Quintana v. Gibson

113 Cal. App. 4th 89, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898, 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9646, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 12120, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1665
California Court of Appeal·Decided November 6, 2003·No. No. B162688·Published·Cited by 9 cases

Opinion

Opinion

GRIGNON, J.

Plaintiff and appellant Michael Quintana appeals from a postjudgment order granting a motion for entry of satisfaction of judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Gregg Whitaker Gibson in this action for damages arising from an automobile accident. Plaintiff’s medical expenses were paid by his employer’s workers’ compensation insurer. Defendant’s liability insurer paid the workers’ compensation lien and offered to settle with plaintiff for $5,000, which plaintiff accepted. Judgment was entered pursuant to the settlement agreement. Defendant’s liability insurer mailed plaintiff a check for the difference between the amount of the settlement and the amount of the workers’ compensation lien ($2,146). Plaintiff refused to accept the check. Defendant demanded plaintiff accept the check in full satisfaction of the judgment. Plaintiff refused to sign an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment. Defendant moved for an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment. The trial court granted defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff contends defendant failed to comply with the demand requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050 prior to moving for entry of satisfaction of judgment. Defendant argues that a noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050 is not the sole method of obtaining an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment. In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude the noticed motion procedure set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050 is the exclusive method for obtaining an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment, but defendant’s failure to comply with the procedure did not result in any prejudice to plaintiff under the facts of this case. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address plaintiff’s remaining contentions, including his contention that defendant was required to pay a proportionate share of plaintiff’s attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. We affirm on condition that defendant pay his proportionate share of plaintiff’s attorney fees.

[92] FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND*

DISCUSSION

I.-II

Footnotes

Quintana v. Gibson, 113 Cal. App. 4th 89, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898, 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9646, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 12120, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1665 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).

113 Cal. App. 4th 89 (Quintana v. Gibson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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