added in 1993 due to “complaints by arbitrators that some parties and

lawyers would merely attend but refuse to participate in arbitration.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 91(b),

Committee Comments (adopted June 1, 1993).

¶ 39 Plaintiff contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by debarring rejection of the

arbitration award without a bad-faith finding. As plaintiff correctly observes, a box was checked

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on the arbitration award which stated: “All parties participated in good faith.” Such notation on

the arbitration award is puzzling, given plaintiff’s absence and his attorney Abuzerr’s failure to

proceed at the arbitration hearing. We further note that Rule 91(b) requires the parties to

participate in the arbitration hearing “in a meaningful manner.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 91(b) (eff. Oct. 1,

2021). As the arbitration award indicates that the arbitration hearing commenced at 8:45 a.m.

and concluded one minute later at 8:46 a.m., we would be hard-pressed to characterize any

purported participation therein as “meaningful,” even in the absence of a transcript. See, e.g.,

Saldana v. Newmann, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1099 (2001) (noting that the entry of the written

arbitration award at 8:52 a.m. on the date of the arbitration hearing supported “a reasonable

inference that [t]here was no meaningful participation”).

¶ 40 More significantly, however, the circuit court did not rely on Rule 91(b) as a basis for its

decision. Rather, the circuit court debarred plaintiff’s rejection of the arbitration award based on

Rule 90(g) (discussed above), as a sanction for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a Rule 237(b)

notice to appear. Rule 90(g) and Rule 91(b) set forth separate bases for debarring a party from

rejecting an award. State Farm Insurance Co. v. Gebbie, 288 Ill. App. 3d 640, 642 (1997). See

also State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Trujillo, 2018 IL App (1st) 172927,

¶ 24 (stating that “defendant’s Rule 91(b) arguments are irrelevant to the question of whether

Rule 90(g) sanctions were properly imposed”).

¶ 41 As discussed above, Rule 237(b) provides that “the appearance of a party may be

required by serving the party with notice which designates the person who is required to appear.”

Gebbie, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 642. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 237(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). Rule 90(g) provides

that the remedies for a party’s failure to comply with a notice pursuant to Rule 237(b) include an

order debarring the party from rejecting an award in a mandatory arbitration. Gebbie, 288 Ill.

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App. 3d at 642. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 90(g) (eff. Feb. 2, 2023). Based on our review of the record

herein, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this sanction.

¶ 42 Despite notice pursuant to Rule 237(b), plaintiff did not appear in person at the

arbitration hearing. Under Rule 90(g), the circuit court thus had authority to debar plaintiff from

rejecting the award. Gebbie, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 642. The attendance of attorney Abuzerr did not

preclude the circuit court from entering an order debarring plaintiff from rejecting the award as a

sanction. See Trujillo, 2018 IL App (1st) 172927, ¶ 23; Bachmann v. Kent, 293 Ill. App. 3d

1078, 1081-82 (1997). Furthermore, the requirements of Rule 237(b) would have been satisfied

even if plaintiff had appeared without a Spanish interpreter. E.g., West Bend Mutual Insurance

Co. v. Herrera, 292 Ill. App. 3d 669, 675 (1997) (noting “there is no provision that the witness

provide[s] an interpreter, if one is necessary,” but rather Rule 237 simply requires that a witness

“ ‘appear’ ”). See also Kazakova, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1033 (finding that Rule 237 “requires

defendant to appear, and that is what defendant did”). Simply put, numerous courts have upheld

the imposition of the sanction of debarment based solely on a party’s absence from an arbitration

hearing in violation of Rule 237. Trujillo, 2018 IL App (1st) 172927, ¶ 21 (compiling cases).

¶ 43 We further observe that plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that his

noncompliance “was reasonable or the result of extenuating circumstances,” as provided in

Johnson v. Saenz, 311 Ill. App. 3d 693, 698-99 (2000). The defendant in Johnson traveled to the

courthouse on the date of the arbitration hearing but went to a courtroom in the wrong building

based on a miscommunication with court personnel. Id. at 698. The appellate court held that the

circuit court abused its discretion in barring the defendant from rejecting the arbitration award

where “there was no evidence that defendant’s failure to appear at the hearing was the result of a

deliberate and pronounced disregard for the rules and the court.” Id.

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¶ 44 Unlike the Johnson defendant, plaintiff has failed to show that his noncompliance with

the Rule 237 notice was reasonable or the result of extenuating circumstances. Plaintiff

admittedly did not even attempt to appear at the arbitration hearing and has offered shifting, and

arguably inconsistent, excuses for such absence. For example, his emergency motion to

reschedule the arbitration hearing provided that “counsel is still seeking a Spanish interpreter.”

In his subsequent response to defendant’s motion to debar, plaintiff represented that “the only

reason for a default was due to a scheduling conflict.” The appellant’s brief now posits that

“indeed, a Spanish interpreter could have been secured, however, that places the burden on

[p]laintiff to pay for an interpreter knowing that an arbitration will not take place given that the

lead attorney cannot appear.”

¶ 45 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court’s order debarring plaintiff’s

rejection of the arbitration award did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

¶ 46 Denial of Reconsideration

¶ 47 Plaintiff maintains that the successor judge who denied the motion to reconsider failed to

correct the “misapplication of Rule 91(b)” by the original judge who ordered the debarment.

We reject this contention. As discussed above, the order debarring rejection of the arbitration

award was based on Rule 90(g), not on Rule 91(b). Furthermore, we have concluded that the

circuit court did not abuse its discretion in debarring plaintiff’s rejection of the arbitration award

based on Rule 90(g). Given the absence of any newly discovered evidence, changes in the law,

or errors in the circuit court’s previous application of existing law, we find that plaintiff’s motion

to reconsider was properly denied. See Liceaga v. Baez, 2019 IL App (1st) 181170, ¶ 25. See

also In re Marriage of Zander, 273 Ill. App. 3d 669, 673 (1995) (noting that the respondent was

not entitled to a new trial “if happenstance or court procedure requiring the rotation of judges

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prevents the original judge from presiding over post-trial motions”).

¶ 48 CONCLUSION

¶ 49 For the reasons discussed herein, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is

affirmed in its entirety.

¶ 50 Affirmed.